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This is an approach to theology which defines the theological enterprise as fundamentally 
anthropological; theology is viewed as a human creative and imaginative process, subject to 
historical and cultural conditioning, rather than an exposition of absolute truths encapsulated in 
doctrine or dogma. Within this structure, I locate the theology of Professor John Hick and examine 
the development, consistency and coherence of his theology of religious pluralism, with particular 
regard to his distinction between literal truth and mythological truth in relation to the doctrine of 
Incarnation. I argue, with Hick, that some Christian doctrines, such as that of Incarnation, are no 
longer religiously meaningful when interpreted as literal truth, and act as a barrier to tolerance and 
harmony between world faiths. Kant's philosophy, which has been very influential upon Hick's 
work, provides a philosophical basis from which religious traditions can examine ethical issues of 
common concern. 
I argue that Christianity should welcome Hick's suggestion of systematic moral criticism of its own 
inherited doctrines, and link his work with that of Paul Knitter and Latin American theologians, 
Jon Sobrino and J. Luis Segundo, who have worked towards a more precise agenda of shared 
ethical concerns. I suggest a synthesis of secular and religious moral philosophy, to provide a 
theoretical framework for this agenda. Refuting the views of those such as MacIntyre and D'Costa, 
who argue that moral codes are tradition specific, I claim that a shared common morality is 
capable of transcending doctrinal differences. 
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Introduction 
In a world that is self-consciously pluralist, efforts towards collaboration among world religions 
must be made in the full confession that religious disputes, both now and in the past, have 
contributed devastatingly to the division in humankind. It must therefore be the most pressing 
theological issue of our time, to lessen this division. IMis thesis asks, is there potential for 
Christianity to see itself as one among many world religions, as an expression of human religiosity 
within a particular cultural and historical enviromment, on an equal basis with other world faiths? 
It is therefore an examination of Christianity's relationship with other religions which starts with 
the premise that it is possible, indeed, essential, to work towards answering this question in the 
affirmative. 
Professor John Hick is, possibly, the best known as well as the most controversial representative 
of the pluralist position. His pluralist model for the theology of religions involves a radical 
revision of Christian self-understanding; as such it has inevitably been the focus of criticisms and 
it must form a central part of this study to explore how successfully he has overcome these. 
However, given the presupposition of this thesis, that theologians' views are grounded in their 
approach to the questions raised by their historical and cultural experience, it would be impossible 
to explore Hick's religious pluralism without first examining certain fundamental aspects of his 
theological thinking. Thus, I commence with an examination of Hick's theology of religious belief, 
grounding it within the frarnework of an anthropological approach to theology. I shall also attempt 
to demonstrate that his religious pluralism is rooted in, and consistent with, a Kantian 
philosophical framework regarding the derivation of human faith and knowledge. In chapter 21 
attempt, not to defend Hick's "Copernican Revolution" and its subsequent developments directly, 
but to suggest that the thinking of some exclusivist and inclusivist theologians may be inconsistent 
with their own concessions to historical and cultural relativism. This will be attempted with 
reference to the theologies of Lesslie Newbigin and Karl Rahner. Part I is concluded with an 
examination of Hick's revision of traditional Christology; it is my purpose to demonstrate that 
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Hick's interpretation of religious language and thought forms in terms of a mythological 
conception of the doctrine of Incarnation is compatible with essential Christian beliefs, and that 
critics have failed to demonstrate the sense in which the concept of mythological truth is 
unacceptable to Christianity. 
Part 2 is concerned with some of the problems relating to religious pluralism. I argue against the 
criticism that the "Copernican Revolution" is unacceptable to non-theistic faiths and that Hick 
overlooks, or minimizes the difficulties inherent in genuinely conflicting truth claims. I also 
examine the apparent contradiction in Hick's theology regarding the cognitive status of religious 
language and eschatological verification, arguing that his notion of mythological truth is compatible 
with cognition; this will involve an examination of Hick's most recent major contribution to the 
theology of religious pluralism, to be found in "An Int=retation of Religion - Human Responses 
to the Transcendent", published in 1989.1 conclude with suggestions supporting the possibility of 
a viable theology of religious pluralism based on moral criteria, looping back to Hick's argument 
for rational theistic belief based on Kantian insights into the innate moral awareness of humanity. 
Moral criteria, while not admitting of absolutes, open up the possibility of inter-religious dialogue 
on an equal basis, for they allow for a greater degree of objectivity than religious truth claims and 
thus provide a yardstick by which the truth claims of the phenomenological religions may be 
judged - In support of this thesis, I shall 
draw upon the work of Paul Knitter and Latin American 
theologians such as Juan Luis Segundo and Jon Sobrino, who have advanced further than Hick in 
forming an agenda of shared ethical concerns among the world faiths. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Anthropological Approach in relation to the Philosophy and Theology of John Hick 
One of the great paradoxes of the world's religious traditions is that while each began with a claim 
to direct, ummediated knowledge of God, or infallible insight into the true nature of reality, each, 
nevertheless, affirms an ultimate agnosticism about the nature of God, or that which is ultimately 
real. Within Christianity this was expressed by St. Thomas Aquinas at the beginning of the 
"Summa Theologiae" by the statement that we cannot grasp what God is but only what he is not, 
and how things are related to him. Even though we may truly say of God that he is "good" or 
"merciful" these constructs cannot mean what we understand them to mean, for they are simply 
human language constructs which function as an analogue rather than a true correspondence to 
what God is. 1. From a very different tradition, that of Advaitin Hinduism, Sankara held that 
Brahman without attributes, "nirguna Brahman, " is the highest reality towards which we reach, 
but can never grasp. 2. Intrinsic to religious belief is the tension between scriptural revelation, 
viewed as an absolute, and the ineffability or unknowability of the reality affirmed by that same 
scripture. How far, then, are we to regard Christian revelation, or any other religious knowledge 
which claims to derive from revelation, as a "given; " how far are we to acknowledge that 
agnosticism is a genuinely religious insight? A religious perspective which retreats into notions of 
the total ineffability of God or the inapprehensibility of reality must run the grave risk of lapsing 
into incoherence, for that which is properly ineffable cannot be talked about. This study is an 
attempt to drive a wedge between the polarity of approaches to theology exemplified by the 
seemingly contradictory concepts of revelation and agnosticism. I shall argue for their non- 
contradiction and ultimate compatibility, although this will involve some revision of the concepts 
themselves. 
The basic presupposition of this study, and its starting point, is that theology is essentially a 
human activity; it may be defined as an attempt to understand the fundamental nature of reality 
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in terms of the referent of religious faith, but the theologian or believer who engages in the 
theological enterprise remains a human thinker, inevitably subject to the conditioning of his or her 
own experience and the tradition of rationality which shapes the interpretation of experience. 3. 
Such a view of theology may be regarded as a denial of the belief that theology is a "given, " that 
knowledge of God is direct, unconditioned and initiated by God himself in such a way that it is 
beyond dispute. 4. An anthropological understanding of theological thinking predetermines that 
a certain tension must arise between the relative and the absolute; though the object of the study 
may properly be regarded as in some sense absolute [whether it is defined as a personal God or 
as impersonal Ultimate Reality] the human apprehension of this absolute is relative to the 
experience and cultural conditioning of the theologian and believer. 
The difference between these views of the nature of theology itself may be regarded as the root 
cause of the difference between the extremities of Christian response to other world faiths. In 
recent times, such responses have been labelled according to the three categories of exclusivism, 
inclusivism and pluralism. It is not always easy, however, to categorize theological thinking in 
these terms, and there is some disagreement among theologians themselves, in categorizing the 
thinking of others. 5. Broad categories do not always do justice to the range of theological thinking 
that is discernible, though the very existence of such a range of human thinking may be seen as 
supporting the idea that theology itself is anthropological in character. Generally speaking, 
however, the pluralist position may be defined as an acknowledgement that faiths other than 
Christianity may be seen, equally, as salvific paths to God, and that there are good theological and 
phenomenological grounds for rejecting the Christian claim to be the only true faith [exclusivism] 
or the culmination and fulfilment of other faiths [inclusivism. ] The pluralist model itself, as I shall 
attempt to demonstrate, draws heavily on an acknowledgement of the human character of 
theological thinking and on historical and cultural relativism to support its stance in relation to 
world faiths. 
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Professor John Hick is, possibly, the best known as well as the most controversial representative 
of the pluralist position. His pluralist model for the theology of religions involves a radical 
revision of Christian self-understanding; as such, it has inevitably been the focus of criticism. Hick 
has revised and redefined his position on many occasions up to the present time in order to answer 
such criticisms; it will form a central part of the focus of this study to explore how successfully 
he has achieved this. However, given the presupposition of this study, that theologians' views are 
grounded in their approach to the questions raised by their own historical and cultural experience, 
it would be impossible to explore Hick's religious Pluralism without first examining the nature of 
his theological thinking in its broadest sense. In the case of Hick, the central concern of the first 
part of his academic life was to explore the viability and coherence of Christian belief in the light 
of questions raised by contemporary western philosophy. Thus, in his philosophical theology, the 
relationship between faith and knowledge is of crucial importance and it will be necessary to define 
precisely what Hick means by these constructs in order to try to do justice to his theological 
thinking and to determine how far it may properly be placed within the framework of "an 
anthropological approach to theology. " Firstly, however, it is necessary to examine this approach 
in rather more detail, primarily to refute certain misconceptions that may arise as to its nature and 
scope. 
1. The Anthropological approach to Theology and Theological Realism 
What the anthropological approach to theology, as I understand it, will not do, is to deny the 
existence of the objective reality, the "given", which Christianity calls God. The kind of 
agnosticism I am seeking to outline is not one which leaves us in a total void, claiming we can say 
nothing about the nature of religious truth. [Were it to do so, it could scarcely be called theology. ] 
As stated above, an understanding of theology which rests upon notions of the total ineffability 
of God, or reality, is ultimately self-refuting and lapses into incoherence. The kind of agnosticism 
am thinking about functions, rather, as a filter or qualifier upon our present, limited 
apprehensions of what we believe to be religious truth. It admits that theological statements must 
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inevitably be tentative, exploratory and subject to revision in the light of the development of 
human knowledge, and that the probability is that theology will always entail unsolved puzzles and 
messy, complex arguments. It will be compatible with what Hick has called "a religious, but not 
confessional interpretation of religion in its plurality offorms. " 6. [my emphasis] and with his 
more recent statement that theology is, ultimately, a creation of the human mind. 7. It will be 
necessary, presently, to attempt to define the concept of "an acceptable religious agnosticism" 
more closely, within the context of an anthropological approach to theology. 
From the outset it must be made clear that the anthropological approach to theology does not entail 
a non-realist conception of what we in the west call God: it denies the Feuerbachian view that 
religion is nothing more than the projection of idealized human values. It rejects Feuerbach's 
understanding of religion which states that, 
"... Consciousness of God is self-consciousness, knowledge of God 
is self-knowledge. By his God thou knowest the man, and by the 
man his God; the two are identical. Whatever is, God to a man, 
that is his heart and soul; and conversely, God is the manifested 
inward nature, the expressed setf of a man. " 8. 
Equally, it is a denial of Barth's critique of Feuerbach that, 
"... a theology which uses human reasoning about human 
experiences will never get beyond the human to the divine; the 
only way to avoid the Feuerbachian reduction of theology into 
anthropology is for theology to be derived wholly from divine 
revelation. " 9. 
It seeks to drive a wedge between these opposing theological views, although its starting place, 
certainly, is that we cannot begin from elsewhere than with ourselves, our questions and structures 
of understanding. I shall argue, however, that to affirm a Feuerbachian starting point to theological 
enquiry is by no means necessarily to arrive at Feuerbachian conclusions about the nature of 
religious belief. 
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Feuerbach's charge that language about God is a projection of the idealized qualities of human 
beings has two main implications, firstly, that talk about God is fundamentally anthropomorphic, 
and secondly and more seriously, [for the theist] that "God" does not exist as a mind-independent 
reality, but merely as a human invention or projection. This, for Feuerbach is because "there is 
no distinction between the predicates of the divine and human nature therefore there can be no 
distinction between the divine and human subject. " 10. Efforts to distinguish between theology and 
anthropology are therefore doomed to failure. 
As regards the first criticism, we need have no hesitation in conceding that Feuerbach is basically 
correct, for human language is the only "tool" available to human beings to conceptualize reality. 
Words are symbols of reality, and humans cannot do otherwise than to construct descriptions of 
God, or that which they believe to be ultimately real, by means of the tool which functions to 
order, conceptualize and communicate experience and understanding. Some degree of 
anthropomorphism is inevitable, unless theologians are to speak of God as "totally ineffable" or 
it utterly other", which, as stated above, effectively means there is nothing further that can be said 
about Him/It, and so closes the theological enquiry before it has got off the ground. au 
However, since the time of Feuerbach, it has been recognised by some theologians that language 
about God is fundamentally symbolic, and that in order to be meaningful, such symbols must be 
linked to some non-symbolic referent. This is why Tillich, for example, while holding that "any 
concrete assertion about God must be symbolic" relates all such symbolic statements to a totally 
abstract, non-symbolic concept, God as "being itser. 11. I. T. Ramsey, also, has sought to refute 
the Feuerbachian charge of anthropomorphism by pointing out that certain words, "infinite" 
[infinite love] "perfect" [perfect wisdom] and so on, act as "qualifiers" and function in such a way 
as to distinguish predicates of God from predicates which apply equally to the human, for no-one 
would think of ascribing "infinite love" or "perfect wisdom" to a human subject. 12. If we avoid 
using predicates of God which are identical to those used of the human, we refute the 
Feuerbachian charge of non-distinction, which lies at the heart of his criticism of the absurdity of 
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religious language, although we would have to concede the inevitability of some degree of 
anthropomorphism. 
Secondly, it may be argued that epistemological solipsism is not the inevitable consequence of the 
fact that we describe things in terms of our apprehension and experience in historically and 
culturally relative situations. What we consider ourselves to know is at least partially the result of 
our experience and is linked to what we know of ourselves, but it does not follow that this 
knowledge is therefore limited or constricted in some kind of capsule of self-knowledge. Initially, 
the human infant seems to be largely unaware of the distinction between "self' and "not-self' but 
rapidly grows to an awareness of his or her separateness from the context in which he or she 
exists. From this sense of self radiates our awareness of things and persons which are not-self. A 
non-solipsist view normally develops in the human individual in response to perceptual experience 
of his or her environment and other persons in it; were it not to do so, were the individual 
seriously to adhere to a solipsist alternative, that person might well be counted as insane, for 
solipsism would radically disorientate relationships with other persons in the shared environment. 
Such an individual would be incapable of interpersonal relationships, being unable to see other 
persons as independent conscious beings with separate desires, views, wills and purposes 
independent of their own. Although our ways of understanding and interpreting start with 
ourselves, it does not follow that theological understanding must be restricted to understanding 
only the structures of rationality which govern them, or the self which possesses them. To argue 
otherwise is as fallacious as saying that my present awareness that it is raining outside tells me 
only about myself. Every time we attempt to understand other persons' arguments or empathise 
with the situation they find themselves in, we are in fact recognising the limitations of individual 
experience and using a projective method of human understanding to reach beyond our own 
experience, although our own experience functions as a filter or qualifier in relation to the data 
received - To affirm the Feuerbachian. starting point to a theological enquiry, or any other enquiry, 
is not to concede the truth of solipsism, nor need it be the case that projective methods of human 
understanding cannot lead us to important theological insights. 
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Hick himself has written of Feuerbach, 
"... whereas his presentation of the broad hypothesis is vivid and 
memorable ... his specific arguments are generally lading in 
rigour, their logical gaps being filled by positions in nineteenth- 
century idealist thought which may well have seemed seýf-evident 
to Feuerbach and many of his contemporaries but which have 
since lost much of their plausibility. " 13. 
Nevertheless, his view of Feuerbach's thinking is not entirely negative, for, as he understands it, 
Feuerbach's critique was primarily directed towards organised religion as negating human love as 
a universal principle and promoting exclusiveness between members of particular groups. 
"... Whereas love is universal, making no distinction between person and person, faith as the belief- 
system of a particular group is divisive, creating hostility between believers and unbelievers. " 14. 
However, although he has a considerable appreciation of what he has called Feuerbach's "noble 
vision" he rejects the conclusions he reached as regards the non-realist nature of faith assertions, 
as we shall see when we come to examine Hick's own theology of the nature of religious belief. 
2. The Anthropological Approach and the primacy of Human Reason 
It may be argued that in the modern post-critical period, few, if any, theologians deny that 
theology is essentially a human activity, and that the claim to direct, unconditioned knowledge of 
God, or infallible insight into the nature of reality is an anachronism. Nevertheless, I would argue 
that this is not always the case, as exemplified by Barth's critique of Feuerbach, above. Barth has 
clearly stated that, "... knowledge of God is knowledge completely effected and determinedfrom 
the side of its object, from the side of God. " 15. Although he qualifies this with the statement, 
11 of course it remains a relative knowledge, a knowledge imprisoned within the limits of the 
creaturely, " 16. it is clear that for Barth, the starting point for the quest for knowledge is the 
object of that knowledge, God himself. More recently, this approach to theology has been 
advocated by Torrance, who believes we cannot and should not attempt to start with ourselves, 
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our questions and tentative human conceptions of God, for knowledge of God must be determined 
by God's own modes of self-disclosure. Torrance re ects, the method of theological enquiry which j 
starts with such questions as "how can God be known? " as "unscientific. " 
"In scientific theology we begin with the actual knowledge of God, 
and seek to test and clarify this knowledge by inquiring carefully 
into the relation between our knowing of God and God Himseýf in 
His being and nature ... How God can be known must be 
determined from first to last by the way in which He actually is 
7-- 
known. 
This approach, I will argue, is to be rejected, since it depends on an absolutist approach to 
reve ation and seems to deny a proper role to human reason and human experience in interpreting 
that revelation. Revelation, I shall argue, should be viewed as a fallible and developing human 
response to the divine "voice"; no revelation can exist without a human recipient to receive it, and 
it is impossible for the recipient to do otherwise than start with his or her attempts to interpret that 
"voice. " Revelation and religious experience, I shall argue, are reciprocal; revelation takes place 
within the confines of human experience and is importantly conditioned by that experience and 
interpreted by reason; it is not in itself a separate category of knowledge apart from experience. 
18. Thus I shall argue for a Feuerbachian starting point to the theological enquiry, for to do 
otherwise is to abandon the primacy of the role of rational reflection in theological understanding. 
The acceptance of Feuerbach's starting point need not, I repeat, involve accepting the atheistic 
conclusions he arrived at. Barth and Torrance, it may be argued, represent the extremity of those 
who hold an absolutist approach to revelation, as opposed to the anthropological approach, which 
rejects revelation as a distinct category of knowledge aside from human experience. Is there 
nothing in between? Certainly there is, and the "middle road" would be that travelled by most 
theologians. Nevertheless, to travel at all is to commence from some starting point, and each of 
us can only commence from where we are. It seems sensible, therefore, to move from what is 
familiar, [human reason and experience] to the relatively distant [Ultimate Reality] simply because 
this is the only means available to us, beyond and apart from our earliest religious affiliations, 
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which, as Hick has argued, may be very much the products of the accident of birth and subsequent 
religious conditioning. 19. Hick himself argues for the primacy of human reason in the theological 
enquiry in the following way; 
"... we can never properly be more certain of the truth of a 
revealed proposition than of the soundness of our reasons for 
classifying it as revealed. We cannot claim that the revelation 
once accepted is seýf-guaranteeing, for its guarantee is only valid 
if it is indeed a genuine revelation and whether this is so must 
first be decided by reason. In short, faith defined as the 
acceptance on God's authority of propositions which he has 
revealed, presupposes the two prior convictions [a] that there is 
a God and W that he has made the revelations alleged. And so 
we are thrown back upon the more fundamental problem of our 
cognition of the divine Being himsetf and his revealing activity. " 
20. 
To deny that reason should be the starting point for theological enquiry is to leave believers and 
prospective believers with no way of judging between truth and untruth, between justified and 
unjusti ed assertions of religious faith and between the credible and the incredible, apart from 
what many would consider to be the highly unsatisfactory means of private or corporate 
illumination. To assert that human reason must be our starting point and yardstick for discerning 
religious truth may seem unwarrantably arrogant, but it is preferable to the promotion of some 
kind of religious supernaturalism that is beyond being reasonably examined and therefore cannot 
be reasonably justified. Therefore, for all its limitations, human reason must be our only means 
of reaching an intellectually respectable understanding of theology, and should be the starting point 
of the enquiry. That reason is the starting point need not and does not predetermine what our 
theological conclusions will be, although it does presuppose that they are likely to be tentative and 
open to further revision in the light of increased human knowledge. What we will be looking for 
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is some meeting point between reason, experience and alleged revelation, where properly 
considered assent may be given. 
3. The Anthropological Approach and its Historical and Cultural Backgroun 
It will be apparent, from the above, that the anthropological approach to theology is rooted not 
only in an acknowledgement of the human character of theological thinking, but in associated ideas 
of the importance of historical and cultural relativism in the enquiry. It would be no exaggeration 
to say that the rise of the historical /critical method in relation to the documentary sources of 
religions, and a general critical consciousness which has emerged since the Enlightenment, have 
revolutionized attitudes towards religions as grounded in definitive and unchangeable authority. 
The historical /critical approach involves the acceptance of certain principles of methodology; 
Troeltsch, perhaps more than anyone else, has outlined the nature and consequences of historical 
consciousness and the use of the historical method. 21. 
Firstly, the principle of criticism predetermines a certain scepticism, which disinclines the 
individual to accept what he or she is told, but, as far as possible, seeks verification of this against 
documentary sources and other available evidence. 22. Secondly there is the principle of analogy, 
which works on the assumption that general characteristics of the present time must also have 
applied to the past. The interrelatedness of history has been emphasised by Troeltsch. 
"... Biblical scholarship has been compelled, bit by bit, of its own 
accord, to illuminate the beginnings of the religion of Israel by 
analogies from the religions of other Semitic peoples; to connect 
the deep original transformation brought about by Yahwistic 
religion with the general situation in the world of the near East 
and to illuminate the rise of the Christian church by the 
interaction between earliest Christianity and its setting within the 
Roman Empire. " 23. 
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Thirdly, the principle of correlation requires that historical reports from a particular time and place 
must be correlated with others from a similar context and subjected to the same sort of 
exmnination. This principle operates on the basis of an acceptance that all events which take place 
in time are intrinsically interconnected in correlation with each other, and that all events are 
relative to one another. 24. Once this methodology is accepted it becomes impossible to treat the 
scriptures of one particular tradition [ie. one's own] as absolutely authoritative and indisputable, 
whilst critically analysing others. 
The ultimate result of such methodology, as far as Christianity is concerned, has been to 
undermine certainty in what Jesus said, or taught, or even who he actually was. The subject of 
Christology is one we will examine in much greater detail at a later stage, in relation to Hick's 
revision of traditional Christological affirmations. At this point, I wish simply to defend the 
legitimacy of the historical /critical method, while acknowledging its limitations. Contrary to what 
some theologians seem to be suggesting at the present time, certain limitations are well recognized 
by historians and form part of the self-understanding of the methodology itself. There is, for 
example, an explicit recognition within history, that human events, once past, are past and gone. 
No conscientious modern historian would claim to do more than reconstruct events of the past; 
such reconstructions, being no more than approximations of the events themselves, do not profess 
to be the totality of the truth of the events. Furthermore, it is recognized that all events of the past 
are humanly interpreted in two ways. Firstly, they are interpreted by the historian; however 
objective he or she attempts to be, the historian will inevitably start the enquiry with some 
presuppositions about what actually took place. Secondly, and more seriously from the point of 
view of orthodox Christian theology, the historical /critical method recognizes that all documents, 
including scriptural documents, are conditioned by the age and circumstances in which they were 
written. They are after all the products of human writers who, at the very least, made some 
decisions about what was important enough to be written down and what could be left out. The 
nub of the matter, from the historian's point of view, is that the quality of the historical 
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reconstruction will depend very much upon the quality and quantity of the documentary evidence 
available, for it is from this, and nothing else that the historical reconstruction derives. 
As we shall see in a later chapter, neither the quality nor the quantity of the documentary evidence 
relating to the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth is particularly satisfactory from a strictly 
historical point of view, thereby considerably restricting what can be said, with any certainty, 
about the historical Jesus. None of this is denied by serious practitioners of the historical /critical 
method. Historical evidence, taken on its own, could never prove the necessity or otherwise of the 
Incarnation as an appropriate interpretation of the life of Jesus; it would be beyond the scope of 
the methodology to do so. What it could do, and arguably ought to do, is to provide a solid 
substructure of evidence to point to the Incarnation as the only reasonable and complete human 
interpretation of Jesus' life and work. Whether it actually does so is, as we shall see in a 
subsequent chapter, the subject of continuing debate. 
On the other hand, it can scarcely be denied that, historically, there has been in Christianity a 
belief in, and reliance upon the authenticity of scriptural evidence, which has served to underpin 
the Church's faith, and has given an absolutely authoritative status to scripture. Hick has noted 
that the acceptance of historical research in relation to Jesus' self-testimony is a recent 
development. 
"It is worth noting that this is a fairly recent movement within 
traditional orthodoxy. For some seventeen centuries it was 
believed that Jesus did claim to be God incarnate, and Fourth 
Gospel sayings such as such as "I and my Father are one ", "He 
that has seen me hath seen the Father", were treated as historical 
sayings of Jesus. 
Today even conservative [other than fundamentalist] exegetes 
grant that this cannot be sustained. Yhere has thus been a major 
shift from believing that Jesus was God because he said so, to 
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believing it because the New Testament is sometimes close to 
saying so, to believing it because the Church came to say so ". 25. 
It is difficult to over-estimate the significance of this shift which, perhaps, is the root cause of a 
certain defensiveness discernible in the attitudes of some theologians towards the historical /critical 
method. Loughlin, for example, states that, "... historical criticism has a limited vocabulary; it is 
able to describe only certain things and certain aspects of things and divinity is not one of them. " 
26. 
This, as I have stated, would be accepted by serious historians of religion. Loughlin feels unable, 
however, to dispense with the historical method, for, 
"... it is correct that theology use historical criticism in order to 
curb possible docetic tendencies as well as to act as a check on 
Christological affirmation, but not as more than a check, such 
that Christology is abused by it. " 27. 
Indeed, it is very far from easy for Christian theology, having grounded itself in the authenticity 
of its scriptural roots throughout the centuries, to claim in the contemporary period that it can 
dispense altogether with the historical method, and "float free" from its historical and scriptural 
origins. But what does Loughlin's idea of a "check on Christological affirmations" amount to? In 
fact, very little, for on further examination it appears that for Loughlin, historical criticism can 
only act as a check in sofar as it does not undermine his own Christological presuppositions, which 
rest on the fact that, "... one is either convinced that the development of the doctrine was 
providential or one is not. " 28. 
This does no more than pay lip service to historical methodology; if it does not support traditional 
Christology, but, in Loughlin's terminology "abuses it". it is to be rejected. In other words, 
historical methodology is tantamount to being an "abuse" if it does not find what Loughlin wants 
it to find. The truth of Loughlin's attitude towards historical criticism is exemplified by the 
statement, "... the incarnation of God in Jesus of Nazareth is not something that can be seen simply 
Page 20 
by using the tools of historical criticism; it could not be seen then by those who simply looked and 
stared. " 29. 
The implication seems to be that historians of religion simply "look and stare"; as stated above, 
they do not do so, they interpret events, in the consciousness that their reconstructions are always 
interpretations, and limited to the extent that they are based on such documentary evidence as is 
available, and on nothing else. But then so do theologians interpret events, on the basis, in this 
particular case, of their own conditioned thinking, for "one is either convinced that the 
development of the doctrine was providential or one is not. " 30. 
One cannot help but wonder whether the backlash of criticism towards historical methodology is 
not in part due to the fact that it has not "produced the goods" some theologians would have liked 
it to produce, but has, on the contrary, undermined the sense of certainty engendered by the 
Church on the basis of apparently irrefutable scriptural evidence. Without this, Loughlin is forced 
into a "miracle of illumination" kind of theology: 
"..., for theology - as the setf-understanding of the Christianfaith - 
must accept, as a truth of the life it serves, that its own 
knowledge of God is God's seýf-saying in the life and death of 
Jesus Christ. Mus it is sufficient theological refutation of Hick's 
assertion to say that, if God was incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth, 
then that is what God could [and did] do. " 31. lLoughlin's 
emphasis. ] 
This, ultimately, is a theological assertion, rather than a theological argument, and could only be 
considered "sufficient theological refutation" within the very narrow confines of a Christian 
theology which presupposes the unique status of Christian revelation. This understanding of 
theology is not one to which an anthropological approach would subscribe. More importantly, it 
is the kind of approach to theology which has been considerably undermined by the 
historical /critical method, which concerns itself not only with the particularities of specific 
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historical data, [eg. the New Testament documents] but with the cultural conditioning of revelation 
in general, and the cultural conditioning of subsequent theological thinking. 
As far as revelation is concerned, a reductionist view, acceptable to the anthropological approach 
to theology, is that revelation is importantly conditioned by the time and place in which it 
occurred. Revelation takes place within the particularities of history, to particular people and in 
culturally and historically specific situations, in answer to specific questions it was intended to 
provide the answers to. Revelation is further conditioned by the understanding and apprehensions 
of the recipient of the particular revelation, for God can only be apprehensible in so far as 
He/She/It is relevant to, and can be interpreted by, human beings in their historical situations. 32. 
In fact the mere possibility of such an occurrence as a revelation is dependent on there being some 
prior understanding and apprehension, on the part of the recipient, of what might be the 
characteristics of God, or ultimate reality, otherwise the recipient would be unable to recognize 
the divinity of the revelation as such. What is true of primary revelation to the great religious 
figures of history is equally true of all subsequent theological reflection. As Pailin has written, 
"... what Ellis, Mansel and Barth found as the revealed "word" seems to readers at later times to 
have been noticeably influenced by their times. " 33. 
This is echoed by Kauftnan. 
"... As our modern historical knowledge vividly shows us, every 
theological Position has always been taken, and every claim has 
been made, by some particular, limited, finite, human being, 
whether named Paul of Tarsus or Yhomas Aquinas or John Calvin 
or Karl Barth. Beliefs about divine inspiration and revelation have 
all too often enabled theologians in the past to obscure this fact 
by claiming that this affirmation or position is grounded directly 
in the very truth of God. " 34. 
In that it starts from, and acknowledges, the limitations of human thinking, the anthropological 
approach to theology denies the validity of any such claims, while affirming nevertheless that 
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theology, as a fundamentally human activity, contains within itself the possibility of reaching 
towards the ultimate meaning and value which is its referent, and which we in the west call God. 
It must be conceded from the outset, however, that the acceptance of the relativity of thought 
cannot exempt these particular reflections, which are likely to be incomplete, tentative and limited 
by the confines of my own particular historical and intellectual perspective. 
4. The Concept of Agnosticism within an Anthropological Framework for Theolog 
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, the anthropological approach to theology affirms an 
ultimate agnosticism about the nature of God, or that which is ultimately real, but states that this 
is a genuinely religious insight, shared by the world's religious traditions in their most profound 
depths of understanding. The kind of agnosticism I am referring to requires some further 
definition, within the context of a theological approach which relies heavily on historical 
consciousness. This kind of agnosticism is neither cynical nor destructive, but acknowledges that, 
in the face of the ultimate mystery of human life and human destiny, theology is a creative but 
humanly limited attempt to grapple with that which we can never claim to understand fully. 
Traditional claims to absolute knowledge of God, or claims that certain religious practices and 
rituals are assured paths to human salvation, constitute an unwarranted and unpardonable human 
arrogance. As Gordon Kaufman has written, 
"... the only possible check against the monumental deceits which 
hwnan religiosity works on our gullibility- and on our desire for 
certainty in a terrifying world- is the constant reminding of 
ourselves that it is indeed mystely with which we humans 
ultimately have to do; and therefore we dare not claim to know 
the right and the true, the good and the real, but must 
acknowledge that in these things we always proceed in faith, as 
we moveforward through life into the uncertainjuture before us. ff 
35. 
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Kaufman's interpretation of the symbolic linguistic construct, "God", as "Ultimate Mystery" 
creates a useful framework from within which this theological enquiry can proceed. We need to 
acknowledge that all our theological constructions, including the construction of the concept of 
God, are products of the human imagination, not in the sense of being "imaginary" or "false" but 
in the sense of being humanly limited. As human constructions, they must always fall short of 
what God is, when God is understood as Ultimate Mystery. Our consciousness of the inscrutability 
of this mystery does not entail, however, that we retreat into nihilism, throwing up our hands in 
despair in the face of our ultimate inability to know all there is to know about the subject of our 
enquiry. Awareness of human limitation must be qualified by awareness of human freedom and 
responsibility to re-orientate and reconstruct values, meanings and purposes for human existence 
in the highly problematic and complex world in which we live. Historically, the religions have 
functioned in this way, providing meaningful structures within which men and women have been 
,: A% able to orientate their lives. Theological reconstruction has taken place throughout history [though 
not always self-consciously] in relation to the changing nature of human societies, for structures 
which cease to be relevant to the world in which people find themselves, and which fail to make 
sense of this environment, must ultimately be restructured, or abandoned. As Kaufman argues, 
compellingly, we are fundamentally historical creatures. 36. In our own historical time we are 
moving very rapidly towards an awareness that we live in "one world"; we have crossed the 
threshold of intercultural consciousness. While acknowledging and even celebrating the diversity 
and particularity of the world's great cultures and religious traditions, we have to view them within 
a framework of genuine universalism, and our theological enterprise, if it is to be relevant to the 
world we live in, must reflect this awareness. Tbis, according to Kaufman, is not so much a matter 
of choice, as of necessity, for, 
ff all particular and thus parochial religious and cultural and 
philosophical traditions are now outmoded and superseded to the 
extent that cannot give an adequate or illuminating interpretation 
of our new historical situation, these new sociologicalfacts about 
human life. " 3 7. 
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A theological reconstruction, if it is to function to orientate the lives of human beings as they find 
themselves to be in their own historical time, must approach its task from the perspective of a 
world view which takes into account the evolutionary character of life on earth, and the 
development of human history within that evolutionary framework. 38. 
John lEck's ERistemology of Religjon and the Anthropological Approach to Theology. 
1. The Realist view of the Nature of Religious Languag 
Having made some attempt to outline the parameters of this approach, it is clearly essential to 
examine Hick's epistemology of religion in detail, in order to determine how far his theology may 
properly be regarded as "anthropological" in character. Theology, as understood by the 
anthropological approach, asks, in what ways does a religious perspective provide a rationally 
coherent understanding of the nature of reality, and how are we to assess its claims to truth? 
Theology, clearly, concerns itself with "religions" although it is by no means easy to define what 
is meant by "religion". Well known definitions such as Tillich's idea of "... the state of being 
grasped by an ultimate concern" could encompass a variety of ideologies and religious surrogates, 
including Marxism, secular humanism or even materialism, for what concerns human beings 
ultimately could be conceived in terms of human achievement or human prosperity. 3. Wi in 
this study, however, "religion" is understood as a form of culture in which human beings ask and 
attempt to answer the existential question of the meaning of ultimate reality, presupposing that 
what concerns human beings ultimately has a transcendental dimension beyond the mundane world, 
towards which they are innately orientated. The existential question, which seeks self- 
understanding in relation to the divine reality, can be formulated in a number of ways; why are 
we here? - what is the meaning of life? - what is final human destiny? It is closely related, 
however, to certain other questions centring on the issue of how we relate to one another, thus the 
metaphysical aspect of the existential question has a closely related ethical aspect, and it is with 
this ethical aspect of what are generally known as religions, that we shall eventually concern 
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ourselves, in an attempt to discern commonality Of Structure or goal, towards a viable pluralist 
theology of religions. 
For the present, however, our concern is to determine how far this understanding of religion is 
compatible with Hick's epistemology. At an early stage of his academic career, Hick stated that 
"... there is no universally accepted definition of religion, and quite possibly there never will be. " 
40. 
However, he subsequently proposed a working definition of religion as, 
" ... an understanding of the universe, together with an appropriate 
way of living within it, which involves reference beyond the 
natural world to God or gods or to the Absolute or to a 
transcendent order or process. " 41. 
Thus, he distinguished his understanding of religion from that of the naturalist or humanist. 
However, in his latest seminal work, An InteEpretation of Religion - Human Responses to the 
Transcendent he has broadened his conception of religion by drawing on Wittgenstein's concept 
of family resemblances. 42. He writes, 
it is, I think, illuminating to see the different traditions, 
movements and ideologies whose religious character is either 
generally agreed or responsibly debated, not as exemplifying a 
common essence, but as forming a complex continuum of 
resemblances and differences analogous to those found within a 
family. 0 43. 
It is now his belief that Tillich's concept of "ultimate concern" is appropriate in that it suggests 
the ultimate and abiding importance which is attached to religious symbols, rituals and beliefs, by 
those who count them as religious. 44. However, his stance is unchanged in that he still rejects 
the naturalistic or non-realist interpretation of religion. This is most easily discerned with reference 
to his understanding of faith, as the human response to the divine reality. Faith, as a reference to 
the religious belief and commitment which constitute a person's existential self-understanding, has 
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a complex structure; the components of faith of a typical religious believer frequently include his 
or her value commitments, moral principles, ritual performances and formal or informal 
membership of a community. However, a fundamental component of faith is generally considered 
to be the assent to certain beliefs about what is actually the case, as well as the following of a way 
of life compatible with those alleged truth claims. In other words, ordinarily religious faith has a 
factual element, and the believer gives assent to certain propositions. The claim that religious faith 
and belief include reference to a mind-independent reality does not, however, enjoy universal 
assent, even within western theism. Some philosophers and theologians have claimed that this view 
of faith arises from a false understanding of the nature of religious language. They hold that the 
grammatical structures and apparent references of talk about God are different from their proper 
logical character. Within this understanding, "God" is not the name of a mind-independent reality, 
and talk of God properly refers to values to which the individual gives assent, or functions as a 
cipher for some preferred course of action. Accordingly, Braithwaite has suggested that the 
statement "God is love" is to be understood as "... the expression of an intention to follow an 
agapeistic way of life. " 45. Cupitt claims that the understanding of religious language engendered 
by a non-realist approach actually enhances rather than diminishes the value of the religious 
perspective. His recommendations are, 
to a break with our habitual theological realism, a fidl 
internalization of all religious doctrines and themes, and a 
recognition that it is possible autonomously to adopt religious 
principles and practices as intrinsically valuable. " 46. 
The non-realist view of religious faith, as Hick has noted, is rooted in the Feuerbachian 
understanding of religious language. 47. He commends some insights of contemporary non-realist 
theologians, in particular, their focus on the intrinsic worth of a growth in the human virtues of 
love, compassion and justice, and their insistence that the emphasis on such virtues is not 
exclusively the province of the realist religious world-view, but points, rather, to the autonomy 
of the moral life. 48. He is in agreement, also, with the non-realist stance in respect of the cultural 
conditioning of religious belief and practice. 
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"... 7he relativity of religion to human cultures is today common 
knowledge - though like many other aspects of modern knowledge 
it has had to push its way to general consciousness against the 
weight ofpre-modern dogmas. 49. 
However, in other respects, Hick parts company with the non-realists. Firstly, he has, from an 
early stage in his career, sought to defend the cognitive status of religious language against the 
attack from logical positivism. 50. He has argued that the non-realist interpretation of religious 
language is simply not compatible with what religious believers would want to say about their 
faith, and conflicts with their own understanding of the function of their language. 
"... it seems clear to me that such utterances as "God is a very 
present help in time of trouble, " "Me Lord God omnipotent 
reigneth "... entail [in the case of statements] or presuppose [in the 
case ofprayer] that God exists; and it also seems clear to me that 
normal or typical users of such language have intended this 
entailment or presupposition... Christian language, as the actual 
speech of a living community, presupposes the extra-linguistic 
reality of God. " 51. 
This remains his belief to the present time; 
"... although we cannot look into the minds of the seminal 
religious figures of the past, or of the body of believers ftom 
century to century within the great traditions, it nevertheless 
seems to me transparently evident that they have normally 
understood their own and one another's core language in a realist 
way. " 52. 
Thus Hick has consistently asserted the cognitive status of religious language, firstly because he 
believes a non-realist interpretation of this language says more about what some philosophers and 
theologians want to say of religions, than what religious believers themselves are saying. Secondly, 
he believes that, for all its apparent emphasis upon the intrinsic values promoted by the religious 
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world-view, the non-realist conception spells, ultimately, a picture of deep pessimism. This is 
because, for all but the fortunate few both now and throughout the historical ages, the prospect 
of fulfilling human potential and attaining the spiritual transformation described by the non-realists, 
is exceedingly remote, if not entirely unachievable. Without some sort of immortality or continued 
existence beyond death, affirmed by the world's religious traditions, there is no escaping the 
unpalatable fact that human suffering, poverty, misery and degradation is the reality of existence 
for the vast mass of humanity and the only reality towards which they may look forward. Thus 
Hick has written, 
"... if we think of God's love in concrete terms, as a creative 
purpose seeking an authentically hwnan existence for every 
individual, we are led to see life in a much larger context than 
this earth. For on this earth God's loving purpose succeeds only 
very partially. " 53. 
More recently he has affirmed his continued belief that the fulfilment of human potential, the 
"good news" of which the religions speak, is negated by the non-realist interpretation which in 
reality spells "bad news" for all but the fortunate few. 
"... If that potential is ever to be realised - and that it is to be 
realised is the meaningfor human life of the ultimate goodness of 
the universe - then reality must be structured accordingly. But to 
believe that it is indeed so structured is to construe religious 
language in a basically realist way. " 54. 
Hick is not saying that the non-realist position is necessarily false - it may indeed be the case that 
the unavoidable destiny of the vast majority of human beings is to live in misery and to 
die 
unfulfilled. But he is saying that in its fundamentally pessimistic implications, it fails to 
depict 
the authentic religious message of the faith traditions, and is unintentionally elitist. 55. He has 
been criticized for this statement, in relation to humanism, by Mesle. 56. In reply Hick has 
stressed that he would not wish to suggest that all non-realists are necessarily approving of, or 




Mesle that this would not be true of all humanists, although he believes this criticism may still be 
applicable to some process theodicy. 57. However, whether or not humanists or others approve 
of, or deeply regret, the facts of human suffering or misery, does not alter the truth of Hick's 
observation that such is, manifestly clearly, the lot of the vast mass of humanity. No amount of 
unequivocal repugnance alters the facts of the case. Without some kind of continued existence 
beyond death [denied by religious non-realists and humanists alike] it is impossible to see how the 
religions of the world can be justified in affirming their basically optimistic world-view. It is for 
this reason, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, that the affirmation of continued life after 
death is essential to Hick's theology. 
As outlined above, it has been Hick's concern, throughout his career, to defend the cognitive status 
of religious language against the attack of logical positivism. It will be necessary at a later stage 
to examine his position in this respect, in relation to certain developments in his theology 
regarding the idea of eschatological verification, for here the charge is that he involves himself in 
some contradiction. 58. But clearly, it is Hick's basic belief that the central affirmations of 
religious belief have the logical character of factual assertions which will, ultimately, be shown 
to be true or false. In theory at least, the factual assertions of religious belief are subject to 
verification in after-life experience, as illustrated by the well-known "Celestial City" parable. 59. 
Hick does not reject the propositional basis of religious belief, but his understanding of this takes 
a nuanced form which we shall now examine. 
2. The relationship between Propositional Truth. Experience and Revelation 
In the Twentieth Century, there has been a major assault on the idea of propositional truth in 
religion, not only from those who advance non-cognitive accounts of the nature of religious 
language, but from those who would wish to emphasize the primacy of a personal, experiential 
response to religious truth. In support of the latter stance, Wilfred Cantwell Smith has written, 
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"Truth and falsity are often felt in modern times to be properties 
or functions of statements or Propositions; whereas the present 
proposal is that much is to be gained by seeing them as rather, or 
anyway, seeing them also, and primarily, as properties or 
functions of persons. " 60. 
In Smith's view, religious belief is not simply a static assent to propositions or doctrines deriving 
from propositional truth claims, but a dynamic human interaction and involvement with that which 
is said to be true. Smith's understanding of religious faith places emphasis upon the idea of the 
fundamental religious disposition which is, 
"... an orientation of the personality, to oneseýf to one's 
neighbour, to the universe, a total response; a way of seeing 
whatever one sees and of handling whatever one handles; a 
capacity to live at more than a mundane level; to see, to feel, to 
act in terms of, a transcendent dimension. " 61. 
Hick is in fundamental agreement with this analysis, which sees faith as a cognitive choice, an 
uncompelled response to conscious experience. Such an analysis of faith by no means entails 
. albandoning the notion of propositional truth in religious affirmations; in Hick's view, the 
distinction between propositional and non-propositional truth is not to be seen as an exclusive 
disjunction, an either/or choice. Religious truth is more than an assent to propositions, but it 
presupposes a propositional basis. He is in agreement with H. H. Price, who has noted that even 
a so-called non-propositional view of faith is ultimately dependent on propositional truth. 62.1 
cannot "believe in" my doctor if I did not also "believe that" he exists, similarly, one cannot 
"believe in" God, unless one also "believes that" he exists. Faith is still a propositional activity, 
the propositions arising from within the context of a response to experience. 
Although Hick does not reject the propositional basis of religious faith, his account of it as a 
response through human experience, to divine revelation, has certain implications for his 
understanding of the nature of revelation itself. For Hick, "revelation" is not a body of truths 
about God, it is the self-disclosure of God, his intervention in the sphere of man's existence. God 
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has acted in human history. There is a response, through the mind and feelings, that God has acted 
decisively and that certain events in history can be viewed as salvific events. [Equally, however, 
they could be interpreted in a purely historical, non-theistic sense. ] Hick, whose theology relies 
heavily on Kantian epistemology, emphasizes the interpretative nature of all human experience, 
and holds that the interpretative element cannot be excluded from religious belief. Faith arise from 
the interaction between God's disclosure and the interpretation of this disclosure by the human 
recipient; there are strong connotations of trust and confidence, and an emphasis on "belief in" 
rather than "belief that, " [the acceptance of propositions] in Hick's account of the nature of 
religious belief. Hick confirms his strictly limited understanding of Revelation as authentic 
knowledge in and of itself when he writes, 
"... the uniqueness of the Bible is not due to any unique mode or 
quality of its writing but to the unique significance of the events 
of which it is the original documentary expression, which became 
revelatory through the faith of the biblical writers. As such the 
bible mediates the same revelation to subsequent generations and 
is thus itself revelatory in a secondary sense, calling in its own 
turn for a response offaith. " 63. 
He has argued, further, that Revelation does not provide access to an understanding or knowledge 
which transcends our normal processes of rational thinking. It is worth quoting Hick again on this 
point, since it is of crucial importance to the anthropological understanding of his theology. 
ff 
... we can never properly 
be more certain of the truth of a 
revealed proposition than of the soundness of our reasons for 
classifying it as revealed. We cannot claim that the revelation 
once accepted is self-guaranteeing, for its guarantee is only valid 
if it is indeed a genuine revelation and whether this is so must 
first be decided by reason. In short, faith, defined as the 
acceptance on God's authority of propositions which he has 
revealed, presupposes the two prior convictions [a] that there is 
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a God and 1b] that he has made the revelations alleged. And so 
we are thrown back upon the more fundamental problem of our 
cognition of the divine Being himself and his revealing activity. 11 
64. 
If what Hick is saying is true, Revelation cannot be classed as a separate category of knowledge, 
distinct from reason or experience, for it is in actuality the experience of others passed down 
through the generations and interpreted by each individual by his or her cognitive act of reason. 
This is not, as I understand it, an argument which claims that knowledge of God is possible 
through reason alone, but that reason must always qualify, correct or confirm that which we 
believe to be revealed, which is revealed through the process of religious experience. Revelation 
thus falls into the sphere of knowledge which may properly be described as experiential; it is a 
sub-category of experience, but not a distinct and separate form of authentic knowledge. In 
practice, allegedly revealed knowledge of the divine is conditioned by the ways of thinking of 
those who apprehend it. Therefore, Revelation, in and of itself, cannot be used to shore up 
particular claims for absolute indubitable knowledge of God, for two reasons. Firstly, when 
viewed as a totality, the revelations of the world's faiths present a scenario of contradiction and 
mutual exclusivity. Secondly, there is what Hick describes as the religious ambiguity of the 
universe, which suggests that a naturalistic interpretation of the universe cannot be ruled out on 
rational grounds. 65. It is to this idea of religious ambiguity, which seems to imply a degree of 
religious agnosticism, that we now turn, having analyzed what may be properly be defined as 
Hick's reductionist view of revelation, in conformity with the anthropological approach to 
theology. 
3. The Rationality of Religious Belief 
In summary, it would seem that Hick's understanding of the nature of religious faith hinges on the 
idea of the interpretation of experience. He has written, "... Faith is the interpretative element 
within what the religious man reports as his experience of living in the presence of God. " 66. He 
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emphasizes that this is an epistemological analysis of the nature of religious faith, rather than an 
argument for the validity of that faith: "... the analysis of religious faith as interpretation is not 
itself a religious or an antireligious but an epistemological doctrine. It can with logical propriety 
be accepted ... both by the theist and the atheist. 
" 67. 
In Hick's view, religious faith is both rational and voluntary, however, the reasonableness of faith 
does not derive from the possibility of prior demonstration of the existence of God. For Hick, 
arguments for the existence of God are inconclusive and must necessarily be so, or faith in God 
would be rendered coercive. Hick holds that the epistemic distance between God and man is the 
right distance, and has consistently asserted that the universe, as presently accessible to us, 
"... is religiously ambiguous in that it is capable of being interpreted intellectually and 
experientially in both religious and naturalistic ways. " 68. 
Hick believes that assertions of faith themselves rest upon a particular way of experiencing the 
world. There is he believes, a distinctively religious way of experiencing the world and one's place 
in it. Equally, there is a non-religious way. 69. Faith itself is to be equated with this interpretative 
activity. In fact Hick holds that cognition of every kind involves the interpretation of experience; 
it is worth quoting him at some length on this point, for it forms the cornerstone of his 
epistemology of religion. 
"... Ae knower-known relationship is in the last analysis sui 
generis: the mystery of cognition persists at the end of every 
inquiry - though its persistence does not prevent us from 
cognizing. We cannot exPlain, for example, how we are conscious 
of sensory phenomena as constituting an objective physical 
environment; we just find ourselves interpreting the data of our 
experience in this way. We are aware that we live in a real world, 
though we cannot prove by any logical formula that it is a real 
world. Likewise we cannot explain how we know ourselves to be 
responsible beings subject to moral obligations; we just find 
ourselves interpreting our social experience in this way. We find 
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ourselves inhabiting an ethically significant universe, though we 
cannotprove that it is ethically significant by any process of logic. 
In each case we discover and live in terms of a particular aspect 
of our environment through an appropriate act of interpretation; 
and having come to live in terms of it we neither require nor can 
conceive any further validation of its reality. Yhe same is true of 
the apprehension of God. 7he theistic believer cannot explain how 
he knows the divine presence to be mediated through his human 
experience. Hejustfinds himsetfinterpreting his experience in this 
way. He lives in the presence of God, though he is unable to 
prove by any dialectical process that God exists. " 70. 
Thus for Hick, belief in God is what he has called a foundational natural belief of a kind that 
cannot be argued about in rational discourse. 71. Other such fundamental beliefs are, belief in the 
existence of the external world, the fact that things of the external world will behave as we expect 
them to behave [ie, the law of causation] and the fundamental belief in certain kinds of moral 
truth. These, for Hick, are not matters we can argue about in a rational way, we simply do 
believe, though, in the case of God, our epistemic distance ftom him makes it possible for us not 
to believe in his existence if we so choose. 
In fact, since Hick fully concedes that it is possible to interpret the world naturalistically as well 
as theistically, it would seem that belief in God is considerably less "fundamental" than belief in 
external reality. Belief in God is a disputed matter, whereas despite "Cartesian doubt" all people 
do believe in external reality. This point has been forcibly made by Swinburne. 72. Hick is not 
entirely clear on this point of what may or may not be regarded as a "fundamental belief' of this 
kind, in particular with respect to the idea of the status of ethics in religion and the notion of the 
moral autonomy. In 1970 he outlined an argument for the rationality of belief in God based on the 
facts of moral obligation, which he called "a fatal challenge to humanist philosophy". 73. 
However, he has since acknowledged that belief in objective morality is not entirely inconsistent 
with a naturalistic interpretation of the universe. 74. We shall examine Hick's moral argument for 
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rational theistic belief, and the inconsistencies which may be discerned in the light of his later 
thinking, in the next section. At present, it is my concern to examine in more detail what may be 
regarded as the cornerstone of his defence of the rationality of a religious interpretation of the 
universe; that is, the rationality of religious belief as grounded in experience. 
4. Rational Religious Belief grounded in Religious Ex Zerience 
It is Hick's basic contention that religious belief is grounded in experience, however, as we have 
seen, he also believes that the universe as we presently experience it is religiously ambiguous and 
can be interpreted by the rational human subject in both naturalistic and religious ways. 
"... the universe maintains its inscrutable ambiguity. In some 
aspects it invites whilst in others it repels a religious response. It 
pennits both a religious and a naturalistic faith, but haunted in 
each case by a contrary possibility that can never be exorcised. 
Any realistic analysis of religious belief and experience, and any 
realistic defence of the rationality of religious conviction, must 
therefore startftom this situation of systematic ambiguity. " 75. 
Hick's theology asserts the rationality of religious belief as grounded in experience, and yet also 
A eS conced the possibility that this experience may be mistaken; it is characterized by an affirmation 
of the veridical nature of religious experience and an equal acknowledgement of agnosticism as 
an insight which is central to the religious as well as the non-religious disposition. How does he 
synthesize these seemingly contradictory ideas, while ultimately rejecting a naturalistic 
interpretation of the universe? Hick has posed the question in terms of a synthesis of rationalist 
and empiricist approaches. Given his contention that arguments for the existence of God are 
inconclusive, his question centres upon the rationality of religious belief; is it reasonable for the 
individual to believe in his or her apprehensions of God, on the basis of experience? 76. This, 
Hick clearly states, is not an argument for divine existence, based on experience. The 
proposition, "that God exists, " may be true or false, we have no way of knowing unequivocally. 
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The rationality of belief in a certain proposition is not determined by the truth or falsity of that 
proposition; Hick's referent is to the rationality of belief rather than to the truth or falsity of the 
belief itself. Citing Pascal, it remains his contention that, 
"... the justification of theistic belief does not consist in an 
argment moving directly to the conclusion that God exists but 
rather in an argmentfor the rationality of so believing despite 
the fact that this cannot be proven or shown to be in any 
objective sense more probable than not. " 77. 
Hick's contention is that, given the testimony of certain persons, particularly the great religious 
leaders Jesus, Muhammad, Ramanuja or Guru Nanak, to have experienced their lives as lived in 
the presence of God, it is perfectly rational for them to believe in the reality of God; 
"... for unless we trust our own experience we can have no reason 
to believe anything about the nature, or indeed the existence of the 
universe in which wefind ourselves. We are so made that we live., 
and can only live, on the basis of our experience and on the 
assumption that it is generally cognitive [though perhaps in 
complexly mediated ways] of reality transcending our own 
consciousness. " 78. 
Hick is of course perfectly aware that western philosophy, from the time of Descartes, has been 
unable to prove the existence of external reality, but as has been stated, for him, as for many 
philosophers, the existence of the external world as perceived by our senses is something we 
simply have to believe, not to do so would be entirely irrational. For Hick, the existence of 
external reality is a "foundational natural belief. " Proceeding from this point, Hick concludes that 
the same must be true of first-hand religious experiences of a revelatory character; unless there 
is good reason to doubt the veridical nature of such an experience, the recipient is justified in 
believing it, indeed it would be irrational not to do so. 
Here, Hick is very much in agreement with Penelhum's Parity Argument, and with Swinburne's 
argument based on the "principle of credulity. " 79. Swinburne developed this argument, based on 
Page 37 
the principle that, ordinarily, what seems to be there is there, to an argument based on a "principle 
of testimony", that, ordinarily, people tell the truth. Were this not so, we would be unable to rely 
on the veridical nature of the most commonplace assertions of factual knowledge. The individual 
cannot experience everything there is to be experienced; the totality of human knowledge is based 
upon the general reliability of the testimony of others. Thus, not only is the recipient of religious 
experience justified in believing it, others are also justified, on the basis of his or her testimony, 
unless it can be shown that the believer has a tendency to make unlikely assertions, or is deficient 
in the most ordinary perceptions, or is a consummate liar. Most claims for revelatory experience 
by no means comply with these grounds for scepticism. The Old Testament prophets, Jesus and 
the apostles were persons who seemed more perceptive than their contemporaries, more aware of 
the problems confronting humanity. Mohammed was an exceptional leader and statesman. 80. 
These arguments shore up what is, for Hick, a convincing analysis of the rationality of belief in 
God on the basis of experience. Clearly, however, this analysis does not commit Hick to a 
specifically Christian account of religious belief, for he cites as examples of the "great mahatmas" 
leaders from a variety of world faiths. Thus, his construction of rational theistic belief is pluralist 
in conception and does not restrict him to the traditional Christian approach to Revelation which 
commits the believer to the acceptance of certain propositions about God within the framework 
of Christian Scripture and ecclesiology, not to all and every proposition. 
In agreement with Hick, I would argue that, given the premise that we are justified in believing 
the veridical nature of primary religious experience to exceptional historical persons, we can have 
no grounds in experience for being selective about those testimonies of revelatory experience we 
will believe and those we will not believe. Certainly, the religious tradition we belong to 
frequently requires us to be selective. We will probably find that our particular faith tradition 
requires us to believe that certain persons - not all - have received knowledge of God through 
revelation and that this is affirmed in scripture. Taking a broader view, that revelation occurs 
outside Christian Scripture, we may believe that others have misinterpreted their revelations. But 
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we cannot say we have knowledge gained through experience, which allows us to refute the 
revelations of others. Experience itself does not allow us to refute the first-hand experiences of 
others on the grounds that their experiences do not conform to what we think they ought to be, 
precisely because we have not had these experiences. This point has been forcibly made by Hume; 
ff we cut the ground from under our own feet, and invite the 
sceptics' response if we are selective in our acceptance of the 
first-hand experience of revelation of others, accepting for 
example, the revelation in Jesus Christ but not that of Gautama 
the Buddha, or Muhammad. 81. 
The point that we cannot argue on the basis of experience for the untruth of the religious 
experience of others because we have not had those experiences, must be further developed, and 
defended, particularly in relation to those whose views might be held to be especially inimical to 
the anthropological approach to theology; there might be a wide range of such opposing views, 
from atheists to Barthians. It is my contention that the content of religious experience can only be 
known and authenticated by the individual whose experience it actually is. It cannot be evaluated 
in its entirety by anyone else. The same must be true of all experience, which may be illustrated 
by means of analogy with other, more mundane experiences. I cannot, on the basis of my own 
experience of a caring and fulfilling experience teaching in a school with a religious foundation, 
argue that state schools are, definitively, uncaring or unfulfilling. I cannot, on the basis of a 
healthy life in a temperate climate, reason that life in the tropics is invariably unhealthy. This is 
not, of course, a denial of the truth of my own experience, but an acknowledgement of its 
limitations to me personally. As far as the experience of others is concerned, I am reliant on their 
testimony as regards the authenticity of this experience, through what Swinburne has called the 
principle of testimony. 
But, as Swinburne has pointed out, a great deal of knowledge is ordinarily derived in this way, 
since individual experience is necessarily limited. I do not, if I wish to travel to Watford, take out 
a compass and find that by travelling north I "discover" Watford. I rely on a map, and trust to the 
previous "discovery" and reliability of the testimony of others. The truth of this testimony would, 
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of course, be negated if I were to discover, through my own experience, that the map was 
unreliable, but of course, this is rarely, if ever, the case. How might this analogy be applicable 
to religious experience? Must one therefore, believe indiscriminately in the testimony of others, 
regardless of the nature of their beliefs, or even if their description of experience flatly contradicts 
one's own? 
The human analogy may help to illustrate this point further. Suppose an individual were to tell me, 
on the basis of his or her experience, that they found my husband to be evil and dishonest, 
whereas my experience of him was that he was good and truthful. Such a flagrant contradiction 
in experience must imply that one of us was mistaken, we could not both be right. [The flaw in 
the analogy is its asymmetry; in this case one must suppose that one of us would have greater 
knowledge and experience of the matter than the other, which cannot be presupposed in the case 
of religious experience. ] However, if my partner in dialogue were to affirm that my husband 
seemed to be shy and introverted, whereas I had always found him to be socially adept and an 
extrovert, this would not necessarily imply a flat contradiction, but simply that persons may in 
their human complexity, exhibit a variety of behavioural patterns which may lead them to be 
viewed in a variety of ways by different individuals. 
How might this relate to religious experience? I would suggest that in the case of conflicting 
testimonies of religious experience, we are rarely, if ever, confronted with testimonies of flagrant 
contradiction, one faith contending that God is good and merciful, while another sees Him. /Her/It 
as evil or punitive. [The kinds of conflicts in religious truth claims which do occur, will be the 
subject of later examination. ] We are of course conftonted with testimonies which suggest that 
God, or Ultimate Reality is conceived very differently, as in the basic disagreement between world 
faiths, that God is personal or impersonal. I would argue however, that this does not constitute the 
kind contradiction which must necessarily negate the experience of one or another individual, but 
points, rather, to the variety and diversity of human conceptions of the divine reality. Analogously, 
it is akin to the fact that my husband may be introvert in some situations and extrovert in others, 
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but does not constitute the kind of Contradiction which would exist if it were asserted that he was 
both good and evil or honest and dishonest. 
The idea of the variety and diversity of human conceptions of the divine reality is in conformity 
with Hick's belief that the totality of human experience suggests that God has revealed himself 
partially, in a variety of ways and at a variety of times. 82. The pluralist stance is that, "the great 
world traditions constitute different conceptions andperceptions of and responses to, the Realfrom 
within the different cultural ways of being hwnan. " 83. Further, Hick confirms his own belief that 
we cannot rationally be justified in asserting the veridical nature of our own religious experience, 
while denying that of others; 
"... the kind of rational justification. -for treating one's own form 
of religious experience as a cognitive response- though always a 
complexly conditioned one - to a divine reality must... apply 
equally to the religious experience of others. In acknowledging 
this we are applying the intellectual Golden Rule of granting to 
others a premise which we rely on ourselves ... let us avoid the 
implausibly arbitrary dogma that religious experience is all 
delusory with the single exception of the particularform enjoyed 
by the one who is speaking. " 84. 
What, however, of the atheist who negates the totality of religious experience on the grounds that 
experience simply does not lead him or her to interpret the world religiously? Must not the 
individual who experiences the world religiously [and is entitled to believe in the truth of this 
experienceJ reject this position unequivocally, as being mistaken? I would argue that, given the 
premises of the argument above, and the facts of the religious ambiguity of the universe, it is not 
reasonable to deny the validity of the atheistic experience. Given the primacy attached to the idea 
of the authenticity of experience, this must be applied to a non-religious as well as religious 
interpretation of the universe. One may suspect that, if experience itself involves an act of 
cognitive choice, in freedom, of interpreting the world religiously, the individual may have freely 
chosen to reject a religious interpretation of experience. One may suspect, perhaps on the basis 
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Of knowledge of the individual's character, that he or she has not sufficiently analyzed or plumbed 
the depths of experience. What one cannot do is to assert that the non-religious experience could 
not be true. What is probably more common than committed atheism, is a degree of agnosticism 
which may be religious in character, what Hick has described as, 
"the ordinary believer who does at least have some remote echo 
or analogue within his or her own experience of the more 
momentous experience ofthe great religiousfigures... One's belief 
is not as deeply or solidly grounded as theirs. But I would suggest 
that it is well enough groundedfor it to be reasonable to proceed 
in faith in the footsteps of a great religious leader, anticipating 
the full confirmation which our faith will ultimately receive if it 
does indeed correspond u4th reality. " 85. 
Equally, an approach that accords primacy to authentic religious experience requires that it is not 
possible to refute, absolutely, the experience of a Barthian who might claim that he or she 
experiences God in a direct umnediated way. The principle of taking seriously the religious 
experience of others does not exclude those others whose religious experience seems directly 
opposed to one's own, or denies the validity of one's own. What to the Barthian seems a direct 
umediated experience of God, is, in very real terms, just such an experience. What one might 
suggest, however, is that such individuals have failed to take into sufficient account [or into 
account at all] the anthropological conditioning of their own theological thinking. Given that the 
anthropological approach to theology acknowledges the significance of its own conditioning in this 
way, it can, with propriety make just such a suggestion. 
In the case of Barthian theology, there is good reason to believe that, despite its monumental 
achievements, it is to be interpreted within the context of the reaction against pre-1914 "liberal" 
sympathy with the Kaiser's war policy, and the subsequent corruption of Christianity associated 
with the rise of Nazism. 86. Against this background, Barth's reactionary focus upon the preaching 
of the "unsullied" gospel of Jesus is explicable, but, nevertheless, clearly historically and culturally 
conditioned. What the anthropological approach to theology attempts to do, in the case of 
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conflicting and contradictory testimonies of religious experience, is to acknowledge the primacy 
of individual experience while viewing it within the context of the totality of human experience 
through projective methods which are in fact the denial of solipsism. 
5. Ile Relationship between Religious Experience and the Concgpt of Revelation 
Given that the anthropological approach to theology involves an acceptance of the veridical nature 
of authentic religious experience, how far are we justified in accepting Hick's view that the totality 
of religious experience constitutes good grounds for a religious interpretation of the universe? As 
we have seen, Hick draws an analogy between the experiences of great leaders such as Jesus and 
Muhammad, and the ordinary believer's experience which is, he admits, generally a far less 
intense awareness of living in the presence of the divine. Hick recognizes that there is a distinct 
difference between the momentous religious experiences of the great leaders, and the ordinary 
believer's experience, which is more mundane, less dramatic and thus less solidly founded. 87. 
Nevertheless, he believes there is sufficient analogue between the experience of the ordinary 
believer and the experience of the great religious leader for the former to feel justified in following 
in the footsteps of the latter, [of whatever religious persuasion. ] 88. 
It is possible however, that he overstretches, the analogy, minimizing the difference between what 
Troeltsch called "productive" and "reproductive" revelation. 89. Generally, the experience of the 
ordinary believer is "reproductive", deriving from the first-hand experience of the great religious 
leaders, prophets, apostles and saints. Even the original "productive" revelation of such persons 
is received within a particular cultural and historical context and is therefore open to interpretation. 
For Troeltsch, and for Hick, the definition of revelation is experiential- what Troeltsch called the 
"inner sensing and certainty" of God- and thus the terms "religious experience" and "revelation" 
can be used interchangeably. Conceptually, however, the idea of "revelation", outside of a 
specifically religious context of language usage, does have connotations of active participation and 
first-hand involvement. An example will illustrate this. If, for example, a jewel in a casket is 
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shown to me, a revelation has taken place, something has been disclosed which was previously 
hidden. If, on the other hand, I am simply told there is such a jewel, I am dependent on the truth 
of the teller, that such a jewel actually exists. R am in fact dependent on what Swinbume called 
the principle of testimony. ] However, if I have not actively participated in the disclosure, can it 
be claimed that something that can properly be called "a revelation" has taken place? 'ne 
suggestion I am making is simply that it is questionable whether experience confirms that the 
religious beliefs of individuals are necessarily obtained by means of "revelation. " Conceptually, 
the word may be misapplied to the means by which the ordinary believer obtains his or her faith. 
Most of us would concede that our religious beliefs are, at least initially, obtained through 
reception, rather than through revelation, through "being told" [testimony] rather than through 
first-hand experience. Initially, this must necessarily be the case, unless God is in the business of 
providing revelatory experience to infants! We are received into the Church, through baptism in 
the case of Christianity, and are told the truths of our religion in our most receptive years. This 
"received knowledge" is generally speaking, extremely effective in its impact upon the religious 
beliefs of the human individual. This is why Hick himself is able to note, 
"... if I had been born in India I would probably be a Hindu, if in 
Egypt, probably a Muslim, if in Ceylon probably a Buddhist; but 
I was born in England and am, predictably, a Christian. " 90. 
"Revelation, " is thus obtained, so to speak, vicariously; it is dependent on the previous first-hand 
experience of others and is very much a matter of being received into a particular historically and 
culturally conditioned tradition. Of course, Christians, perhaps conceding the great significance 
of the accident of birth, may nevertheless claim that, having been received into, accepted and 
interiorized the truths of Christianity, and having tried to live by its tenets, they have found them 
to be true. Thus, by their own experience, not just the experience of others, they know 
Christianity to be true. The problem, here, is that similar claims can be made, and are made, by 
adherents of other faiths. This would support Hick's pluralist position of there being a general and 
partial revelation to all world faiths - if it is possible to accept that the idea of "revelation" is 
appropriately used, in such instances. 
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It may be that it is possible to accept this idea of revelation, as being genuinely experiential, 
provided that the correlating idea of the thoroughly anthropological character of all human belief 
is equally accepted. It could be argued that there can be no such thing as "unconditioned 
experience. " The great religious leaders, Jesus and Muhammad, received their experiences of God 
within specific historically and culturally conditioned religious contexts. Jesus was, after all, a 
member of a typical First Century Jewish Palestinian family. But it would be impossible for Jesus, 
or for anyone else, to receive knowledge of God in a historically and culturally "neutral" context, 
for no such thing can be deemed to exist. Moses, when he saw the burning bush and interpreted 
his experience as a sign from God, must have had some prior apprehension of God, in order to 
have made such an interpretation. The same must apply to any individual, in any time or place, 
in relation to their interpretation of experience. Taking this into account, it would seem that the 
experience of the present-day believer cannot "float free" from Scripture; Revelation does not exist 
in a vacuum and cannot derive from nowhere, for all human knowledge exists within a particular 
historical and cultural context. Troeltsch, while emphasising a personal, individual and experiential 
understanding of "revelation", nevertheless made the point that; 
"... Revelation always requires some kind of documentation where 
the revelation can be lowwn in classical and normative 
form ... 7his documentation- 
however much freedom may be 
possible in its interpretation and the elaboration of its 
implications- still constitutes the authority that religion cannot do 
without, either for the formation of its community or for the 
conviction that its idea is to be recognized as valid truth. " 91. 
Given these insights, it would seem that Hick's stance on the rationality of religious belief based 
on the experiences of the great religious leaders is viable. It remains the case, however, that the 
rationality of such belief can only be acceptable from within a pluralist framework. Hick is in 
agreement with Cantwell Smith in his view that it is inappropriate to view particular "religions" C5. 
as mutually exclusive entities; such views have developed, in error, since the Seventeenth Century, 
and are peculiarly the product of the western mind. 92. Man is "homo religioso"; it is possible 
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to see the religious life of humankind as a vast dynamic continuum, rather than as a set of 
mutually exclusive belief systems. It may well be that the separation of the "purely religious" from 
the historical /cultural context is a false device, for it is clear, according to Smith, that world faiths 
have, in their development, been shaped by historical and cultural conditions. Here, Hick would 
be in agreement; 
"... Yhe different religions are different strewns of religious 
experience, each having started at a different point in human 
history and each having formed its own conceptual 
self-consciousness w4thin a different cultural milieu. " 93. 
Conceived in this way, world faiths should not be viewed as rival ideological communities, and 
it is inappropriate to speak of "a religion" as being true or false. Each tradition provides a context 
in which the individual may experience himself or herself as being in the presence of the divine; 
"... each of the great traditions constitutes a conteja and, so far as 
human judgement can at present discern, a more or less equally 
effective context, for the transformation of human existence ftom 
self-centredness to Reality-centredness. " 94. 
Thus, Hick argues, convincingly, that empiricism confirms that the rationality of belief in God, 
based on revelation as an aspect of religious experience, can only be viable and coherent from 
within a pluralist framework. This is because only pluralism takes each experience seriously on 
its own terms and confirms the validity of all authentic religious experience. 
It must be conceded, however, that this theological model of religious belief involves a 
considerable reduction of what is generally meant by the notion of revelation. There is an explicit 
acknowledgement that revelation cannot be conceived as direct, divine communication to humanity. 
Revelation does not provide access to an understanding or knowledge of God which transcends our 
normal processes of rational thinking; reason interprets experience and allows us to make 
judgements regarding the authenticity of that which is alleged as revealed. In practice, allegedly 
revealed knowledge of the divine is conditioned by the ways of thinking of those who apprehend 
Page 46 
it. Therefore, the concept of revelation should not be used in an attempt to shore up particular 
claims for absolute, indubitable knowledge of God. 
6. Hick's Epistemology of Religion in Relation to Moral Awareness of God: a Developin 
Philosoph 
Hick's understanding of the nature of revelation and religious belief based on experience, as 
outlined above, would seem to suggest that knowledge of God can be conceived in terms of an 
innate awareness of the Divine, an intrinsic "God consciousness" that is historically and culturally 
conditioned by the context in which it is received. His empirical approach to the nature of religious 
belief has however, been linked with a further argument, based on a rationalist approach to the 
nature of faith and knowledge, expounded in terms of a reformulation of a moral argument which, 
he has stated, challenges a purely naturalistic interpretation of human existence. 95. The intrinsic 
link is discernible by means of reformulating Hick 's insights concerning religious experience in 
terms of a question, "from whence did Moses, or Jesus, or Muhammad [or "homo religioso", 
from the dawn of time] receive their apprehensions of God? Is there, one may ask, a "first cause" 
of God-consciousness that is realized experientially but can be differentiated from experience itselp. 
In reformulating a moral argument for the rationality of theistic belief, Hick has drawn on the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, regarding the nature of faith. Since Kantian epistemology underpins 
a great deal of Hick's philosophical theology and provides a grounding for his "Copernican 
Revolution", which was initially the hallmark of his religious pluralism, it will be necessary, at 
this point, to enter into Kantian philosophy in some detail. This is not to say that 
it will be 
possible, or even necessary, to examine every aspect of Kantian philosophy and the many 
diverse 
interpretations of it; such as a task would clearly be beyond the scope of this thesis. I shall 






Immanuel Kant [1724-18041 believed that it was impossible to have knowledge of God; his 
concern was with the conditions of the possibility of human knowledge, but knowledge, he 
believed, could not transcend the world of experience. Kant said; "I call all knowledge that is 
concerned not with objects, but %4th our way of lawwing objects in so far as these are possible, 
a pnon transcendental. " 96. Here, Kant is using the term "transcendental" in a different way 
from its application to God, he is referring to the relationship between the "thing known" and the 
active participation of the knowing subject. Kant's theory, applied to the idea of the objective 
reality of time and space, distinguishes between the entity as it is in itself, and the entity as it 
appears to human perception. He recognizes the importance played by the cognizing set of the 
human mind in its perception of "what is. " Thus, whatever the individual observes, he or she 
makes a connection between it, and certain previously existing structures of his or her capacity to 
know, for only in this way can judgements be made. For Kant, "an object, " in our experience, 
is the phenomenal form of that object, it is not the object "as it is in itself, " detached from human 
perception of it. His contention was that knowledge is the product of the interaction of reason upon 
experience, thus he synthesized the approaches of the rationalist and the empiricist. 
However, Kant specifically limited human knowledge to the phenomenal world which it is possible 
for us to experience, and, for him, this excluded God. The judgements made "a priori" by 
humans, upon the phenomenal world are "transcendental" in that they transcend the experiential 
world itself. For Kant, this was as far as any metaphysical discussion could go. He believed it was 
not possible to discuss, meaningfully, God, the Angels, the "First Cause, " etc. for knowledge is 
only obtainable in the sphere of "possible experience, " and God, the "First Cause, " etc. fall 
outside this sphere. 97. Kant did not dispute the existence of God, explicitly, but he disputed the 
possibility of human knowledge of him. The fact that people cannot, strictly speaking "know" 
God, does not mean that they are not entitled to believe in him, however. For Kant, belief in God 
is a postulate of practical reason; God is an object of faith that transcends knowledge, "knowledge 
is denied, in order to make room for faith. " 98. For Kant the essence of religion is morality; he 
called this "pure religion, " which is apprehended by faith rather than by knowledge. Morality 
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requires and in fact validates the existence of God, for the ultimate object of good will, the 
"Summum bonum, " or perfect state of affairs, cannot be brought about by human will. It is within 
the power of human beings to become good wills, through the claim of universal moral principles 
upon them. But the totality of the "summurn bonum", which encapsulates the element of 
proportioning happiness to just deserts, is beyond the power of humans to achieve. God is a 
postulate of the claim of morality upon us and of the reality of the second element of the 
11 summum bonum. " 
Thus Kant speaks of "natural religion, " which is in accordance with the intrinsic nature of men 
and women as rational beings. All alleged "special revelation" within the ecclesiastical faiths has 
to be judged in terms of how far it conforms to, and enhances, the idea of "pure religion. " Pure 
religious faith does not in any way depend on contingent historical events; "... true religion consists 
not in knowing or considering what God has done for our salvation, but in what we must do to 
become worthy of it. " 99. Tbus, Kant's account of religion entails that a plurality of phenomenal 
world faiths may serve as vehicles for faith in God, [or, equally, they may fail to do so. ] 
Despite what seems to be Kant's claim that the divine existence is a presupposition of the claims 
of morality upon us, it is nevertheless not easy to determine the precise status of religion in 
relation to morality, in his thinking. In one sense he seems to be saying that the existence of 
ethical ideals and moral obligations entails that we postulate a divine existence as their source or 
ground, but in another he seems to be suggesting that morality is autonomous. Morality could be 
viewed as autonomous within Kant's thinking because he seems to see it as based upon a universal 
and rational aspect of human nature which is encapsulated in the idea of the "categorical 
imperative. " The consciousness that one ought to do something, regardless of one's preferences 
or desires, constitutes an absolute claim that is grounded in universal, rational and unrestrictedly 
valid principles. But the categorical ought need not be, in itself, a specifically religious insight, 
but simply the expression of a highly developed feature of human nature as it exists among humans 
as naturally gregarious creatures. 
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The difficulties in uncovering the inner logic of morality have been classically expressed in Plato's 
"Euthyphro"; "Is what is holy, holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because 
it is holy? " 100. Presented as an exclusive disjunction, an either/or choice, the dialogue between 
Socrates and Euthyphro is not intended to provide an answer to this question, but to uncover 
certain misapprehensions held by Euthyphro [and us] about the nature of religious and moral 
beliefs, and to draw his attention [and ours] to the difficulties of the relationship between them. 
The problem consists of this; if what is good is good because God commands it, then it is only 
contingently good, and dependent on God's will. Even if God is viewed in Kantian terms as the 
agent of the perfect state of affairs or "summum bonum". morality is still dependent on the will 
of this agency, therefore the notion of intrinsic human morality becomes redundant. On the other 
hand, the insistent prompting of moral consciousness, that cruelty is intrinsically evil, while loving 
kindness, justice and compassion are intrinsically good, seem so much part of human experience 
as to incline us to the belief that morality is autonomous and can be defined independently of God. 
This belief is ftirther reinforced by the examples of good atheists and humanists who appear not 
to need religious mores as either a cause of, or reason for, the goodness of their actions. If 
morality is autonomous, even the goodness of God can be measured and evaluated by the yardstick 
of moral rules that hold good in themselves, indeed, moral norms and values can inform and 
correct religious norms and values. But if this is the case it cannot be true that morality is rooted 
in God, and it becomes impossible to argue from the existence of morality as intrinsic to human 
nature, to God as the cause of that moral consciousness. 
Kant's exposition of the inner logic of morality does not seem to provide an unequivocal answer 
to the question of its nature in relation to religious belief. Nor, I believe, does Hick's philosophy 
of religious belief, and it is in this sphere that his thinking has undergone a considerable shift. 
Hick, drawing on Kant's insights, has presented a reformulated moral argument as a "fatal 
challenge to humanist philosophy" rather than an argument for divine existence based on the moral 
experience of humanity. 101. He used the illustration- which he admitted to be extreme one- of 
a humanist knowingly sacrificing his life, not for another individual, or for family community or 
country, but for a moral principle. [He did not ask whether, in fact, humanists actually do so more 
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frequently than religious believers, or what might motivate such a humanist, but simply suggested 
that such an instance of self-sacrifice could conceivably occur. ] However, were it to occur the 
humanist must, according to Hick, be deemed to be acting irrationally, his action could not be 
justified by his creed. 102. This is because humanist philosophy entails that the human organism, 
after living for seven or eight decades, is bound for eternal extinction. No moral action that is 
based solely on a principle can override the instinct for self-preservation, for no moral principle, 
for the humanist, can be what Kant called a "categorical imperative. " Such an act of moral 
altruism, for no-one in particular but for humanity at large, would involve the humanist in a 
profound contradiction, for humanism argues that there are no moral absolutes. 103. If the 
humanist's action is not to be considered irrational, this implies the existence of moral objectivity 
which is a postulate of the existence of God. 
As stated above, Hick's reformulated moral argument was not presented as an argument for divine 
existence based on the moral experience of human beings, but rather, as a challenge to humanist 
philosophy. Its conclusions were appropriately tentative; 
to follow out the implications of our own moral insights is to 
raise a question to which the answer may be - God. Is the mortal 
setf-sacrifice for the good of humanity, which our moral nature 
prompts us to salute, rational or irrational? If the naturalistic 
picture of the universe is correct, such action is irrational and 
can only occur because men are not in the last resort able to 
assert their reason against the power of nurture, internalised as 
conscience. But if on the other hand we trust our conscience, 
believing it to be rational so to do, then we ought to disavow the 
naturalistic picture and move in a direction which might in the 
end lead to belief in God. " 104. 
Tentative as were the conclusions of Hick's argument, it is nevertheless the case that his beliefs 
regarding the religious status of ethics have undergone a considerable change during the course 
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of his academic career. It remains his stance that, from a religious perspective, it is still possible 
to view morality as a function of our human nature, which is grounded in the divine creation. 105. 
However, morality may equally be viewed as an aspect of the structure of human nature which 
is capa le of being incorporated into a naturalistic world-view, as simply a distinctive phenomenon 
of that structure. 
"... On either view it is the aspect of our nature which generates 
the invisible dimension of moral value. 7his dimension is 
hospitable to a religious interpretation; but it is nevertheless not 
incompatible with a non-religious interpretation. " 106. 
Hick is no longer inclined to argue, as he did previously, from morality to God as an 
epistemological doctrine for the rationality of religious belief. This is not to say that he has ceased 
to consider the relationship between religious beliefs and morality in the sphere of religious 
pluralism, for, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, one of the criteria he has used for 
evaluating religious traditions as they have existed in their historical situations is a moral criterion. 
107. And it remains the case that Hick's argument for the discernment of common ground among 
world faiths in support of the pluralist hypothesis, is rooted in his belief in the existence of a 
"Golden Rule". that "... love, compassion, generous concernfor and commitment to the wetfare 
of others is a central ideal for each of them. " 108. He does not however, distance himself from 
the notion that, equally, this common ground may be shared by humanists and others who may 
hold non-realist views of religions. 
Ultimately, it will be my concern to argue that the fact that morality is not exclusive to the 
religious world view does not negate its usefulness to world faiths as an area of common ground 
and possible agreement - if such commonality may be discerned. Before doing so, it will be 
necessary to attempt to establish the truth of moral realism, for a pluralist hypothesis which 
argues on the basis of common ethical criteria among world faiths presupposes the kind of 
objective morality which has been much disputed in recent times. Humanist philosophy presents 
the challenge that moral values, like religious values, are determined by historical, cultural and 
social conditioning. 109. Since the pluralist approach to world faiths concedes that religious truths 
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are not absolutes, but are partial and incomplete and have been shaped by historical and cultural 
conditioning, might not the same be argued for moral truths? Even if the truth of objective 
morality can be established, it will be necessary to attempt to move from this, to an examination 
of what the content of such morality might be; Hick promotes the hypothesis that there may be 
a common ethical ideal but does not attempt a detailed examination of the possible content of this. 
Such issues must be examined in detail in subsequent chapters. 
In agreement with Hick's present view of the status of morality and its relationship with religious 
belief, it seems to me that, if it is presupposed that moral knowledge is innate to the structure of 
human nature, it must be regarded as autonomous and based on a "universal categorical", which 
precludes its exclusivity to the religious world-view. To argue otherwise is to reftite what 
experience confirms, that moral values, at least in theory and at least sometimes, are equally 
upheld by those who do not affirm a religious interpretation of experience. Thus, also in 
agreement with Hick's more recent views, it becomes impossible to argue from morality to God 
as part of an epistemological doctrine for the rationality of religious realism, for moral knowledge 
seems to exist without such a religious interpretation of experience. We are therefore thrown back 
upon the empiricist approach, rooted in the validity of religious experience, in support of a 
religious interpretation of the universe, and it is in this sphere that our enquiries will be centred 
initially. 
The suggestion I wish to explore initially is that theologians who adopt an exclusivist or inclusivist 
stance in relation to world faiths are themselves involved in some kind of contradiction. Many of 
them concede the philosophical insights which are essential to Hick's theology, which involve an 
acknowledgement of the validity of human religious experience through some kind of general 
revelation. The most cursory survey of the views of theologians regarding revelation, reveals that 
those who adopt a more open-ended approach, which allows revelation to be genuinely 
experiential, and Personally interpreted, do so, paradoxically, by means of recognizing an "a 
priori" element in human nature. They subscribe to the belief that there is, in men and women, 
an innate "God-awareness. " Paul Tillich has called this "Ultimate Concern. " 
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Ov our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or not 
being, not in the sense of our physical existence but in the sense 
of ... the reality, the structure, the meaning and the aim of 
existence. " 110. 
Karl Rahner writes of the "transcendental nature" of man, that man is orientated towards the 
"absolute mystery", which is God; "at this point theology and anthropology necessarily become 
one. " 111. 
For Hans Ming, belief in God is the belief that provides an ultimate reason, support and meaning 
for reality as a whole, for humans themselves are characterized by, "... a fundamental trust in 
reality as in principle meaningfid, valuable, actual, in spite of its uncertainties and ambiguities. " 
112. 
Chapter 2, therefore, will be concerned with an examination of exclusivist and inclusivist theology 
in relation to these ideas, for it is possible that the exclusivist and inclusivist stance in relation to 
world faiths may be inconsistent with philosophical insights regarding faith, knowledge and general 
revelation, which they themselves accept. What I seek to examine is the tension which arises 
between the concessions made by some exclusivist and inclusivist theologians to the idea of there 
being a "general revelation, " as a referent to the Divine will and purpose, and the theological 
positions they adopt. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A Critiame of Exclusivist and Inclusivist Theology in 
Relation to Anthropology and Historical Relativism 
Hick's pluralist model for the theology of religions involves an explicit rejection of the Christian 
responses to other world faiths that have been categorized in terms of the labels, "inclusivist" and 
if exclusivist. " It is my purpose in this chapter to demonstrate that there is in fact an inconsistency 
in the stance of some inclusivist and exclusivist theologians regarding other world faiths, given 
their acceptance of certain philosophical insights regarding faith, knowledge and revelation as 
outlined in Chapter 1.1 shall attempt to demonstrate this with reference to the theologies of Lesslie 
Newbigin and Karl Rahner. These two theologians represent, respectively, the exclusivist and 
inclusivist approaches to faiths outside Christianity. While their views would not necessarily be 
identical with those of other theologians whose works have been categorized within this tripartite 
framework, exclusivism / inclusivism / pluralism, nevertheless we may assume a certain similarity 
of response to the fundamental theological issue in question between these representative 
theologians and other exclusivists and inclusivists. 
Whilst accepting that the tripartite classification of theological thinking, " exclusivist" " inclusivist" 
and "pluralist" does not do justice to the range of theological thinking that is discernible, 
nevertheless I find it preferable to the alternative model proposed by J. Peter Schineller, Christ and 
the Church. a Spectrum of Views, for several reasons. Schineller's fourfold grouping is as follows: 
1. Ecclesiocentric universe, exclusive christology. 
2. Christocentric universe, inclusive christology. 
3. Theocentric universe, normative christology. 
4. Theocentric universe, non-normative christology. 1. 
Whilst the fourfold grouping is not without merits, it is my belief that it complicates the issue of 
classifying theological thinking without necessarily clarifying it. For example, Hick's pluralism 
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can scarcely, in its most recent developments, be considered "theocentric. " 2. Nor does this 
typology allow us to do justice to the range of theological thinking to an appreciably greater extent 
than the tripartite sYstem. For example, in Jesus Christ at the Encounter of Worlds Religions J. 
Dupuais classifies the christology of Ernst Troeltsch in category 3. "theocentric universe, 
normative christology. " 3. However, this is not beyond dispute. Troeltsch's christology, at least 
in his later writings, would not necessarily be considered "'normative, " if we take "normative" to 
mean "an ideal type which can be used as a measure for others, " which is the sense in which it 
will be used in this thesis, according to my understanding of the meaning. In his later writings 
Troeltsch speaks of the relationship between Christianity and other world faiths in terms in which 
Christ is not normative, in this sense. 4. Therefore it is my intention to adhere to the tripartite 
system, recognising its limitations in classifying the entire range of theological thinking which is 
certai ya presupposition of an anthropological approach to theology. 
1. Exclusivist Theologry in relation to Anthropology and Historical Relativism: Lesslie Newbigin 
As we saw towards the end of Chapter 1, many Christian theologians give limited assent to the 
idea of there being a general revelation in the sense of an innate human awareness of God. Lesslie 
Newbigin writes, in The Gospel in a Pluralist Soci , 
"... God is the same always and everywhere and to everyone. 7his 
is why it seems to be the case that wherever human beings are 
found there are always evidences of some kind of awareness of 
God, however faint and confused. " 5. 
However, he qualifies this, 
ff... no overview of the total human situation can provide authentic 
knowledge of the purpose of the Creator .. we have to add that this 
general revelation, valid as it is, cannot communicate the purpose 
of Godfor his creation ... We have no alternative but to begin u4th 
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one specific community and the tradition of rationality developed 
Mthin that community. "6 
Newbigin examines in detail the relationship between reason and experience. He argues that they 
are inseparable; reason is the faculty we use to sift experience and order it within a framework, 
to make sense of the world we live in. He emphasizes the fact that traditions of rationality are 
necessari y embodied in specific historical/cultural contexts; 
every exercise of reason depends on a social and linguistic 
tradition which is, therefore, something which has the 
contingent, accidental character of all historical 
happenings 
... Yhere are no "truths of reason " except those that 
have been developed in a historical tradition. " 7. 
"Truth" and "reason" are thus located in society and in history; there can be no such thing as 
innate, unconditioned reason, for the social and historical context determines the framework of 
what is rational. 
Historical Relativism 
Newbigin's work is an examination of the relationship between history and relativity; he 
emphasizes the influence of what he calls the "plausibility structure" of society, which he believes 
functions today to create a pluralist world-view. The idea of a plausibility structure signifies the 
patterns of belief and practice which are held as norms by any given society and which determine 
which beliefs and practices may be held as reasonable by its members. According to Newbigin's 
analysis [which he utilizes in Christian apologetic] it is the case that in a modern, pluralist and 
predominantly secular society, it is considered unreasonable for the religious truths of any one 
tradition to be held as absolute and authoritative. What is true for me may not be true for you. All 
religious truth is relative truth. Religious truths are thus marginalized, for they are not matters of 
fact, but matters of belief, which may be accepted or rejected. However, society does not make 
this statement about all truth; the "truths" of the physical sciences, for example, do not have the 
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status of relative truth. It would be held as absurd, for example, to claim that it was a matter of 
opinion that the sun is the centre of our solar system and that the earth and the planets revolye 
around it. This, within the prevailing plausibility structure is a matter of fact about which there 
can be no dispute, but the truths of religion do not have this status. 
Newbigin believes that the problem for the Christian is that he or she inhabits a plausibility 
structure which is, as it were, at odds with the plausibility structure of the mainstream secular and 
pluralist society. For Newbigin, the Bible itself creates for the Christian believer the framework 
or plausibility structure which must determine his or her view of the prevailing norms and values 
of external society. "... Our proper relation to the Bible is not that we examine itfirom the outside, 
but that we indwell it and from within it seek to understand what is out there. " 8. 
For Newbigin, it is axiomatic that knowledge of God becomes possible for the human individual 
through, and only through, Christian Scripture. "... Me possibility is actualized in the fact that 
God does reveal himseýf and has revealed himseýf " 9. 
In Barthian terms, to which Newbigin would subscribe, the Bible is not seen as Revelation itself, 
but, uniquely and exclusively, has the capacity to become the means by which God is revealed to 
the human individual more fully and completely than he can be revealed by any other religious 
tradition or scripture. 
"... The Christian tradition affirms that God has made his mind 
and purpose known to some [not to all] people through events in 
history - not all events but some, the memory of which is 
treasured in the Christian tradition. " 10. 
Newbigin is surely right to question the dichotomy that is created in modern society between 
verifiable facts such as those of science, and the beliefs of religious traditions which are relativized 
and marginalized. This is a false dichotomy; such a world-view oversimplifies the way scientists 
proceed in their enquiry. Not all scientific facts are of equal status: the scientist must necessarily 
sift facts and select those he or she believes to be most significant in order to proceed in any 
investigation; the subjectivity of the perceiving scientist is also a significant factor in the enquiry 
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itself. The prevailing world-view, which attaches high status to scientific facts also gives too little 
weight to intuitive belief, the leap of imagination which may be a necessary pre-condition for the 
formation of hypotheses in the first place. It also glosses over the fact that scientific truth, also, 
is located in history. For example, the present day fact of Copernican astronomy was, for long 
periods of history, held as a matter of opinion, and would have been considered absurd, not a fact 
at all, in still earlier historical time when the Ptolemaic theory was held as an incontrovertible fact. 
Scientific facts, in common with other so-called facts, are only relatively true. 
However, Newbigin's argument regarding the influence and importance of society's plausibility 
structure is less convincing in that it is very one-sided. He uses it in Christian apologetic, to 
underline the difficulties of the present-day Christian believer, whose plausibility structure must 
be created by Scripture itself and thus is at odds with the mainstream. Given that the plausibility 
structure of any society is variable according to social and historical conditions, and that it exerts 
a powerful influence, it must necessarily be the case that the plausibility structure of First Century 
Palestinians was equally influential in shaping the beliefs and truths of their society, for, by 
Newbigin's own axioms, 
"... there are no "truths of reason" except those that have been 
developed in a historical tradition ... every exercise of reason 
depends on a social and linguistic tradition which is, therefore, 
something which has the contingent, accidental character of all 
historical happenings. " 11. 
Traditions of rationality, Newbigin has told us, shape and determine the truths of historical 
experience. We cannot know exactly what tradition of rationality prevailed in First Century 
Palestine, for we are not First Century Palestinians, but it seems reasonable to suppose that it was 
rather different from our own. It is a possible hypothesis that the plausibility structure of the 
Biblical witnesses may have predisposed them towards a supernaturalist, incarnational 
interpretation of the historical events which are the content of Christian Revelation. It will be 
necessary to explore this idea further, in Chapter 4, when we examine the traditional 
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Christological formulations of the Church. For the present, the suggestion is simply that Newbigin 
seems to deplore the enormous influence of the prevailing plausibility structure in the modem 
context and virtually ignores its influence in the Biblical context. But, conceptually, the idea of 
a plausibility structure is a double-edged sword; it cannot be used as a weapon of attack in one 
context and ignored in another, if a convincing argument is to be sustained. Newbigin does not 
claim that human perception of historical events is absolute and non-interpretative He writes; 
"... in all cases we are interpreting the events. In no way do we 
have access to "what really happened" apartfi-om any tradition 
of rational discourse and there is no evernal criterion by which 
we can decide in advance which tradition is the one to be relied 
on. " 12. 
By his own axioms, all events are interpreted through the spectacles of some plausibility structure. 
Yet, in a sense, he seems to ignore his own axioms; he tells us of the constraints of the historian's 
task, but does not acknowledge the logical implications of these constraints. He states, 
0 all writing of history involves selection among the vast mass 
of possible material ... these data are themselves the products of 
some decision about what was significant enough to be 
remembered or recorded, " 13. 
However, he does not follow up the logical implications of these constraints as regards Biblical 
history, for he clings to the absolute status of the Revelation of Christian Scripture, and its 
superiority over any other alleged revelation of God. He shows a strong but very one-sided 
awareness of historical relativity. These instances of concessions to historical relativity make it the 
more remarkable that Newbigin recommends so strongly that we attempt to inhabit the tradition 
of rationality of the Early Christian Church, and from this standpoint, criticize the pluralist norms 
of society. Even supposing that it is possible to stand outside the structure of rationality that 
underpins our own understanding of what rational discourse is, the fact is that we are being asked 
to inhabit a plausibility structure about which we must, apparently, be a-critical. Not only do we 
know very little about it, we are not invited to discover more; critical as Newbigin is about the 
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prevailing norms of our plausibility structure, he does not follow up his statements of awareness 
of historical relativity by any suggestion that it is equally necessary to approach critically the 
plausibility structure which prevailed in Biblical times. In effect, he fails to follow the momentum 
of his own thought. He touches on the nature of the historian's task but does not follow up the 
logical implications of his own historical consciousness. 
Nor is his position in relation to the distinction between general revelation and Christian 
Revelation entirely satisfactory. General revelation is valid in that it comes from God himself. 14. 
It is not merely some kind of natural revelation of the Divine. Yet it is, apparently, not salvific 
revelation. If the general Revelation, given to non-Christian faiths, is from God himself, it must 
surely be authentic revelation. The idea that it is authentic without being salvific leads to the 
supposition of a very capricious, unjust God, who has chosen certain minority groups of persons 
for salvation. This, however, is not Newbigin's meaning; he explains this apparent selectivity on 
the part of God by means of the doctrine of election. It is Newbigin's belief that the doctrine of 
election is essential to a true understanding of the Biblical narrative, and provides a scheme for 
synthesizing universality and particularity within Christianity. Whether we like it or not, God's 
universal salvific purpose is carried out through a set of specific choices, the choice of Israel, the 
choice of the disciPles of Jesus, chosen to be "fishers of men, " [Mark 1.17.1 the choice of the 
Church, "to declare the wonderful deeds of God, " [1. Pet. 2.9. ] 15. Statements of universality 
[Romans 10.12-13. ] are qualified by statements affirming the requirement of mission. [Romans 
10.14-15.1 There will be those who are chosen to spread the good news of Jesus Christ, that all 
may receive it. Thus, universality and particularity are not to be seen as incompatible or 
contradictory, but, on the contrary, are complementary principles by which God's purpose for men 
and women is achieved. 
According to Newbigin, contemporary criticism of the doctrine of election on the grounds that it 
is unacceptably elitist cannot be allowed to overrule the facts of the Biblical assertion, that it is by 
Ineans of particular persons that God has chosen to make known his universal salvific will. The 
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sovereign will of God cannot be gainsaid by criticism that is the product of particular cultural 
norms, peculiar to the historical times in which we live. Newbigin is fully conscious of the 
"scandal of particularity, " and the negative effects of its impact on the world faiths at certain times 
in Christian history, to the present day - 16. He stresses also that election is not to be understood 
as in any way a privileged status, it is not a contract between God and man by which salvation is 
assured, rather, the reverse is true, it is a fearsome responsibility and warnings of judgement are 
addressed primarily to the elect. [Matthew 7,21-23. Luke 13,23-30. ] Men and women must be 
aware that salvation always takes place through a free act of grace on God's part, and his is the 
sole prerogative in judgement. 17. 
At this point one may ask, how far does Newbigin's defence of the doctrine of election and his 
synthesis of the universalist and particularist aspects of Christianity help to render the "scandal of 
particularity" less scandalous? How far has he provided an acceptable answer to the questions that 
might very reasonably be asked by any devout Buddhist or Hindu or Muslim, "why is it that a 
God of universal love cannot make himself known to me and cannot provide for my salvation 
within the tradition of my birth? Why is it necessary to import a European tradition [and, 
incidentally, European elitism and imperialism] when I have, already provided for me, a tradition 
of profound religious insight and experience? " Newbigin's defence of the doctrine of election is, 
not surprisingly, rooted in Biblical texts which, for him, constitute the absolute Revelation of God. 
"... Within the Christian tradition the Bible is received as the 
testimony of those events in which God has disclosed ["revealed"] 
the shape of the story [of hwnan history] as a whole, because in 
Jesus the beginning and the end of the story, the Alpha and 
Omega are revealed, made known, disclosed. " 18. 
He does however concede that the Biblical narrative should not be seen as set apart or immune 
from historical criticism, "salvation history, " for Newbigin, is not to be understood apart from 
human history as a whole. Therefore the questions posed by scientific historiography, "what are 
the sources of the stories about Jesus? what evidence can we gather about the reliability of the 
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witnesses? what was their purpose in writing?. " - are perfectly legitimate questions. 19. 
Nonetheless, Newbigin warns that the historian will inevitably bring to the enquiry certain beliefs, 
presuppositions and prejudices which must affect the outcome of the enquiry. As a human thinker, 
it is inevitably the case that he or she is unable to pursue any kind of enquiry unconditioned by 
the cultural norms - what Newbigin. has elsewhere called the plausibility structure - which make 
him or her the person that he or she is. And herein lies the real problem, for the historian of 
course will not necessarily bring to the enquiry the presuppositions of the Christian believer, which 
must be that, in Jesus, the truth is revealed absolutely. 20. 
Again we seem to be confronted by the "impasse" caused by Newbigin's very one-sided 
application of the idea of a plausibility structure, for much as it is certainly the case that the 
modern day historian is a culturally conditioned human thinker, the same must also have been true 
of the Biblical witnesses. Newbigin seems to want to claim a unique status for the Biblical writers 
which cannot be accepted by his own axioms concerning human conditioning. Unless he is 
claiming that in some way the texts of the Bible were presented to humankind as the direct word 
of God, unconditioned by human thinking, sifting and interpreting, he must also accept that the 
Biblical witnesses and writers must have approached their task with certain presuppositions. We 
cannot know precisely what these presuppositions were, but they must have existed. Historical 
exegesis suggests that the Biblical narrative was not in any sense received as a direct, unmediated 
miracle of intervention on the part of God, but was the product of human thinkers. Revealed 
knowledge of the divine, as I suggested in the previous chapter, is conditioned by the ways of 
understanding of those who grasp it. Moreover, it is culturally specific; Newbigin seems to fail 
to accept that the insights of a particular revelation, such as that given to Israel, 2000 years ago, 
may be misapplied if they are held to contain truths which must be applied universally, in very 
different times and places. 21. 
Newbigin's inconsistency with respect to the anthropological conditioning of all human thinking 
may be ftwther illustrated by means of reversing an axiom he holds himself, it is Newbigin's belief 
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that it is impossible to begin to understand anything except by relating it to what is already known 
and taken for granted. 22. This must certainly be the case; any new hypoth is with which we are es 
confronted is received in the light of hypotheses already believed to be true. The Christian 
believer, Newbigin asserts, by "indwelling" the Bible, 
"... brings to the interpretation ... the presupposition that the point 
of the whole human story has been revealed here; that in Jesus the 
whole meaning of the story is disclosed; that everything else, 
including all the axioms and presuppositions and models 
developed in all the cultures of mankind are relativized by and 
must be judged in the light of this presupposition. " 23. 
But suppose instead, that one starts from an entirely different presupposition, that one's very 
conception of God entails that he is not God unless he has made himself known equally and 
authentically [though in a variety of ways] to all people in all times and at all places. Newbigin 
might argue that this is not a presupposition that derives from any sacred text or inerrant scripture 
[though it could derive from an overview of the totality of such texts] but is a purely human 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, it does not seem to me that any qualification such as this precludes it 
from being held as a perfectly reasonablepresupposition by a theistic enquirer. Indeed, it could 
be held as a "categorical imperative", in Kantian terms. That is to say, it could be held to be 
absolutely indispensable to the essence of God as one conceives him to exist as the grounding of 
human moral knowledge, that he cannot be God unless he has indeed made himself equally and 
authentically available to all human beings as they exist in their historical and cultural conditions. 
24. 
Clearly, it is very far from being easy to eradicate [or even slightly shift] certain presuppositions 
held by the culturally and historically conditioned individual. Newbigin concedes this when he 
writes; 
"... 7he ftamework which I devise or discern is my ultimate 
commitment or else it cannot function in the way intended. As 
such a commitment it must defend its claim to truth over against 
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other claims to truth. I have no standpoint except the point where 
I stand. 7he claim that I have is simply the claim that mine is 
the standpointftom which it is possible to discern the truth that 
relatiWzes all truth. " 25. 
These are forceful words, yet, while acknowledging that similar claims must inevitably be made 
by believers of other faiths, he seems to object to similar "absolutism" on Hick's part, criticizing 
not only his theology but his terminology when he proposes, "... a shift from the dogma that 
Chilstianity is at the centre, to a realization that it is God who is at the centre, and all the 
religions of mankind, including one's own, serve and revolve around him. " 26. 
This, according to Newbigin, is an assertion that Hick's own presuppositions are the way to arrive 
at the truth, while those of Christianity are not; 
"... what claims to be a model for the unity of religions turns out 
in fact to be the claim that one theologian's conception of God is 
the reality which is the central essence of all religions ... Hick's 
conception of God is simply the truth, and there is no possibility 
that one of the world's religions can challenge it. " 27. 
But how, one may ask, if Newbigin is right, does Hick's position in this respect differ from his 
own? How, by Newbigin's own axioms, is it possible for Hick to think and write except from the 
basis that religious pluralism is the truth, if this is something that he holds in faith as an absolute 
commitment, an indispensable presupposition, before all other thinking? Newbigin asserts that a 
humanly conceived "idealist" notion of a Transcendent Being is a less reliable starting point for 
the religious quest, than a historic person, such as Jesus. 28. This is his standpoint. But surely he 
must concede Hick's right also, to have no standpoint except the point where he stands? 
The basic presupposition of this study is that, since theologians are human, theological thinking 
is itself shaped and conditioned by the historical and cultural context in which the theologian finds 
himself or herself. In other words, to use Newbigin's own terminology, the prevailing plausibility 
structure of society will inevitably influence the theologian) s apprehension of what he or she 
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believes to be religious truth. 29. Moreover, the plausibility structure of society is not one entity, 
but many, for history is in a constant state of flux, and what is so today in a given historical 
context may be different in the same context tomorrow. Viewed in this way, the human demand 
for absolutes, for reliable and certain truth is understandable, but is refuted by the historical 
process itself. Historical relativism is in effect a recognition of the tension that exists between our 
awareness of ourselves as historical beings, who exist and experience ourselves only within 
historical time,. and our requirement for absolute religious truth. The religions of the world can 
be viewed as the vehicles through which the individual's innate orientation towards God finds 
concrete expression. Yet the existence of the world's religions in history predetermines that they 
are, through their historical nature, limited and changing, in contrast with the Absolute, which is 
limitless and unchanging. Though the religions of the world seek the Absoluteness of God, they 
are all, through the determination of their very natures, incomplete and partial manifestations of 
religious truth. As Kauftnan has written "... human existence is in afundamental and quite specific 
way historical. " 30. By this he means that humans, uniquely among living creatures, have 
constructed for themselves systems of language, patterns of meaning, symbolic orders and cultural 
systems which are characterised by a complexity far beyond what is necessary for simple 
biological survival. It is his belief that complex human systems are part of a creative cosmic 
process or historical trajectory, which he calls "serendipitous creativity"; within this conceptual 
framework he locates the linguistic symbol, "God", in such a way that it becomes more 
meaningful for men and women as they find themselves in the present historical context. 31. In the 
particular historical context of the present day, we must redirect our ideas and energies towards 
solving the many religious and moral problems with which we are confronted. This aspect of 
Kaufman's thesis is one we shall return to, in the context of an examination of shared ethical 
concerns among world faiths. 
For the present, it is simply worth noting that Kaufinan's analysis of the complexity of human 
systems, emerging in history, also implies that such systems are also immensely diverse. He 
believes there can be a theocentric frame of orientation for life as an ultimate point of reference 
in our biological existence; we have constructed and will continue to construct images and concepts 
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of God which all necessarily fall short of the reality of God as Ultimate Mystery. It is necessary, 
however for us to come to terms with the implications of the fact of diversity in human cultures 
generally and in theological systems in particular. Diversity implies partial and incomplete 
knowledge and the great likelihood that an alternative theology is no less complete, or adequate, 
than our own. 
"... if we understand that all theologles are products of hwnan 
imaginative construction we cannot but welcome the attempts of 
others, ftom quite dfferent perspectives, to address in their own 
distinctive ways the deep moral and religious problems of our 
society; the adversarial stance towards other points of view, so 
often expressed in theological writing in the past, no longer has 
any point 1. 
2. Inclusivist ThgQlogy in relation to Anthropology and Historical Relativism: Karl Rahner 
Karl Rahner, our representative inclusivist theologian, also gives very positive assent to the idea 
of there being a general revelation, accessible to all humankind, indeed, Rahner believes human 
consciousness is so constructed that it is innately orientated towards the mystery of God. Grace 
is an intrinsic element in human nature, and through grace, God's salvific action is intended for 
all men and women. Central to his theology is the notion of "Vorgriff, " the Infinite, which is the 
object of an "a priori" transcendental element in the nature of human beings, which he has called 
the "supernatural existential. " 33. This element precedes all that is acquired by humans through 
experience, and can be defined in terms of the sort of questions asked by people about themselves 
and their existence in relation to what they conceive as reality. Such questions as "what is truth? " 
"does God exist? " and "what is meant by freedom, love or justice? " - are orientated towards a 
reality that transcends the empirically historical world, though they are necessarily mediated 
through temporal/spatial existence. They are the hallmarks of the transcendental nature of humans, 
who are specifically orientated towards the completeness of the mystery of God. 
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"... For we can say what man is only if we say what he has to do 
with and what concerns him. But in the case of man who is a 
transcendental subject, this is boundless, something which is 
nameless and ultimately it is the mystery whom we call God. " 34. 
However, man is also a thoroughly historical being, who experiences his orientation towards God 
only in and through the events of history. Rahner recognizes that man's knowledge is always 
connected with the world he lives in and is mediated through his sensory perception of this 
environment. All explicit knowledge and experience men gain in the world is therefore "a 
posteriori"; Rahner calls this "categorical knowledge. " it is essential, he believes, for the 
theological enquiry to direct itself towards man's experience of himself in the world. 
"... Because it is the union of the real essence of God and of man 
in God's personal self-expression in his eternal Logos, for this 
reason Christology is the beginning and the end of anthropology, 
and this anthropology in its most radical actualization is for all 
eternity theology. " 35. 
This, then, is the essential link between the "anthropological" and "transcendental" aspects of 
Rahner's theology. This link, as I hope to demonstrate, gives rise to some tension, not only in 
terms of his stance in relation to non-Christian religions, but in terms of the internal coherence of 
his theology itself. 
Rahner's Christology, [which will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 4, when I discuss 
philosophical objections Hick has raised against the traditional Christian doctrine of Incarnation] 
is, essentially, kenotic Christology. In his self-emptying love, God facilitates the essential 
fulfilment of man's God-orientated nature, by becoming manifest in human history as the man, 
Jesus Christ. The Incarnation of God in the man Jesus is the realization of the highest possibility 
of man's being, the unique, supreme case of the total actualization of human reality. 36. It is 
essential, because Rahner believes man experiences his transcendental orientation towards God 
only in and through the events of history, that this should be an actual historical event. 
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"... If this total event of the bestowal of grace on all mankndfinds 
its fuffilment, it must have a concrete tangibility in history. It 
cannot be sudden and acosmic and purely meta-historical, but 
rather thisfuffilment must take place in such a way that this event 
emanates in time and space from one point. " 3 7. 
Rahner emphasises not only the historicity of the events of the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus, but their uniqueness. He believes God's self-communication through Christ has a universal 
significance, it is intended for all men and women, but nevertheless, he believes that it is a unique 
event that has happened and can only happen once. He does not claim that Christ is the exclusive 
revelation of God, but in the sense of God offering himself in self-communication there can be 
only one event in which God speaks the "ultimate word. " To believe otherwise would be to 
undermine the historicity of the event and to dilute the significance of what did take place in Jesus 
Christ. 
"... Yhe truth of a divine humanity would be mythologized if it 
were simply a datum of every person always and everywhere. 
Such an idea would also overlook the fact that the humanity of 
God, in -which the God-man as individual exists for every 
individual person, neither is nor can be graced in itself with a 
closeness to God and an encounter with God which is essentially 
differentfrom the encounter and self-conununication of God which 
is in fact intended for evejy person in grace, and which has its 
highest actualization in man in the beatific vision. " 38. 
In a sense, however, while emphasising the historicity of Christ, Rahner seeks to transcend 
historical barriers, through the eschatological dimension of his christology, and through his revised 
theory of atonement. Rahner is dissatisfied with the classical satisfaction theory of atonement by 
which it is maintained that the alienation of humanity from God, through sin, is healed only by 
the Incarnation and Resurrection. Within this theory, classically expressed by Anselm, the life, 
death and resurrection of Jesus bring about the salvation of humanity, which was previously not 
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possible. Rahner's objections to this are rooted in the unacceptability of the idea of a 
transformation of God, that, in fact, a capricious God has changed his will in relation to the 
ultimate destiny of humanity, rather than that the nature of God is changeless and boundless love. 
39. Further, in relation to the hypostatic union, this theory implies that "... the one making 
satisfaction and the one accepting it are ... the swne. ' 40. 
Rahner finds this idea implausible. Lastly, the satisfaction theory of atonement limits the idea of 
the saving grace of Christ to the community of believing Christians; this is at variance with 
Rahner's axiom that the grace of Christ is always and everywhere available, even to those who 
do not know or confess him. 
Rahner seeks to avoid the difficulties inherent in the satisfaction theory of atonement by 
maintaining that Jesus is not the efficient but the final cause of God's salvific will. 
"... the Incarnation and the cross are, in scholastic tenninology, 
the 'final cause" of the universal setf-communication of God to 
the world which we call the Holy Spirit, a setf-communication 
given with God's salvific will which has no cause outside God. " 
41. 
By "final" Rahner means the outward expression of what has always been present [ie. the salvific 
will of God] but was previously obscured. The absolute self-communication of God becomes 
manifest in the Incarnation and Resurrection. Most importantly, "cause" is not to be understood 
in the mechanistic sense of "that which brings something about", it is, rather, a "cause" in the 
sense of being an absolute, irrefutably true ain of that salvation. 
"... If salvation history is irreversibly directed in this sense to 
salvation, and not to dwnnation, through a concrete event, then 
this historically tangible occurrence must be a sign of the 
salvation of the whole world in the sense of a "real symbol" and 
so possesses a type of causality where salvation is concerned. " 
42. 
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In this way, Rahner's christology assumes an eschatological dimension, which, he believes, allows 
it to transcend the constraints of historical methodology. What happened in Jesus is not simply a 
historical event; as the "final cause" of salvation, he is of universal significance both in the 
present, [sacramentally] and in the future [eschatologically. ] Rahner sees the entire Christian 
experience as a continuum. "... What we know about Chilstian eschatology is what we know about 
man's present situation in the history of salvation ... in man's experience of himsetf and of God in 
grace and in Christ we project our Christian present in to its fitture. " 43. 
Several questions arise, in relation to this thesis. Firstly, how far is Rahner using the notion of 
"salvation history" to by-pass problems associated with the historical/critical method? In doing so, 
is not his theology in tension with his own admissions of the lack of certainty of the life of Jesus 
and his own assent to the anthropological nature of theology? Secondly, how far is this tension 
aggravated by his insistence on the unigueness of Christ - in view of his equal insistence on the 
universality of God's grace? Thirdly and lastly, in the light of New Testament evidence, which 
suggests a considerable gulf between Jesus' eschatology and the Church's extrapolations in 
dogmatic theology, and in the light of what Rahner himself says of the "hiddenness" of the last 
things, is not Rahner's eschatological christology too deeply entrenched in traditional ecclesiology Oj 
to be entirely plausible? We shall examine these possible objections in turn. 
I. "Salvation History" as an a-Historical Concept? 
Rahner draws a distinction between " Geschichte", "salvation history", and "historich, " the merely 
historical, which can be grasped outside faith. "Geschichte", conversely, can only be understood 
from within an existentially committed free assent to faith in which "... the grace offaith opens 
one -*s eyes to the credibility ofparticular historical events. " 44. In asserting the primacy of faith, 
he attempts to overcome the tension between the relative certainty of historical facts about the life 
and work of Jesus [which, as we shall see, he freely admits] and the absolute requirements of 
faith. 
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But how far is such a distinction actually legitimate? If we accept the application of historical 
criticism, we concede that all historical events are unique in the sense that they occur once and 
once only, yet all are bound together in permanent correlation, in that historical events of far 
reaching importance must inevitably affect the future course of history. Any religion which claims 
to be founded in history can legitimately claim links between its historical roots, its present-day 
relevance and its futuristic dimensions, indeed, withou such a correlation between the event of 
the past and subsequent developments, such a religion could scarcely survive as a living faith. But 
parallels can be drawn between religiously significant historical events [for example, the life and 
death of Jesus] and secularly significant historical events [for example, the Second World War. ] 
In the case of the first, we see, for example, the correlation of the growth of the Church, of 
dogmatic theology, of eschatological predictions. In the latter case we see the correlation of the 
breakdown of colonialism, of the emergence of two dominant world powers, the Cold War, and 
so on, into an infinity that also encompasses the hope of future world harmony. My point in 
drawing these parallels between "secular" and "religious" historical events is to question whether 
it is necessarily true that the eschatological dimension of Rahner's christology allows him to 
transcend the constraints of history, for the distinction between "'Geschichte" and "historich" may 
be a false one. ne crucial aspect of this distinction, according to Rahner is that it is only to be 
apprehended in faith. But it is surely necessary to ask, what is the nature of the faith Rahner refers 
to? From whence does it derive and how does it manifest itself.? 
Faith, for Rahner, is the linchpin of the God-man relationship. There is an indissoluble link, 
between God and man, which determines the giving and receiving of a faith which Rahner sees 
as both a gratuitous miracle and a decision made in freedom. The giver/receiver relationship is 
defined in terms of the idea of man reaching out to God through the transcendental nature that is 
the essence of his humanity. 
"... Yhe knowledge of God is ... a transcendental knowledge 
because man's basic and original orientation towards absolute 
mystery, which constitutes hisfundamental experience of God, is 
a permanent existential of man as spiritual subject. " 45. 
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Here, Rahner assents to a universalist conception of faith, defined as innate awareness of God, 
realised experientially. Yet he also believes that this faith, though valid, is incomplete if it does 
not also assent to the truths of Christianity as the Church professes them to be. But the fact is that 
the universalist and general conception of faith is supported by history, in that religious belief is 
a nearly universal phenomenon, and acknowledged by Rahner to be essential to the true nature of 
human consciousness, whereas the truths of Christianity required in faith by the believing Christian 
are supported, on Rahner's own admission, only by relative historical certainty, and are confined 
to a minority of persons in historical time and place. If we were to make a value judgement about 
conceptions of faith, the historical perspective, at least, would seem to point to the greater 
authenticity of faith as innate awareness of God, realised in a diversity of experience, as opposed 
to the particularity of the Christian experience. 
The tension between the universalist and particularist conceptions of faith within Rahner's theology 
is highlighted by his own acknowledgement of the uncertainty of the historical data about the life 
of Jesus. He states that, 
"... Christological assertions have a historical dimension ... they are 
also inevitably burdened with all the difficulties and uncertainties 
of knowing an event which lies far back in history. " 46. 
Unlike some modem critics of the historical/critical method, he does not retreat from the problem 
by asserting that, ultimately, historical issues are of negligible importance. According to Rahner, 
"... the historical events with which we are dealing here are not 
of such a nature that despite all our historical curiosity about 
their existence, their more exact nature and their interpretation, 
we can ultimately forget about them. Aese events are rather of 
decisive intportancefor man's existence. " 47. 
History is important, and historical certitude is simply not to be obtained, yet, paradoxically, faith 
requires an absolute commitment which should be "accepted calmly" for, 
a person cannot live out his existence without calmly accepting 
the inevitability of such an incongruence between the relative 
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certainty of his historical knowledge on the one hand, and the 
absoluteness of his commitment on the other. " 48. 
Here, Rahner attempts to minimize the difficulties inherent in the tension that arises between the 
absolute requirement of faith in one saviour, Jesus Christ, and the acknowledgement of historical 
uncertainty about his life and work. Given that the Christian believer must accept the incongruence 
between the absolute requirement of faith, and the relative certainty of our historical knowledge 
of Jesus, he or she may affirm, with Rahner, that, 
"... faith in itsformal and existential structure is the real and only 
legitimate criterion for deciding what historical and factual 
content is really to be counted as part of its essence and what is 
not. All content of an historical nature which cannot be reached 
by this approach to the essence of faith is not essential to faith 
and cannot be the object of a genuine article offaith. " 49. 
Faith, then, is to be selective in terms of the historical data, and is in itself to determine the 
acceptance of propositional truth. As I have stated, Rahner seems to assert the primacy of faith, 
as distinct from historical knowledge, in his attempt to overcome the tension between the relative 
certainty of historical facts about the life and work of Jesus, and the absolute requirements of faith. 
This results, ultimately, in a retreat from, or a narrowing down, of the notion of faith as 
"Vorgriff. " Rahner writes; 
or ... man is a transcendent 
being insofar as all of his conscious 
activity is grounded in a pre-apprehension [Vorgriffl of "being" 
as such, in an unthematic but ever-present knowledge of the 
infinity of reality... he also experiences hope, the movement 
towards liberating freedom, and the responsibility which imposes 
upon him real burdens and also blesses them. " 50. 
Here, I believe he touches at the very essence of a universalist conception of human religiosity. 
This, however, is undermined by the qualifications he later feels obliged to impose upon faith in 
order to strait-jacket it into acceptable Christian confines, and in order that faith may be the 
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determinant of our apprehension of "salvation history. " My suggestion is that, in this way, Rahner 
only succeeds in making a distinction between "Geschichte" and "historich" by means of a retreat 
from his own powerful and persuasive analysis of the nature of faith as a pre-apprehension of God, 
essential to the very nature of humanity. 
Rahner has acknowledged that there is in the modern world a profound crisis in faith [in the 
narrower sense of the acceptance of specifically Christian propositions. ] If faith, the human 
response to Revelation, is in crisis, it must logically be supposed that Revelation itself is not so 
absolutely obvious and compelling that its content can be imposed as a mystery that requires no 
further discussion. If this were so, the present crisis in faith would be wholly unaccountable. 
Rahner in fact traces the problems facing Christians today, in part, to the imposition of what he 
calls a "formal structure"; statements of dogma are expressed in such a way that they seem to be 
unrelated to man's interpretation of his own experience and alien to his way of thinking. 
Theological concepts have undergone a process of ossification; there is a need for them to be 
reinterpreted in the light of present-day experience. There must be, 
ff a new language offaith, and this new language cannot under any circumstances be the ghetto 
language of the initiated. " 51. Rahner himself affirms the Christological formulations of the 
Council of Chalcedon, unlike some theologians whose work has also been labelled according to 
the inclusivist paradigm. 52. Yet he believes a variety of Christological models are acceptable 
within Christianity, implicitly acknowledging the philosophical difficulties which the orthodox 
of substance Christology" may present to the theologian and believer. There seems to be some 
tension here, between his reluctance to sever his Christology from the Chalcedonian formulation 
and his recognition that this formulation is in part responsible for man's alienation from 
Christianity; is wi be discussed in ftirther detail in Chapter 4. 
We have seen that Rahner has emphasised the meeting point between theology and anthropology: 
he also acknowledges the anthropological conditioning of his own theological thinking. By his own 
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aXIOMS, it is only possible for him to formulate a theology through his own experience. He 
concedes this in answer to the question, why should it be Jesus? 
"... A man can simply begin with what he is and what he already 
believes. Yhe limited nature of his existence makes it 
findamentally impossible for him to work his way through every 
possible religion and philosophy. Why should he not begin, then., 
with the one who was the only one in history to assert that he 
was more than simply a prophet and to claim that he was himseýf 
the setf-communication of God to man? " 53. 
This is, clearly, an honest answer which concedes the human conditioning of Rahner's own 
thinking. Two objections may be raised. Firstly, that New Testament exegesis has cast 
considerable doubt upon the question of whether Jesus did in fact make any such assertion. 54. 
This is an issue I shall address explicitly in Chapter 4. Secondly, as Rahner knows very well, the 
vast majority of humankind, both now and in the past, start from a very different position from 
his own in the quest for spiritual truth, and this must inevitably affect their apprehension of 
Christian theology. 
2. The Uniqueness of Christ? 
The tensions in Rahner's theology between the universalist and particularist conceptions of faith 
are considerably aggravated, I believe, by his insistence on the uniqueness of Christ. In many 
ways, his account of Incarnation makes the concept itself more meaningful; it is seen as the 
fulfilment of our innate orientation towards divine mystery, the actualization of our reaching out 
to the infinite, to which we are drawn by our spiritual natures. But in describing the depth of 
meaning of what took place in Jesus, Rahner inadvertently paves the way for the possibility that 
incarnation, as process, could take place elsewhere. If God's will to self-communication and our 
divinely orientated human natures are what Rahner says they are, there seems no logical reason 
why this could not be so, that we could claim not only "in him [Jesus] all the fullness of God was 
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Pleased to dwell" [Col. 1: 191 but also "you [other saviour figures] may be filled with the fullness 
of God. " [Eph. 3: 19.1. Bruce Marshall has explored the tensions which exist between the 
universality of Rahner's Christology, and the particularity of Jesus. According to Marshall, in 
flict, developments in philosophy since the mid Seventeenth century have 
entailed that the concept of "absolute saviour" became severed from the person of Jesus. The 
absolute saviour, or redeemer becomes a moral archetype, an ideal of moral perfection which is 
universally accessible through human reason, and not necessarily and indissolubly linked to the 
person of Jesus. 55. Rahner's Christology, he believes, attempts to draw on this general principle 
of universal accessibility while unsuccessfully retaining the particularity of Jesus. Whilst not in 
agreement with Marshall regarding the ontological status of Jesus I share, to a very great extent, 
his concerns regarding the inconsistency of Rahner's Christology. As we have seen within 
Rahner's entire theological enterprise, the concept of "absolute saviour" is, in itself, intrinsically 
enmeshed in the transcended nature of human beings, who are universally orientated towards the 
mystery of God. According to Marshall, 
"... Rahner's account of the meaningfulness, credibility and 
existential assimilability of "an absolute saviour "fails to include 
any reference to Jesus Christ as a particular person "' 56. 
Thus, "that Jesus Christ is the absolute saviour" cannot be deduced from the concept of saviour 
itself; salvation through Christ comes in an actual historical encounter. But, logically according 
to the premises of Rahner's Christology, an unspeciflably diverse variety of persons could function 
as the focus of faith, if it is God's saving grace alone, and God's self offering, which facilitates 
human awareness of the concept of "absolute saviour". This, as Marshall points out, leads to an 
inconsistency in Rahner's Christology. either he must hold that Jesus, as a historical person, is the 
only means of salvation, or he must sever the concept of salvation from the status of universality. 
He cannot, with consistency, hold both views. 
Rahner holds the view that God's offer of himself in absolute self-communication is, essentially, 
a historical event. 
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". -- Me truth of divine 
humanity would be mythologized if it were 
simply a datwn of every person always and everywhere. Such an 
idea would also overlook the fact that the hutnanity of God, in 
which the God-man exists for every individual person, neither is.. 
nor can be graced in itseýf %dth a closeness to God and an 
encounter with God which is essentially different from the 
encounter and setf-conununication of God which in fact is 
intended for eveCy person in grace, and which has its highest 
actualization in man in the beatific vision. " 57 
For Rahner, there is, and can only be, one unique manifestation of God, in the fullness of his 
revelation, in the man Jesus, in a particular historical time and place. Thus there seems to be a 
sense in which Rahner seems to believe that the actuality and tangibility of what took place in 
Jesus would be undermined if it were held to be repeatable, at least in theory, in other saviour 
figures. I find it very difficult to see why this should be so. If the encounter and self- 
communication of God can only take place in one specific and unique historical event, then God, 
who is deemed to desire the salvation of all humankind, must necessarily be less accessible to 
humans as they find themselves in the diversity of human history, than if he had manifested 
himself equally and authentically, in a variety of times and places. Rahner provides no reason for 
supposing that it would be impossible for God to do so, indeed, any notion of the impossibility 
of God's so doing must be at variance with the Christian axiom of the omnipotence of God. 
Rahner's reasons for supposing that God has not become incarnate, in the sense of offering himself 
in absolute self-communication, elsewhere, seem to be entirely based upon the belief that this idea 
would undermine what did take place in Jesus. I am not at all sure that such reasons are either 
plausible or sufficient. To use a human analogy, the achievement of any human being in any 
human sphere is not necessarily lessened by the achievement of another. Churchill does not 
become a "less great" Prime Minister if we have a great one now! Rahner in fact concedes 
something very similar when he writes, concerning saviour figures; "... there is no reason ... to 
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write them off contemptuously, as if theY stood in such contrast to faith in Jesus Christ as the 
eschatological, unsurpassable saviour, that they can only be judged negatively. " 58. 
However, he continues; 
"... Saviour figures in the history of religion can only be viewed 
as signs that - since man is always and everywhere moved by the 
Spirit - he gazes in anticipation towards that event in which his 
absolute hope becomes historically irreversible and is manifested 
as such. " 59. 
In this way he writes, in effect, as if the judgement has already been made. [It must in fact be a 
prejudgment, since human history has not reached an end. ] To return to our human analogy, what 
exactly is achieved by this kind of comparison? Logically, nothing is either added to or subtracted 
from the "greatness" of one Prime Minister by comparing him or her with another. Why should 
not the same be true of saviour figures? As Hick has pointed out, much depends on one's 
interpretation of "absolute. " 60. It is perfectly possible for the absoluteness of Christianity to be 
compatible with the absoluteness of other faiths, if "absoluteness" is taken to mean the salvific 
sufficiency of the Gospel and the Christian way, for Christians. This, however, is not possible if 
"absolute" is understood as "unique. " And this does seem to be Rahner's meaning for, "... God's 
promise of himself as our salvation has become in Jesus a historical event in a uniq and 
irreversible way. " 61. 
The problem, here, is that if Christ is to be understood as unique, it is not easy to see how he can 
also be definitive and normative -the sticking point of Rahner's christology - since "normative" 
must surely be defined as an ideal type, which can be used to judge others by its own standard. 
Rahner certainly uses the idea of normativity in this way, by inviting, at least in theory, the 
comparison between Jesus and other possible saviour figures. 62. Just as there different ways of 
interpreting the concept of "absoluteness", so there are different ways of interpreting the concept 
of "uniqueness". Paul Knitter has recently explored the context of Jesus' uniqueness in "Jesus and 
the Dther Names". Knitter defines "uniqueness" in terms of the qualities that make a person 
special and distinctive. 
Page 88 
".. -So the uniqueness of 
Jesus and the gospel is that %4thout 
which Jesus would no longer act or speak the way he is portrayed 
in the New Testment, that without which we would no longer 
have the authentic, complete gospel". 63. 
There is a sense, in this interpretation of uniqueness, that the concept is equally applicable to all 
persons, in that what is special and distinctive is not contained within the person, but, rather, 
radiates outwards and is centred upon the distinctiveness of the teaching. What is distinctive about 
Jesus is his message, centred upon the notion of the Kingdom of God, and the saving presence of 
God, offered to the poor and the oppressed of humanity. In the sense that Rahner interprets 
uniqueness, however, it seems to be centred upon the ontological significance of Jesus and is 
therefore by definition, very different, from Knitter's broad interpretation, which entails that, "the 
questions I have asked about the uniqueness of Christ are neither intended to, nor do they have 
to, prove Christian superiority or enshrine an essence of Christianity". 64. Rahner's insistence on 
a narrowly interpreted unique ontological significance for Jesus is in tension with his claim for a 
normative ontological significance, for his interpretation of uniqueness seems to imply exclusivity, 
while his notion of normativity seems to invite comparison with others. 
3. The Absoluteness of Christian Eschatol2gy2 
Essential to Rahner's entire theological enterprise is the idea of the comprehensiveness or totality 
of the Christian experience in the dimension of time. 
chatology is not really an addition, but rather it gives 
expression once again to man as Christianity understands him 
basically he can say what he wants in hisfreedom only by saying 
what he fteely hopes will be given to him and will be accepted 
by him in his freedom. Because of man's very nature, therefore, 
Christian anthropology is Christian futurology and Christian 
eschatology. " 65. 
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The eschatological dimension, however, projects Christianity into the sphere of what is ultimate 
mystery, beyond time as humanly conceived, for "... eternItY subswnes time by being liberated 
from the time which came to be temporarily so thatfreedom and something offinal and definitive 
validity can be achieved. " 66. 
In one sense, as I have suggested, Rahner seeks to overcome some of the problems associated with 
the historical/critical method by means of Christian eschatology; through the Spirit, what happened 
in Jesus is of past, present and future significance, thus transcending the dimensions of mundane 
history. In another, however, his emphasis is very much upon the ineffable and mysterious nature 
of the eschaton, both individually, and collectively. He writes, 
"... there is little chance of our being able to make an 
unambiguous statement about the more exact relationship between 
the fu? fllment of an individual person through death, a fuffilment 
which is going on now continually, and the fidfilment of the 
human race and with it the fuffilment of the world, the world 
which has no other meaning to begin with except to be the realm 
of spiritual and personal history. " 67. 
Further, "... in reality this absolute fidfilment remains a mystery which we have to worship in 
silence by moving beyond all images into the ineffable. " 68. There seems to be some tension 
between Rahner's insistence on the significance of the eschatological dimension of Christianity, 
while [rightly] conceding the unknown and unknowable nature of this sphere. If the final 
eschatological state is unknown to humankind, how can Rahner be so sure that specifically 
Christian affirmations are of ultimate significance, especially given the variety and diversity of 
these, and the uncertainty of Jesus' own eschatological predictions? In retreating into an 
ineffability thesis, is not Rahner in conflict with his own claim for Christianity, that inclusively 
yet uniquely, its eschatological dimension allows it to transcend the limitations of history? 
The variety and diversity of eschatological views within Christianity is explicable both in terms 
of an inevitable acknowledgement of the ineffability of the final state, and in terms of the 
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contradictory and fragmentary nature of scripture in this sphere. It can be argued that the 
development of the Church's doctrinal statements regarding the afterlife has a basically 
improvisational character, largely due to the fact that Jesus seems to have left very little guidance 
on this matter. New Testament evidence suggests that, while he affirmed the afterlife, he was very 
imprecise regarding its nature, and that his thinking, and that of the Early Church, was dominated 
by an expectation of the imminent ending of the existing order. 69. The New Testament is full of 
references to the Parousia; it is not until the latest documents of the New Testament that the 
emphasis changes somewhat, to highlight the idea of Jesus' presence through the Spirit, with those 
who believe in him, and the timeless nature of God's plan for humanity. 70. [Sceptics, here, could 
argue with some justice, that expedients were being employed in connection with similar 
unfulfilled prophecies in earlier Judaism. ] The Biblical evidence is certainly open to interpretation, 
and there have been some interesting hermeneutical developments regarding Jesus' own 
eschatological views. 71. It is undeniable that a great deal of scriptural evidence supports the view 
that Jesus did expect an imminent ending of the existing world order. This evidence regarding the 
liming of the event must be seen in contrast with the paucity of evidence regarding the nature of 
the afterlife, that can be attributed to Jesus' teaching. If Jesus did in fact exPect an imminent 
ending of the existing world order, then this would imply that he was mistaken, and that in this 
matter his knowledge was humanly limited. It would also account for his imprecision regarding 
the nature of life beyond death, despite his positive affirmation of it. 
From this point, it could be argued that the contemporary spectrum of Christian theology, which 
incorporates a wide variety and diversity of afterlife views, is attributable, at least in part, to the 
ambiguity and imprecision of the New Testament evidence itself. Christian scripture opens the 
door to theological speculation about the afterlife, and this would account for the range of 
theologies of death which have developed through the ages and are in the process of development 
to the present day. In view of this, ecclesiological statements regarding the afterlife ought to be 
more tentative and exploratory than they have been. In part, Rahner seems to acknowledge this, 
particularly with regard to his reseryations regarding the traditional Catholic doctrine of purgatory. 
Page 91 
"... Let me just call attention to the question whether in the 
Catholic notion of an "interval, " which seems so obsolete atfirst, 
there could not be a starting pointfor coming to terms in a better 
and more positive way with the doctrine of "transmutation of 
souls" or of "reincarnation, " which is so widespread in eastern 
cultures and is regarded there as something to be taken for 
granted. Ais is a possibility, at least on the presupposition that 
this reincarnation is not understood as a fate for man which will 
never end and will continue forever in time. " 72. 
My question is simply this; if Rahner can acknowledge so much, how can he equally claim 
normativity for Christian eschatological views? If we can say so little about the pareschaton, and 
ought to consider the insights of faiths outside the Christian tradition in this respect, we may arrive 
ultimately at an open-ended view of eschatology. And if this is so, the eschatological dimension 
of Rahner's christology, which he uses as a means to circumvent the problems associated with the 
historical/critical method, is ultimately flawed. 
Page 92 
Conclusio 
We have seen, in terms of our representative exclusivist and inclusivist Christian theologians, that 
there seems to be a certain tension between, on the one hand, their acceptance of some kind of 
divinely-willed general revelation, and on the other, their insistence on the "exclusiveness" or 
is uniqueness" or "normativeness" of Christ. Bodi make certain concessions to historical relativity, 
yet seem to want to claim a status for Christian revelation which is refuted by the historical 
process. Both demonstrate, to some degree, the human conditioning of their theological thinking, 
yet give insufficient weight to this, in its effect upon the theological positions they hold. In the 
next chapter, I return to Hick's pluralist answer to the question of the relationship of Christianity 
to other world faiths, examining his "Copernican Revolution" in some detail. I will attempt to 
demonstrate that, despite certain modifications which he has made since its formulation in the early 
1970 'sý his stance remains basically consistent with his fundamental theology of religious belief, 
formulated at the beginning of his academic career. 
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CHAYEER 3 
The Copemican Revolution and its Philosophical and Anthropological Roots: the Development and 
Consistency of Hick's TheoloU of Religious Pluralism. 
As Hick's career has developed, it is possible to discern a marked increase in his 
acknowledgement of the anthroPological character of theology. He states that he sees theology as 
a human activity, the means by which men and women have sought to confer meaning upon 
certain events in history, and to place them within a conceptual and metaphysical framework. 
"... theology is a creation of the human mind ... Aeology begins 
with religious experience - the experience of encountering God in 
Christ in one's own life - and then tries systematically and 
consistently to interpret this and to relate it to our other 
lawwledge. " 1. 
Hick's conceptual analysis of what theology is has remained consistent up to the present time. In 
his recent publication, The Metaphor of God Incarnate he has written; 
"... theology is a hwnan creation. It is the product of devout and 
faithful men and women lbut in fact nearly always, in the past, 
men], some ofthem extremely intelligent and thoughtfid and others 
less so, who were, like everyone else, enabled and yet also limited 
by the presuppositions and cognitive resources ofa particular time 
and place. " 2. 
As a historical phenomenon, theology is necessarily influenced by human culture and is subject 
to change and reconstruction in relation to the relative slowness or rapidity of change during any 
historical period. The Twentieth Century has been a period of rapid change, and therefore 
correspondingly rapid reconstruction within Christian theology. Two central issues have had to be 
faced; the relationship between Christianity and contemporary scientific knowledge, and the 
relationship between Christianity and other world faiths. It is to the latter problem that Hick 
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addresses himself, in formulating his "Copernican Revolution. " Between 1966 and 1972, we 
discover a significant change in Hick's Christology, from the views he expressed in Faith and 
Knomledge, and, in aligament with this, a shift in his stance as regards the relationship of 
Christianity to other world faiths. In an article, "Christ and Incarnation", first published in 1966, 
he states that the perceivable diversity of human religious experience seems to call a shift from a 
Christ centred view of the Universe of faiths, to a God Centred view. 3. In 1970, in an article, 
"The Reconstruction of Christian Belief for Today and Tomorrow", again he emphasises the fact 
that all theology is a creation of the human mind and, extrapolating from this, paves the way for 
a radical reinterpretation of the doctrine of Incarnation which, by then, he believed to be open to 
serious doubt as it was formulated and enshrined as doctrine by its human creators in the Third 
and Fourth centuries of the Christian era. 4. In aligmment with the fact that Christian doctrine has 
developed and been revised and reinterpreted according to changing historical and sociological 
conditions, he predicts further radical changes in Christian self-understanding, but qualifies this 
by insisting on the centrality of Jesus as the focus of Christian faith. 
"... So long as the person qfJesus of Nazareth is remembered, and 
gives rise to a continuing faith-response, the men and women in 
whom the faith-response occurs will be the Church, and the ways 
in which they conceptualise their faith will be Christian 
7heologies " 5. 
In 1972, in the article "The Christian View of Other Faiths". he calls for a "Copernican 
Revolution" in theology. 6. 
The Copernican Revolution in the theology of religions is, in essence, a history of Hick's growing 
dissatisfaction with traditional Christian exclusiveness in the context of Twentieth Century 
knowledge of other world faiths. Hick believes we find ourselves, at this period in history, living 
in the reality of "One World. " The development of systems of communication has led to a 
situation in which it is no longer possible, as hitherto, to be unaware of man's experience of 
religion outside the Christian tradition. The movement of peoples and the influx of immigrants to 
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the western world has brought about a need to redefine Christian attitudes to non-Christians. The 
ordinary man or woman has an awareness of religious pluralism that would have been 
unimaginable as little as a hundred years ago. In the sphere of religious knowledge, eighteenth and 
nineteenth century oriental scholars have done much to bring about a greater understanding of the 
religions of the East, through the translation from the Sanskrit and Pali of Buddhist and Hindu 
texts. 
In the context of these developments, Hick found it necessary to reconstruct his own position as 
a theologian. In response to Western knowledge of the plurality of man's religious experience, he 
began to formulate what he has called a "global theology of religions. "' For him, the problem is 
in essence a simple one; each religion that professes itself to be objectively true is, by implication, 
stating that other faiths are untrue, or true only in so far as they approximate to its own truth 
criteria. For Christianity, the fact of seeing itself as the only true faith cannot be reconciled with 
the Christian understanding of God, whose love for humankind is said to be universal, and who 
is held to desire the salvation of all men and women. Hick has taken the stance that it is 
impossible, given the universal salvific will of God, to conceive that he has ordained salvation in 
such a way that it is only possible for a small minority of people, i. e. Christians, to benefit from 
it. 7. He believes Christianity cannot escape from this unpalatable truth which it draws for itself 
from its own axioms. For Hick, the concept of the universal salvific will of God is incompatible 
with what he believes to be the exclusiveness of the Christian faith. Since "a religion" is not an 
exclusive entity but simply a cultural human form, it is compatible with the idea of a global 
theology for a plurality of religions to continue to exist, as expressions of the diversity of 
mankind"s religious experience. Each is, or may be, a path towards a Divine Reality that may be 
conceived as personal or impersonal, according to the cultural norms of the various human 
communities. The common factor within each religious tradition is that each sees itself as a path 
towards salvation, liberation or enlightenment. Thus, for Hick, the common factor among the 
world faiths is soteriological 8. 
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In formulating his Copernican Revolution, Hick draws an analogy from astronomy, describing the 
shift that was made in man's understanding of the nature of the Universe and his own place in it. 
Ptolemaic astronomy consisted of a belief that the earth was the centre of the Universe, and that 
the planets revolved around it. The Copernican revolution in astronomy was the realization that, 
in fact, the sun is at the centre, and all planets of the solar system, including planet earth, revolve 
around it. Hick has called for a similar revolution in theology, to a realization that God, [or 
"Ultimate Reality, " as he later stated] is at the centre, and that all the religions of the world, 
including Christianity, serve him and are equally true and valid. 
"... the needed Copernican revolution in theology involves an 
equally radical transformation in our conception of the universe 
of faiths and the place of our own religion within it. It involves a 
shift ftom the dogma that Christianity is at the centre to the 
realisation that it is God who is at the centre, and that all 
religions of mankind, including our own, serve and revolve 
around him. " 9. 
Hick's Copernican Revolution explicitly rejects the exclusivist position, which he believes is 
exemplified by the ancient Christian axiom, "... outside the Church, or outside Christianity, there 
is no salvation. " 10. This, he believes, is incompatible with the equally venerable Christian axiom 
of God's universal salvific love. He also rejects the positions of inclusivist, Christian theologians 
such as Karl Raliner, who attempt to affirm the presence of God in non-Christian faiths, while 
maintaining that Christ is the definitive and normative revelation of God. Hick compares such 
attempts to the "dubious epicycles" by which the ancient Ptolemaic astronomy was upheld, until 
it was recognized as wholly implausible. 
"... Cfearly Rahner is struggling valiantly to do justice to the 
reality of religiousfaith outside Christianity; but equally clearly 
he has not been able to face the Copernican revolution that is 
required and has instead only contributed yet another ingenious 
epicycle to the old Ptolemaic theology. " 11. 
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Hick freely acknowledges the personal and experiential roots of his radical revision in theological 
thinking. He states in God and the Universe of Faiths that the problem of Christianity's 
relationship with other world faiths was one that he had, in effect, ignored, or simply failed to 
recognize through a reluctance to face the implication of exclusivist. Christianity, until he lived in 
the multi-faith city of Birmingham. 12. In Problems of Religious Pluralism, published in 1985, 
he acknowledges the anthropological basis of his philosophical and theological thinking in stating; 
Na philosopher is a hwnan being, living through the history of 
his or her time, and it may be of interest to some to see another 
small example of the way in which life influences and is influenced 
by thought. " 13. 
He then devotes Chapter I to the three controversies in his personal and academic life that have 
influenced and been influenced by his theological thinking. In fact one of the central and most 
significant observations that seems to have influenced Hick's theology is the simple fact that, in 
the vast ma ority of cases, the religious adherence of the individual is determined by birth. 14. i 
Since this is the case, the proposition that there is, or could be, one "true Church, " guardian of 
the monopoly of religious truth, is unacceptable simply because equality of opportunity would be 
patently lacking, in obtaining access to this truth, and this notion is therefore inconsistent with the 
concept of a God of Love. 
It is important to note, however, that in stating that religious belief is almost always a function of 
birth, Hick is simply stating what he [and everyone else] observes to be the case empirically. He 
would not wish to imply that, therefore, any sincerely held belief is necessarily true; in writing 
of Nazism, warlock worship or witchcraft, [which might be held to be true by persons born within 
these "traditions. " I he states; "... to say that whatever is sincerely believed andpractised is, bY 
definition, true, would be the end of all critical discrimination, both intellectual and moral. " 15. 
Clearly, in relation to the "truths" of religious traditions, there must be some criteria relating to 
the efficacy of such traditions in promoting the spiritual and moral development of the individual. 
Hick's position, in relation to what he has called the "grading of religions" is that, 
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"... the basic criterion is the extent to which they promote or 
hinder the great religious aim of salvation1liberation ... that 
limitlessly better quality ofhuman existence which comes about in 
the transitionfrom seýflcentredness to Reality-centredness. , 12. 
It is, however, Hick's present belief, outlined in An Int=retation of Religion, published in 1989, 
that, as far as human judgement is able to discern, each tradition is in fact more or less equally 
effective in bringing about such a transformation. 17. He does suggest, however, "... the possibility 
of systematic moral criticism within each tradition of its own inherited doctrines. " 18. 
Hick has recently reiterated his view that religious traditions must be judged according to moral 
criteria, in response to the legitimate question posed by D'Costa; how do we judge that certain 
quasi-religious movements such as Nazism and the Jim Jones cult are not authentic responses to 
the Divine? 19. Hick believes, 
"Yhe answer is that this criterion is a basic moral insight which 
Christians have received from Christian teachings, Jews from 
Jewish teachings, Buddhists from Buddhists from Buddhist 
teachings and so on. " 20. 
In citing moral criteria as a means of judging religions he does not concede the main point of 
D'Costa's article, that, 'pluralism must always logically be a form of exclusivism and nothing 
called pluralism really exists. " 21. 
Hick holds that the concept of religious pluralism is a broad, useful term used in description of 
a viable Christian response to other world faiths. He concedes that the acceptance of any theory 
or viewpoint is, in effect, a denial of the contrary, but believes it is misleading and unhelpful to 
imply therefore that religious pluralism must by definition be exclusivist, simply because criteria 
of judgement are employed in discerning what is a genuinely religious response to Divine Reality. 
22. 
Hick is surely correct in his assertion that, as a broad categorical term, the notion of religious 
pluralism conveys meaning both to its adherents and his opponents. 
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It would seem that the pluralist position need not involve the complete relativization of religious 
truth but requires, instead, the formulation of objective criteria for critically assessing the doctrines 
of faiths in terms of their soteriological effectiveness. It will form an important part of the focus 
of Part 2 of this study, to assess how far this may be a viable possibility. From the observations 
above, however, it is clear that, since 1973, Hick has in fact revised and redefined his Copernican 
Revolution on several occasions in response to criticisms that have inevitably been directed 
towards his very radical proposals for the revision of traditional Christianity. We shall examine 
some of the initial criticisms of Hick's proposals for a "theological revolution, " before turning to 
the wider issue of the grounding of his theological developments in Kantian epistemology, which 
has subsequently been developed to a greater extent, and has also been subject to criticism. 
Criticisms of the Copernican Revolution as originally formulated 
In brief, these consist of objections that the Copernican Revolution devalues the essential tenets 
of Christianity and that it is theologically unsound, for the very axiom used by Hick to justify it, 
belief in the universal salvific will of God, is an axiom that derives directly from traditional 
Christology, and cannot be severed from it. 23. Further, that the Copernican Revolution, which 
originally placed God at the centre of the "solar system" of faiths, is unable to accommodate 
non-theistic faiths such as Buddhism or Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, on their own terms. 24. 
As far as the first criticism is concerned, the idea that the doctrine of an all-loving God requires 
grounding in Christology, since it is from Christ that we know it, could only be valid if other 
faiths did not assert that God's love for humankind is universal. It could be claimed, however, that 
universalism is central to the three major monotheistic traditions, Christianity, Islam and Judaism. 
25. Against this, it has been argued that non-Christian concepts of God are not necessarily 
compatible with the Christian understanding of God, and that it is questionable whether it is in fact 
possible to abstract "doctrines of God" from the historical and cultural conditions in which he is 
disclosed. 26. This is surely a valid point, but one which strengthens the thesis that all theological 
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thinking is anthropologically conditioned, far more positively, I believe, than it undermines 
universalism. What cannot be claimed, within Christianity, is that all Christian sects and 
denominations have, historically, always asserted the universal salvific will of God, apparently 
rooted in the revelation in Christ. This would not be true, for example, of the Calvinist notion of 
predestination, described by Weber, however much it may be claimed by present-day inclusivist 
Christian theologians. 27. In fact, it could equally be argued that it is precisely because of the 
tension that arises between the Christian axiom of an all-loving God, and the belief that salvation 
is only obtained through Christ, that it has been found necessary to adopt devices such as Rahner"s 
"anonymous Christian" theory, in relation to the salvation of non-Christians, in order that the 
concept of an all-loving God can be in any way credible. For although inclusivists such as Rahner 
and D'Costa may assert, as Christians, that their knowledg of the universal salvific will of God 
is grounded in ýChristology, the actual existence of such a salvific will must have been present 
prior to God's self-disclosure in Christ and must be present now unknown to non-Christians. 
Given the axiom of the universal salvific will of God, it is implausible that this is actually 
dependent upon the event of Christ's life, death and resurrection, although, for Christians, the 
Christ event constitutes the means by which it is revealed. The salvific will of God "as it exists 
in itself' must surely be dependent upon the relationship between God the Creator, and men and 
women, the created. 
Rahner, as we have seen, gives assent to the idea of there being a general revelation, accessible 
to all men and women, through the very nature of human consciousness, which is so constituted 
that it reaches out towards the mystery of God. 
"... For we can say what man is only if we say what he has to do 
with and what concerns him. But in the case of man who is a 
transcendental subject this is something which is boundless, 
something which is nameless, and ultimately it is about the 
mystery whom we call God ... When we have said everything 
which can be expressed about ourselves which is definable and 
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calculable, we have not said anything abOut ourselves unless in 
all that is said we have also included that we are beings who are 
oylentated towards the God who is incomprehensible. " 28. 
If Rahner believes this to be true, he cannot, without undermining his own axioms about the nature 
of human beings, equally assert that the existence of the salvific will of God is ftendent on the 
life, death and resurrection of Jesus. Were he to do so, the idea of general revelation and the 
orientation of men and women towards the mystery of God, through the transcendental nature 
which is the essence of what it is to be human, would become meaningless. Furthermore, if God's 
salvific will is eternal, universal and immutable, one must assume its existence in pre-Christian 
times. How could human beings have received God's salvation, before any possibility of 
knowledge of Jesus, if knowledge is to determine salvation? If God has created human beings 
equally, and if they have an innate orientation towards him, it must be through the nature of the 
relationship between God and humanity, determined by God, that salvation is constituted. 
This line of thinking has been elaborated by S. M. Ogden, who holds, against exclusivists and 
inclusivists, that while Jesus is representative of the possibility of salvation, he cannot be 
constitutive of it, for the only cause of salvation is the primordial and everlasting love of God. 
ff no event in time or history, including the event of Jesus of 
Jesus Christ, can be the cause of salvation in the sense of the 
necessary condition of its possibility. On the contrary, any event, 
including the Christ event, can be at most a consequence of the 
salvation, the sole necessary condition of the possibility of 
which is God's own essential being as all-embracing love. " 29. 
This stance, as Ogden notes, is contrary to the satisfaction theory of atonement, by which it is held 
that salvation becomes possible by the atoning action and obedience of Christ, particularly his 
death, which reconciles the Creator with his creation. By means of this theory, the Christ event 
is seen as the cause of salvation. As we have seen, Rahner, also, finds difficulty in accepting the 
satisfaction theory of atonement. If "cause" means, "to bring about a change, " this theory, 
according to Rahner; "... all but inevitably insinuates the idea of afundamental change in the mind 
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of God, which is metaphysically impossible, and obscures the origin of the cross as a consequence 
of God's forgiving love. " 30. 
To this extent, Rahner would be in agreement with Ogden. But if this is the case, his own theory 
of causation borders on being self-contradictory. If he views the cross as a consequence of God's 
love, this must logically entail that the Christ event is representative of salvation, rather than 
constitutive of it. Rahner, however, does not abandon a constitutive type of christology, but retains 
it with some difficulty, by distinguishing between the idea of the efficient cause of God's universal 
salvific will, which he rejects, in favour of the idea of the final cause of God's will, the instigation 
of the universal primal sacrament of the salvation of the whole world. 
As we saw in chapter 2, Rahner's use of the idea of "cause" is somewhat esoteric, he uses it in 
the sense of a sign, or symbol, rather than in the more usual sense of "that which brings something 
Calt-yout. " 
"... If salvation history is irreversibly directed in this sense to 
salvation, and not to dwnnation, through a concrete event, then 
this historically tangible occurrence must be a sign of the 
salvation of the whole world, in the sense of a "real symbol" and 
so possesses a type of causality where salvation is concerned. of 
31. 
Rahner writes as if the occurrence of the historically tangible event, the life, death and resurrection 
of Jesus, is constitutive of salvation. Nevertheless, it does not seem to me that this interpretation 
of the significance of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, absolves Rahner from the need to 
make a clear distinction between cause and consequence. Rahner's blurring of the distinction 
between them is not helpful, in that one is left wondering, what type of causality in relation to 
salvation could Rahner be thinking ot? Logically, it seems to me that the juxtaposition of Rahner's 
idea of the transcendental nature of humanity, reaching out to the everlasting and universal love 
of God, entails that salvation is consequential of this universal and redeeming love, 
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even if the event of Christ is seen as a real sign or symbol of it. Rahner seems to argue as if cause 
and consequence are the same thing, which cannot be the case. Something may be a cause or a 
consequence of something else, but it cannot be both. For example, as a consequence of the earth's 
revolution, we experience the phenomena of night and day, but it cannot equally be argued that 
day and night cause the earth's revolution. [ Though they may be an experiential sign of it. ] 
Certainly it can be argued, as inclusivists frequently do, that it is because of the events of Christ's 
life and death that we as Christians have knowledge of God's salvific will. 32. But knowledge is 
essentially peripheral to either cause or consequence, for, to employ the same analogy, the cause 
of the earth's revolution will produce the consequence of night and day whether or not 1, or 
anyone else [while experiencing the consequence] has any knowledge whatsoever of the cause. We 
are driven back, I submit, to the idea of the primordial and everlasting love of God as the cause 
of salvation, and the events of Christ's life and death [and, at least in theory, other events] as 
being representative of it. 
As regards the second criticism, it is true that, as it was originally formulated and outlined, the 
Copernican Revolution could only with difficulty accommodate non-theistic faiths such as 
Buddhism and Advaitin Hinduism, which would be unable to accept the replacement of "Christ 
at the Centre" with "God at the Centre. " Yet, from the outset, in God and the Universe of Faith , 
Hick was clearly aware of this precise problem, tentatively suggesting that the different human 
apprehensions of, and responses to the Divine can be accounted for in terms of the isolated and 
fragmented nature of the developing human communities in history. Each faith, in its experiential 
roots, may be in contact with the same Ultimate Reality. 33. In response to criticisms centring on 
this issue, Hick formulated what has been called the "Copernican Epicycle. " 34. He believes the 
Kantian framework he has since elaborated in support of religious pluralism overcomes the 
difficulty of the acceptability of the Copernican Revolution to non-theistic faiths. 35. This is not 
to say, however, that the so-called "Kantian Epicycle" is in any real way inconsistent with the 
original thinking of the Copernican Revolution, or that it constitutes a radical reformulation of the 
original hypothesis for a pluralist theology of religions, for, as we saw in Chapter 1, a Kantian 
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philosophical framework underpins Hick's theology of religious belief itself. Hick gives increased 
emphasis to Kant's epistemological model in "An InteEpretation of Religion" 1989 but in 1973 
he implicitly accepted a Kantian-type limitation of the possibilities of human knowledge in stating, 
". -- the recognition, which is made in all the main religious traditions, is that the ultimate divine 
reality is infinite and as such transcends the grasp of the human mind. " 36. 
Thus he has consistently emphasized the fact that the limitations of human understanding are such 
that all concepts of God, or Infinite Reality, whether conceived personally or impersonally, are 
partial, incomplete images, and that it is simply not given to human beings, in this life, to know 
the totality of the truth, beyond human interpretation of it. Kant's philosophy of the nature of 
human knowledge is the linchpin of Hick's theology of rational theistic belief; human moral and 
religious experience is a postulate of the existence of God, but knowledge of God is limited. Since, 
in the development of his theology of religious pluralism, Hick has placed more emphasis on 
Kantian epistemology than was the case initially, it is worth examining his thesis as it now stands 
in some detail, in order to assimilate its implications. 
As we saw in Chapter I it is Hick's contention that all experience is inherently interpretive; he 
develops from Wittgenstein's notion of "seeing-as, " the notion of "experiencing-as" 37. All 
experience, including religious experience, is interpreted by the human mind by means of 
historical and cultural factors which act as a kind of grid or filter; the cognizing set of the human 
mind determines how the particular experience will be interpreted. The development of Hick's 
thesis has, however, been more heavily reliant on Kant than on Wittgenstein, therefore it is 
appropriate to quote him at some length as regards this development of his epistemological model. 
He writes; 
"... For Kant's broad theme, recognising the mind's own positive 
contribution to the character of its perceived environment, has 
been massively confirmed as an empirical thesis by modern work 
in cognitive and social psychology and in the sociology of 
lawwledge. " 38. 
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While acknowledging that Kant himself did not apply his own insights to the epistemology of 
religion, Hick makes an analogy between Kant's theory of the forms and categories of perception, 
and our perception of religious phenomena; 
"... Analogously, I want to say that the nownenal Real is 
experienced and thought by different human mentalities, forming 
and fonned by different religious traditions, as the range of gods 
and absolutes which the phenomenology of religion reports. And 
these divine personae and metaphysical impersonae, as I shall call 
them, are not illusory but are empirically, that is experientially, 
real as authentic manifestations of the Real. " 39. 
It is important to note that Hick clearly affirms the existence of the noumenal Real as the source 
and grounding of authentic religious experience; such experience, as we noted in chapter 1, he 
believes to be veridical, rejecting the idea that it is the result of human projection. He continues 
to expound his epistemology of religion, based on Kant in the following way: 
one can say that the Real is experienced by human beings, but 
experienced in a manner analogous to that in which, according to 
Kant, we experience the world: namely, by informational input 
ftom external reality being interpreted by the mind in terms of its 
own categorial scheme and thus coming to consciousness as 
meaningful phenomenal experience. All that we are entitled to say 
about the nownenal source of this infonnation is that it is the 
reality whose influence produces, in collaboration with the hwnan 
mind, the phenomenal world of our experience. " 40. 
It appears that the heart of Hick's epistemological model is the distinction between an entity "as 
it is in itself, " and the same entity as it appears to human perception. The distinction between the 
it noumenal world, " which exists independently and beyond man's perception, and the "phenomenal 
world, " as experienced by human consciousness, can be used, Hick believes, to reinforce the 
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pluralist hypothesis. The "phenomenal religions" represent the partial, incomplete and humanly 
limited apprehension of the "noumenal Real" which is beyond the limits of human understanding. 
Again, it must be emphasized that Hick is not saying that every image of God, or Infinite Reality 
is necessarily equally valid; inter-religious dialogue must proceed according to a quest to determine 
objective criteria for judging religious truth claims and the soteriological efficacy of religious 
traditions. He is saying, however, that each tradition shows a partial insight into the nature of the 
"noumenon, ft as far as human judgement is able to discern. The sense of the Divine which is 
conceived as non-personal "Ultimate Reality" and "Nirvana" in Advaita. Vedanta and Buddhism, 
reflects aspects of the same reality that is experienced as God in Western traditions and some 
schools of Hinduism such as Madhva and Ramanuja. Each can only be a partial, interpretative 
aspect of the totality of the Real, in terms of the Kantian epistemological model of the limitations 
of human knowledge. By using this model, Hick is able to counter the criticism that the 
Copernican Revolution is unacceptable to non-theistic traditions on their own terms, and is also 
able to distance himself from the Advaitin belief that God is ultimately non-personal. The Kantian 
framework, he believes, allows him to transcend both these views. 
Grounds for Criticism of Hick's Epistemolggy 
1. The Charge of Agynosticis 
As we saw above, Hick's epistemological model does entail that knowledge of God is humanly 
limited. He further elaborates upon this limitation. 
"... This distinction between the Real as it is in itself and as it is 
thought and experienced through human religious concepts 
entails... that we cannot apply to the Real an sich the 
characteristics encountered in its personae and impersonae. Aus 
it cannot be said to be one or many, person or thing, conscious 
or unconscious, purposive or non-purposive, substance orprocess., 
good or evil, loving or hating. None of the descriptive terms that 
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apply vvithin the realm of human experience can apply literally to 
the unexperienceable reality that underlies that realm. " 33. 
Critics have stated that Hick's Kantian epistemology runs into serious difficulties, and ultimately, 
rests upon agnostic presuppositions. 42. The argument tends to run on the lines that Hick's thesis 
entails that nothing meaningful can be said about "the Real"; its very ontological status is 
indeterminate, if we can say neither that it is personal nor impersonal. 
Hick has, however, replied to D'Costa's criticism on these lines, in terms of drawing a distinction 
between agnosticism and ineffability. While we cannot characterise precisely that which is by 
definition beyond human experience and conceptual ization, we can affirm a realist position in 
relation to the existence of a Transcendent Reality. 
"... In Western terms, the Ultimate is ineffable, not describable in 
human terms. But this does not mean that the concept of Real is 
a mere blank. It is the concept of the inexperienceable and 
indescribable ground of the range of human projection. 7he Real 
is that which there must be if this range of experience is not in 
toto delusory. " 43. 
More recently he has written, 
'* to say that the real is ineffable is not to commit the logical 
indiscretion of saying that we cannot characterize it at all, even 
in purelyformal ways; for we have already done so in saying that 
it is ineffable! It means that we cannotproperly attribute intrinsic 
qualities to it. But, again, this does not mean that it is an empty 
blank; it means that it's nature, infinitely rich in itself, cannot be 
expressed in our hwnan concepts. " 44. 
Further, he distinguishes the position of the religious pluralist very clearly from that of the non- 
realist. 
'... the difference between a pluralistic religious understanding of 
religion and the various non - and anti-realist understanding of it, 
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is the difference between affirming and denying an ultimate 
transcendent Reality, which is the ground and source of everything 
and which enters our human experience in the different ways made 
possible by the thought and practice of the different religions. In 
contrast to this, the non-realist thinkers deny that there is any 
such transcendent reality. " 45. 
Critics, have paid too little attention to the distinction which must be made between agnosticism 
and ineffability; certainly it must be conceded that Hick's thesis points clearly towards the idea of 
religious truth as ineffable; all human attempts to define the Real and to express religious truth 
within the confines of doctrinal structures and belief systems are seen as inadequate human 
attempts to define and express the indefinable and inexpressible. The incomprehensibility of God 
is a theme that may be discerned in Christian and non-Christian thought, and Hick draws upon the 
thinking of Moses Maimonides, Gregory of Nyssa, and St. Thomas Aquinas in support of his 
thesis. 46. He also refers, in a note, to the religious philosophy of Rudolph Otto, whose contention 
is that the idea of the holy is common to all religions, but that this, which he signified by the term, 
'Inuminous, " cannot be fully understood or analyzed, because it "completely eludes apprehension 
in terms of concepts. " 47. In order to safeguard the idea of transcendence of God, some concept 
of ineffability is inevitable; critics acknowledge this, while tending to suggest that too strong an 
ineffability thesis implies that nothing meaningful can be said about God, or the Real, and that 
therefore talk about Him /Her it lapses into incoherence. One could counter this charge by the 
observation that too weak an ineffability thesis runs an equally grave risk of undermining the 
transcendence of God by delimiting and defining him within purely human constructs; there is a 
certain irony in the Christian assertion that the ontological status of God is such that he cannot be 
both personal and impersonal, while firmly asserting that his ontological status is such that he can 
be both man and God. As regards the charge that this emphasis upon the "unknowability" of the 
Real entails that nothing meaningful can be said about it, Hick's reply is that talk of God/the Real 
is made meaningful by the range of religious mythologies which have been developed within the 
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great traditions, to span the epistemic distance between the noumenal Real and the various humanly 
limited phenomenal manifestations of it. 
Als relationship between the ultimate noumenon and its 
multiple phenomenal appearances, or between the limitless 
transcendent reality and our many partial images of it, makes 
possible mythological speech about the Real. ' 48. 
How far Hick's notion of mythological truth is able to counter this particular criticism is a matter 
we shall investigate fully in the next chapter, which commences with an examination of Hick's 
understanding of the nature of myth in religious belief and discourse. 
Several questions still remain; is Hick's Kantian epistemological framework actually appropriately 
used in support of the pluralist hypothesis, and how far can such a radical revision of Christian 
self-understanding be deemed to remain truly Christian? The enormity of the latter question 
demands a chapter in its own right; I shall attempt to answer it in Chapter 4, which is concerned 
with Hicks's revision, of traditional incarnational Christology. In terms of the justification for the 
use of Kantian insights into the nature of human knowledge, it cannot be denied that much of what 
Hick is saying is in accordance with modern empiricist philosophy. However, this use of the 
Kantian distinction between the "noumenal real" existing independently and outside man's 
perception of it, and the "phenomenal real" as we experience it, has been criticized, as was Kant's 
original thesis. Is it possible for Kant, or Hick, to assert that there is a noumenon inextricably 
linked to the various phenomena, since it has been argued that the very existence of conflicting 
truth claims leads to the sceptics' response that, in all probability, none of them are true? Further, 
does not this epistemological model, as applied to theology, severely underestimate the human 
capacity to know things "as they are in themselves, " through the exercise of experience, 
understanding and judgement? We shall examine each of these criticisms in turn. 
nolo-zical Model as an invitation to Scgpticis 
Hick is of course aware of Hume's argument on these lines; 
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"... in matters of religion whatever is different is contrary ... in 
destroying a rival system it likewise destroys the credit of those 
miracles, on which that system was established. " 49. 
In fact, Hume's argument is extremely damaging to any kind of exclusive religious truth claims, 
but if anything, can be used in support of a pluralist hypothesis, if whatever is different is not 
considered contrary, but is acknowledged to be a partial, incomplete truth. The distinction between 
"truth" and "untruth" is too rigid in Hume's argument, which seems to imply that the very 
existence of religious plurality is an invitation to the sceptic's response, which is to deny truth to 
any religious tradition, as a more plausible possibility than allowing that all may be partially true. 
Although admittedly, religions have tended to couch their truth claims in absolute terms, this is 
in itself a denial of the subtlety and complexity of the concept of truth as it is understood in 
ordinary human experience and in other academic disciplines. For example, the historian would 
be dissatisfied with the idea of explaining the "truth" of the causes of the Second World War 
solely with reference to Hitler's will to power, or to Chamberlain's misjudgments, or to the 
economic situation in Germany, or to the shortcomings of the Treaty of Versailles. He or she 
would argue, rather, that the combination of these factors encapsulate "the whole truth. " 
Nevertheless, each statement, taken singly, is still a statement of truth, since each statement is one 
of cognitive fact. "Truth" should be viewed in the context of both/and, rather than either/or; the 
latter model denies the complexity and plurality of truth itself and, in matters of religion, certainly 
invites a sceptical response. But scepticism, I would argue, may actually be diminished, through 
an acknowledgement of the partial character of many truths, and realization of the complementary 
character of phenomenological religions . 
3. The Kantian Epistemological Model as undermining Human Judizement 
Hick's grounding of epistemology in Kant has been criticised by G. H. Carruthers, who believes 
that both Kant and Hick drastically minimize the human capacity to know "things as they are in 
themselves" through the exercise of experience, understanding and judgement. He believes Kant 
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underestimates the component in the complex process of knowledge which we call judgement. He 
writes; 
"... Judgement does not occur on the level of ejaroverted knowing. 0 
Rather, it is part, indeed a crucially constitutive pan of the 
dynwnic process of genuine hwnan knowing. That dynwnism goes 
beyond the question for intelligence, le. beyond "What is it? " to 
the question for judgement, "Is it true: yes or no ? "... It aims not 
at description, that is, not at things as they appear to the knower. 
It alms at things in themselves. Judgement intends what is true, 
what is real. " 50. 
While I would agree that the intention of judgement is to arrive at what is true, I would argue that, 
nevertheless, human judgement is elevated to an absolute status that cannot be justified, when it 
is viewed as an indicator of what is incontrovertibly the truth. This is because the concept of 
judgement in itself presupposes the existence of reasonable alternatives and the making of choices 
between them. Further, human experience leads us to the knowledge that judgement may be 
incorrect; frequently, it is only with hindsight that we know, unquestionably, whether our 
judgement has been correct or incorrect. [As Hick would argue, we may only know the truths of 
religion, incontrovertibly, in the eschaton. ] The variability of human experience in fact 
predetermines the variability of human judgement on a whole host of issues, including the truths 
of religion; for this reason, Carruthers' idea of "experiencing, understanding and judging" is 
problematic, for it seems to presuppose that, on the basis of experience and understanding, we will 
all arrive at the same judgement of what is the truth. This is clearly so very far from being the 
case that I believe that Carruthers is mistaken in his own judgement and seriously overestimates 
the human ability to "know things in themselves" ie. to arrive at noumenal truth in matters of 
religion by the exercise of judgement. True, he concedes that it is only because God has chosen 
to reveal Himself that we may know Him as he is in Himself; '. - -if God chooses to reveal Himsetf 
fully, God can be known in-Himseýf, even if it is only as ultimate Triune mystery. " 51. However, 
to invoke the idea of Christian Revelation as the confirmation of the correctness of human 
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judgement in matters of religious truth avails very little, because it is precisely the fact of contrary 
and contradictory revelation within other faiths [which are judged to be true by their adherents] 
that calls into question the likelihood of human inerrancy in matters of experiencing, understanding 
and judging. Clearly, Carruthers claims too much for human judgement, here, and his criticism 
of Hick's epistemology, grounded in Kantian insights, is unfounded. 
Justification for the Kantian Epistemological Model 
The question of whether it is possible to know that there is a correspondence between phenomena 
and things in themselves, and that the latter act upon consciousness, has also been raised, 
[although not specifically in relation to Hick's epistemology of religion. ] 52. Nevertheless, I 
believe human experience can be utilized in support of Hick's pluralist hypothesis, based on a 
Kantian epistemological model. Human experience does suggest that our perceptions of entities, 
while inextricably linked with what those entities are, "an sich, " are in fact partial and incomplete 
perceptions. If I see a snowflake falling, I do not perceive it "as it is in itself " with the precision 
and exactitude that inspection under a microscope would reveal. But the existence of the snowflake 
is unquestioned, as is also the relationship between "what it is in itself' and my perception of it. 
Likewise, the moon is very far from being a silver ball in the sky, which it appears to be to human 
perception. Yet the correspondence between the phenomenal entity and the "real" moon as it is 
in itself has been demonstrated, the former is a partial and incomplete image of the latter. Thus, 
Hick is justified in stating that, in applying Kant's theme to the epistemology of religion, "... we 
are employing a well consolidated development in contemporary understanding. " 43. Hick's 
theology of religions, in laying emphasis upon the interpretative element in all human experience, 
including religious belief, is in agreement with an important contributor to the sociology of 
knowledge. Both Kant and Hick recognize the importance of the part played by human 
experience, in our perceptions of reality. 
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Conclusion 
It has been my purpose, in this chapter, to demonstrate the internal coherence of Hick's theology 
of religious pluralism, and to underline the fact that his espousal of pluralism, since 1973, is 
consistent with his general theology of the nature of religious belief based on the religious 
experience and moral awareness of humanity. I have also attempted to justify his use of Kantian 
epistemology in grounding his theology of religious pluralism, and to reply to a range of criticisms 
that have been levelled against it. Several questions remain unanswered, notably, the question of 
the existence of genuinely conflicting truth claims, and, also, the question of Hick's stance 
regarding the cognitive status of such claims in relation to recent developments in his theology 
regarding eschatological verification. The charge that, here, he lays himself open to contradiction 
will be examined more closely in Part 2. It would be impossible, however, to examine the nature 
of Hick's religious pluralism in its completeness, without an investigation of the implications of 
the Copernican Revolution for significant Christian doctrines, notably that of the Incarnation. 
Chapter 4, therefore, is concerned with Hick's revision of incarnational Christology, and the 
well-known "myth debate. of 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Christ Qlo_ical_Debate: Hick's Historical, Philosophical and Theological Perspectives 
Throughout most of Christian history, the essence of the faith has been encapsulated in the text, 
"The Word became flesh and dwelt among us. " [John, 1. v. 14. ] For Christian believers the 
doctrine that Christ was uniquely divine, the Incarnate Son of God, is the basis of the belief that 
Christianity alone among religions was founded by God. It is because of the doctrine of the 
Incarnation that Christianity has claimed finality vis a vis other world faiths. This remains the 
stance of exclusivist Christian theologians such as Karl Barth and Lesslie Newbigin, who hold that 
Christ offers the only valid path to salvation, while inclusivists such as Karl Rahner would claim 
that the salvation mediated through other religions is nevertheless the same salvation that is 
definitively and historically revealed in Christ. 
In formulating his Copernican Revolution, Hick clearly perceived the problems that arise in 
relation to Christianity's self-understanding, and an espousal of religious pluralism. "... Wherever 
the Holy is revealed it claims an absolute response offaith and worship which seems incompatible 
with a like response to any other claimed disclosure of the Holy. " 1. 
Clearly, the Copernican Revolution has implications for certain Christian doctrines, notably that 
of the Incarnation. Hick's response, which he believes allows Christians to respond to Christ as 
saviour, without demanding that he be definitive or normative for others, is to reinterpret the 
doctrine of Incarnation as mythic truth, rather than literal truth. This notion of mythic truth, as 
distinct from literal truth, has been the subject of considerable controversy; it will therefore be 
necessary for us to examine the use of the concept of myth in theology in some dv.: dl. 
Th- ieologv 
The very notion of attaching the idea of "myth" to the Incarnation seems to have been responsible, 
at 
... least 
in part, for the controversy which followed the publication of The My± of God Incarnate, 
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nA edited by Hick, in 1977. In fact, Hick's criticisms of the doctrine on historical, phi-losophical and 
theological grounds, and his consequent reinterpretation of it, had been thoroughly outlined in God 
and the Universe of Faiths, published four years previously. At the time of this publication there 
was little controversial response, which seems to indicate that it is indeed the very notion of myth, 
with its [incorrect] connotations of "untruth", which has been responsible for emotive response. 
It will be necessary shortly, to examine Hick's reinterpretation in detail, noting from the outset 
that he is far from being alone in believing that the traditional Chalcedonian formulation of the 
doctrine is no longer acceptable. 2. It is essential first of all, however, to clarify what Hick means 
when he speaks of "mythic truth, " for, as stated, much criticism has centred on the very use of 
the term "mythological. " 
The use of the notion of myth in theology is relatively non-controversial in relation to certain 
Christian doctrines such as the Creation and the Fall, where there is little evidence to corroborate 
a literal understanding of the stories portrayed and much that suggests that they are not literally 
true. However, it has been argued that the Incarnation must be excluded from the category of 
myth, because of the fundamental historicity of the life of Jesus. 
"... Yhe stories of the Incarnation and atonement are tied up u4th 
a specific historical event; they have their grounding in something 
that actually happened in the course of human history; on the one 
hand they are not outside history, and on the other they are not 
true of all history. " 3. 
Here, Norman Pittenger is making the point that the Incarnation, relating as it does to a particular 
historical person, is contrary to the nature of myth, which expresses [usually through fictitious 
characters] what is universally true for humans in relation to God, and is valid for every age. Hick 
believes certain kinds of myth, such as the story of the Fall, function in this way as kinds of moral 
exhortation, and are valuable in that most peoples' minds are more powerfully affected by a 
picturesque, parabolic expression of an idea, than by an abstract expression. 4. Pittenger's 
objection to the inclusion of the Incarnation in the category of myth on the grounds of the 
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historicity of the events, has, however, been emphasized by several other theologians, including 
Wolfhart Pannenberg 5. More recently, this has been criticized by R. C. Craw-ford, who believes 
it is inappropriate to use a term which in everyday speech means "non-existence. " 6. 
However,, it is by no means clear that the use of the terminology of myth necessarily undermines 
the historicity of an event, in fact, the reverse may be true. It is quite possible for theologians to 
accept the category of myth and to use it in such a way that it acts, rather, as a bulwark against 
historical criticism. For example, Emil Brunner writes of the Christian "myth" as belonging to a 
different category of myth from pagan mythology, but accepts the terminology as incorporating 
the entirety of Christian teaching relating to the Creation, Fall, Incarnation and Atonement, in a 
dimension of "super-history. "... He writes of "the crossing of that ftontier that separates all 
historyftom God, that event which takes place between time and eternity. " 7. Here, Brunner seems 
to be using the terminology of myth to insulate the Incarnation from the challenge of historical 
criticism while nevertheless preserving it as a historical event. It is clear that very much depends 
upon the theologian's interpretation of the concept of myth. Hick emphasizes that it is a very 
imprecise term and must therefore be used consistently by the theologian within a given definition, 
which need not necessarily assume that all other definitions are wrong. 8. He himself draws a 
distinction between literal truth and mythological truth and defines literal truth in terms of simple 
factual assertions, or theories and hypotheses. 
"... I am distinguishing it [mythological language] firom the 
language of theory or hypothesis. A theory, whether theological 
or scientific, starts with some puzzling phenomenon and offers a 
hypothetical description of a wider situation - wider spatially or 
temporally or both - such that, seen within this wider context, the 
phenomenon is no longer puzzling. " 9. 
A theory, hypothesis or simple factual assertion must in principle or in practice be capable of 
confirmation or disconfirmation. Clearly, a simple factual assertion such as, "'the 37 bus goes to 
Richmond, " is able to be confirmed or disconfirmed by getting on the bus and travelling, for, 
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preferably, by asking the driver first! ) The same requirement of confirmation or disconfirmation 
is in principle true of scientific theories or hypotheses. ObviOuslY, the doctrine of the Incarnation 
is not a simple factual assertion that can be confirmed or disconfirmed in this way, but neither, 
Hick believes, is it a theological theory. If the language of theory or hypothesis is applied to the 
doctrine of the Incarnation a false kind of truth claim is made, and any attempt to "unpack" or 
confirm the theory is doomed to failure. Hick believes this is corroborated by the attempts of the 
Early Church to do just this, which resulted in the Early Christian heresies. 10. This is not to say, 
however, that all truth content is removed from the Incarnation as expressed within Hick's 
understanding of myth. Within his definition; 
"... a myth is a story which is told which is not literally true, or 
an idea or image which is applied to something or someone but 
which does not literally apply, but which invites a particular 
attitude in its hearers. Mus the truth of a myth is a kind of 
practical truth consisting in the appropriateness of the attitude 
which it evokes. " 11. 
He also states that "true myths" must be clearly related to a context of factual belief. 
"... If the entire range of religious beliefs were regarded as non- 
factual, none of them could possess the kind of significance which 
depends upon a connection with objective reality ... I suggest, then, 
that what might be called valuable or significant myth is 
necessarily parasitic upon non-mythological beliefs, and that if a 
set of myths becomes complete and autonomous it thereby forfeits 
its cognitive status. " 12. 
The appropriate response Hick is thinking of in relation to the myth of the Incarnation is that the 
hearer is to understand Jesus as so fully God's agent and mediator that following him is an assured 
path to salvation. 13. [Although, as he has clarified to a greater extent in An Int=retation of 
he is not-the only path to salvation. ] 14. The notion of "appropriate response" has been 
questioned by G. D'Costa, in that the notion of "an appropriate response" [or an "inappropriate 
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response"] is vacuous if it relies upon the subjectivity of the believer; it must bear some direct 
reference to the actual character of the event itself. 15. But it does not seem to me that an element 
of subjectivity can necessarily be eliminated. If for example, my house is broken into and I 
describe this, in mythological language, as "the work of the Devil, " it would generally be 
considered "appropriate" for my hearer to respond with agreement, or, at the very least, with 
sympathy and condemnation of the event itself. But it is of course theoretically possible that my 
hearer is a secret house-breaker and would respond in terms that I should consider wholly 
inappropriate! Hick has since conceded that the "natural or standard" response does not occur in 
every instance. 
"... a myth may fail to communicate successfidly to a particular 
person at a particular time. And of course, even if it does 
communicate, its message may be rejected, the response which it 
tends to evoke being suppressed and replaced by a contrary 
response. " 16. 
However, the failure of a particular myth, such as that of the Incarnation, to communicate, could 
only be viewed as "inappropriate response" or "sin, " if it were the only religious myth with which 
the believer is presented. But of course, this is not the case. Hick has recently severed his notion 
of an "appropriate dispositional response" more completely from the specifically Christological 
sphere, and has placed it in a more radically pluralistic setting. 
"... In sofar as these gods and absolutes are indeed manifestations 
of the ultimately Real, an appropriate human response to any of 
them will also be an appropriate response to the Real. It will not 
be the an-ly appropriate form of response, because the Real is 
perceived in a range of ways, but it will nevertheless be an 
appropriate response. " 17. 
In so far as Hick continues to assert the factual character of Christianity's central affirmations, I 
believe it is possible for him, without contradiction, to speak of the true religious myth of the 
incarnation. In his chapter entitled "Religion as Fact-Asserting", in God and the Universe of Faiths 
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he makes it clear that what he calls "valuable or significant myths" are reliant upon facts which 
have cognitive value. 18. He distinguishes between these, and "myths which live in a system 
which is mythological throughout. " He makes it clear that the myth of the Incarnation belongs to 
the former category, it is a referent to a factual statement about who and what Jesus was. It is not 
true, therefore, to suggest that all factual and ontological import is removed, from claims made 
about Christ, by the use of the term "mythological" according to Hick's own understanding of it. 
19. Nor is it permissible, as J. A. T. Robinson points out, to equate "myth" with "untruth, " 20. 
Within Hick's understanding, myth refers to a very profound level of truth, which must, 
nevertheless, be distinguished from "literal truth, " if this means, in terms of the Incarnation, that 
God is disclosed "in person" in Jesus, in a way that is different in kind from every other way that 
he may be disclosed. Hick believes that God is revealed in Christ [precisely how, we shall 
examine further presently] but not in a unique, unprecedented and unrepeatable way that is implied 
by the notion of "literal truth, " within a the context of traditional doctrinal structure. 
Hick has been criticized for making this distinction between mythological and literal language by 
Lash, who believes it is too rigid, and does not do justice to the subtleties of religious language. 
21. This is strange, for Hick himself concedes this: "... the question isprobably too sharplyposed, 
for the early cultures did not draw our modern distinction. " 22. But what he is saying is that, since 
modem philosophical thought does make such a distinction [whether we like it or not] it is 
necessary to question whether the thought forms of the ancient world can remain appropriate or 
meaningful for the modern mind. As we saw in Chapter 2, many theologians have some sympathy 
with this view, including Rahner, who adheres to the Chalcedonian formulations while recognizing 
the difficulties inherent in the "formal structures" of religious doctrines, for modem thinkers. 23. 
Clearly, since the critics of "The Myth" object so strongly to the idea of the Incarnation being an 
expression of mythological truth through mythological language, they are themselves 
acknowledging that a distinction exists, between forms of language. Critics have yet to explain 
why it is that a "true religious myth, " that evokes right responses to God, or Ultimate Reality, is 
necessarilY an inferior kind of truth to a "literal truth. " Put in another way, the onus seems to be 
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on the Incarnationalists to explain what is meant when it is claimed that Jesus is God in one of his 
modes of being, and how this is literally true, in order to make it clear why the idea of 
mythological truth is unacceptable. As we shall see presently, considerable phdosophical 
difficulties are involved in making the claim that this is, literally, religious truth. 
Mylb and Metaphor 
Recently, and probably in an attempt to make more acceptable his notion of mythic truth, Hick 
has shifted the emphasis of his terminology in explication of the doctrine of incarnation, by 
invoking the concept of metaphor. Nevertheless, his thesis still rests on the claim that metaphorical 
use of language is to be distinguished from literal use. 
"... Yhe metaphorical stands in contrast to the literal use of 
language ... the precise way in which it differs has proved hard to 
locate, and has in fact never been defined in any generally 
acceptable way. But the central idea is indicated by the derivation 
of the Greek "metaphorein.. " to transfer. 7here is a transfer of 
meaning ... Metaphorical meaning is thus generated by the 
interaction of two sets of ideas. " 24. 
Clearly, the two sets of ideas Hick has in mind in relation to the Christian doctrine of incarnation,, 
are those of a human life lived so openly and responsively to the Divine presence that, 
[metaphorically] the human life is to be understood as an incarnation of that same presence. In this 
sense, Hick's Christology may be said to remain " incarnational ", although it clearly falls short of 
the ecclesiastically orthodox understanding determined by the Early Church. 25. In reality, Hick's 
recent shift from the terminology of myth to that of metaphor makes very little difference to his 
explication of the Incarnation, for he believes religious myths derive from the incorporation and 
development of metaphor within the life of a given tradition. He writes; 
metaphor can readily develop into myth in the sense of a 
powerfid complex of ideas, usually in story form, which is not 
literally true but which may nevertheless be true in the practical 
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sense that it tends to evoke an appropriate dispositional response 
to the subject matter. A myth, so defined, is a much extended 
metaphor. " 26. 
Hick's thinking as regards the nature of the incarnation has remained consistent in recent years, 
but he is obviously trying to explicate his notions of myth/metaphor in such a way as to respond 
to those critics who conceive his notion of mythic truth as "untruth", and to preserve a strong 
christological emphasis which nevertheless sees Christianity as one of a plurality of responses to 
the Divine. 
Hick's thesis could, however, come under criticism from those who would argue that this analysis 
of the nature of metaphor in religious language falls short of its true significance and function. 
J. M. Soskice,, in Metaphor and Religious Languag produces an interesting typology of theories 
of metaphor. She makes a distinction between substitutive, emotive and incremental theories; 
"... those that see metaphor as a decorative way of saying what 
could be said literally; those that see metaphor as original not in 
what it says, but in the affective impact it has, and those that see 
metaphor as a unique cognitive vehicle enabling one to say things 
that can be said in no other way. " 27 
In terms of this typology, Hick's understanding of the nature of metaphor clearly falls within the 
spheres of substitution and emotivism. However, Soskice criticises the substitutive and emotive 
accounts on the grounds that, in the case of both, no real cognitive or assertive gain is made 
through the use of metaphor. She draws a parallel between emotive theories of metaphor, and 
emotive [or non-cognitive] theories of language. "... It has been difficult tofortnulate a convincing 
theory of " emotive meaning " bereft of cognitive content... we cannot conceive of emotive "import of 
apartfrom a cognitive content which elicits it. " 28. V 
if Soskice is correct in her understanding of the relationship between religious language and the 
usage of metaphor in religion, this must imply some tension between Hick's christology and his 
epistemology of religion, given his defence of the cognitive status of religious language. I will 
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argue, however, that the typology formulated by Soskice draws too sharp a distinction between 
different theories of metaphor, and seeks, artificially, to extrapolate differ meaning from 
metaphor, as distinct ftom Hick's more subtle notion of transference of meaning. 
Soskice herself favours a version of the incremental theory, by which metaphor is viewed as both 
fully cognitive and capable of saying that which can be said in no other way. 29. She cites 
I. A. Richard's idea of the "interanimation of words" by which words within an utterance are not 
viewed as "being used metaphorically" or "containing metaphorical meanings" but, rather, the 
utterance is to be understood as a whole and unique entity, construed from within a specific 
context of meaning. She refers to Auden's phrase: 
"Me unmentionable odour of death 
Offends the September night., " 
as an example of the use of metaphor incrementally. 30. Here Auden is saying something about 
the foreboding of war which is appropriate to the notion of odour, without actually speaking about 
smell at all. In this way there is, according to Soskice, 
0a unity of subject mauer and a plurality of association 
networks, and this is what we intended to mark by defining 
metaphor as speaking about one thing or state of affairs in terms 
which are suggestive of another. " 31. 
What is surely questionable, however, is how far this definition of incremental metaphor actually 
differs from Hick's idea of a transfer of meaning generated by the interaction of two sets of ideas. 
Nor is it clear how Soskice can claim that unigue cognitive content is encapsulated in this 
metaphorical usage, for in the example she cites, it is clearly the case that Auden is saying 
something about the foreboding of war that could be said in literal language, ie. he could say 
something like, "there was a sense, at that time, that war, death and destruction were about to 
come upon us. " This is not to deny that metaphorical language is without powerful force and 
impact; one would, equally, recognise that Salvador Dali's painting "Mountain Lake" which is also 
suggestive of the foreboding of war, is powerfully evocative in its impact. But the impact, I would 
suggest, is nevertheless primarily emotive, and it could well be argued that, were the metaphor 
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to ghange meaning, rather than enhance meaning, we might well consider it to be used 
inappropriately. 
Soskice's work has been cited by Gerald Loughlin in "Squares and Circles" (ed H. Hewitt). 
Problems in the Philosophy of Religions. Clearly, he would favour the incremental approach to 
the theory of metaphor, for it is his view that "... Hick's historico-critical and non-metaphorical 
account of Jesus simply does not have the same cognitive content as more traditional accounts. ff 
32. But Loughlin fails to explain in what way he believes cognitive content, as distinct from 
emotive content, is lessened by Hick's account. It is probable that Soskice's typology draws too 
great a distinction between different theories of metaphor, that in fact there is an overlap between 
categories, and that metaphor may function to enhance affective impact, while at the same time 
retaining cognitive content. As I have suggested, a metaphor which functions to change meanin 
rather than to enhance meaning, might well be regarded as a metaphor used inappropriately, and 
does not in fact function as metaphor. Metaphor, I would argue, is firmly linked to the concept 
which is its referent; its function is to enhance, through imagery, our understanding of a particular 
concept, but if it functions otherwise, to change meaning, then it ceases to be metaphor and 
becomes instead, conceptual language. Soskice seems to blur the distinction between conceptual 
language and metaphorical language through the notion of metaphor conveying unig e cognitive 
content. If it does so, what I would suggest is that in reality a new concept is introduced. 
Soskice's work is, however, very much in alignment with what Chester Gillis has called the 
"irreducibflity thesis" in relation to myth and metaphor. According to Gillis in, A Question of 
Final Beli there is a considerable body of support for the view that, 
00 a metaphor cannot be transformed, translated or reduced to 
a simile or to any literal statement without remainder. For there 
is a loss of cognitive content when an interaction metaphor is 
literally paraphrased" 33. 
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Gillis has a profound appreciation of the genres of myth and metaphor in the context of language 
and meaning; he believes that Twentieth Century scholars have discerned that, 
"ngths are set in a time which is altogether different from the 
normal human experience of time. They do not occur "Once upon 
a time" (as fairy tales begin) but "In the beginning", which is a 
time before time itsetf They explore origins and claim truths. 
Thus they are not lies or falsehoods, but bearers of profound 
truths ". 34. 
Gillis himself presents a systematic historical overview of the theories of myth and metaphor as 
they have developed in the Twentieth Century, drawing on the work of Paul Ricoeur, Langdon 
Gilkey, I. A. Richards and Max Black. 35. Nevertheless, his irreducibility thesis' remains 
problematic if, as I have argued in relation to Soskice's work, the notion of the "unique cognitive 
content" of metaphor entails that the new and possibly inappropriate concepts are introduced, as 
distinct from the clear links which remain between a factual statement and its mythological 
presentation, when metaphor and myth are said to represent a transference of meaning. Gillis 
acknowledges (in a footnote) that there is no consensus of scholarly opinion as regards the status 
of metaphor. 36. However, he does not really explore the views of those opposed to an 
"irreducibility thesis" or engage in debate with them. This considerably weakens his own stance. 
Gillis' criticisms of Hick's view of myth rest upon the fact that, according to him, they fail to 
explore the subtleties of language. "... Since hisposition on language is critical to his work, I hold 
that his project is flawed by his un-nuanced understanding of myth and metaphor. 37. Gillis is 
dissatisfied with the distinction Hick makes between literal truth and metaphorical truth. 
11 "; ... Mck views incarnational language as mythical, or non-literal, 
language. Or, in another place, he says it has "metaphorical 
rather than literal truth". 7his "metaphorical truth ", it seems, is 
notfounded in reality as is "literal truth" in Hick's conception. 
Yhere is therefore a sharp distinction between the two types of 
Page 135 
truth, with the literal clearly being the basis upon which the 
mythical (or any other) truth is built". 38. 
Here Gillis seems to echo the earlier comment of Lash, which, as I have stated, pays too little 
regard to Hick's acknowledgement in The Myjh of God Incarnate that- "... the question is too 
sharply posedfor the early cultures did not draw our modern distinction ". 39. Nor do I understand 
Gillis' claim that Hick's notion of mythological truth is "not founded in realfty". Hick, as Gillis 
acknowledges, clearly states that religious myths are parasitic upon factual truth claims. 40. 
Therefore there must be a sense in which they are founded in, or originate, in reality. Thus the 
myth of the Son Incarnate is founded in the reality of historical person, Jesus, and without Jesus 
such a religious myth would not have developed. This Hick has acknowledged on many occasions; 
there is certainly a sense in which religious myths are dependent on factual truth claims. However, 
Hick holds that the dependency on factual truth claims need not entail that those truth claims are 
claims for exclusive truth. Here, Gillis is in agreement. 41. But if this is so, it is very far from 
clear in what sense his theology of religions differs from Hick's, for he does not expand his thesis 
in this respect. 
Since this, Hick has replied to Gillis' criticisms of his understanding of the nature of myth in ed. 
H. Hewitt. Problems in the Philosophy of Religion. He is in agreement that what Gillis has called 
the non-cognitive account entails that, within this understanding, myth "... does not make literally 
true propositional assertions". 42. However, he goes on to ask "... is not a purely propositional 
conception of truth excessively narrow and too much a function of Western rationalist modes of 
thought? ' 43. Again, Hick demonstrates his appreciation of the subtleties of language and truth 
conceptions, against criticism that his distinction between literal and mythic is rigid and un- 
nuanced. Hick's awareness of such subtleties has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, 
refuting the criticisms of Lash and Gillis. 
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Criticisms of Hick's notion of "Mythic Truth" in relation to Christol2U 
In recent times, the failure of some critics to do justice to Hick's notion of mythic truth has led 
to a misreading of his christology. This is exemplified in the work of G. H. Carruthers, who writes 
of Hick's christology; 
'. .. Hick asswnes from the outset that Jesus did not represent 
something radically new in God's setf-revelation. WWat Hick says 
about the prophets, their consciousness of God and God's 
presence to them, is what he says about God's presence to Him. 
There is nothing else to be said about Jesus. Hence., the title 
"Son of God " when applied to Jesus can only mean what it meant 
in the Old Testment. " 44. 
This, I believe, seriously diminishes what Hick has said about the significance of Jesus. Despite 
the fact that he believes the idea of Incarnation should not be interpreted literally, his stance is 
that; 
it is a way of saying that Jesus is our living contact with the 11 * 
Transcendent God. In his presence we find that we are brought 
into the presence of God. We believe that he is so truly God -'s 
servant that in living as his disciples we are living according to 
the divine purpose. And as our sufficient and saving point of 
contact with God there is for us something absolute about him 
which justifies the absolute language which Christianity has 
developed. Aus reality is being expressed mythologically when we 
say that Jesus is the Son of God, God incarnate, the Logos made 
flesh. " 45. 
Carruthers, however, seems to find the notion of "reality being expressed mythologically" 
unacceptable; he fails'to do justice to Hick"s christology because he treats the notion of myth as 
oluntruth, " drawing too sharp a distinction between I iteral and non-literal meaning and equating the 
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former with truth and the latter with falsehood in a way that ultimately caricatures Hick's 
christology. His misrepresentation of what Hick is saying about mythological truth is exemplified 
in the context of his criticism of Hick's alleged desire to ground Christology exclusively in the 
consciousness of Christ. He writes; 
"... lit is true that Christology must be grounded - at least in part - 
in Jesus' historical consciousness. Christology cannot make Jesus 
out to be something or someone he was not. Otherwise, 
Christology would befraudulent, mythological, proposing a lie or 
at least an unintentional error concerning the truth about Jesus. " 
46. 
The juxtaposition of the adjectives, "fraudulent" and "mythological" seems to imply that 
Carruthers holds that anything that is not literally true is, by definition, untrue. This becomes clear 
when his own view of the developmental process from New Testament christology to the 
Incarnational doctrine of Nicea is analyzed. He draws upon Longeran's notion of differentiation 
of consciousness, and applies this notion, as does Longeran, to the development of Christology 
in the first few centuries A. D. 
"... My point is that while there has indeed been a shift in the 
realm of meaning, it is a shift from common sense to theory., 
occasioned by a differentiation in consciousness. Hick maintains 
the shift is from non-literal to literal meaning, and therefore 
invalid. I maintain the shift is from common sense literal meaning 
to theoretical literal meaning. " 47. 
Carruthers endorses Longeran's explication of differentiated consciousness, as applied to the 
development of Incarnational Christology from its New Testament roots, because within this 
schema,, there is no shift in the kind of truth affirmed, whereas Hick's account of developmental 
Christology affirms that there has been a transposition from non-literal, metaphorical meaning, 
discernible in Scripture, to literal, metaphysical meaning, as encapsulated in the doctrinal structure 
of Incarnational belief. Hick himself calls for a return to a metaphorical or mythological 
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interpretation of the significance of Christ and removes the concept of literalness; this, ultimately, 
is what Carruthers cannot accept. For him, "literalness" is the sticking point of religious truth, for 
the uniqueness of Christ is dependent on the fact that he was "literally" God. What Carruthers 
does not succeed in doing, however, is demonstrating that all truth is removed from Hick's 
christology; it is impossible for him to do this while he maintains so rigid a notion of truth which 
does not allow that there may be different kinds of truth. The assumption that all truth must be 
literal truth is, I believe, a mistaken one, but Carruthers cannot avoid making this mistake because 
he distances himself from the notion of mythological truth, and rejects Hick's nuanced view of 
religious truth, which distinguishes between a true religious myth and a religious theory or 
hypothesis. Carruthers rejects both these ideas; 
"... 7he point is, of course, that the Church doctrines and 
definitions are not hypotheses about data. They are affimwtions 
of what is true ... in Church doctrines, the truth 
has already been 
revealed by God, and affinned by faith. " 48. 
Rejecting the idea of religious theories or hypotheses, Carruthers has only one answer to the 
fundamental question, "how do we know what is religious truth? " - that is, Revelation. He further 
clarifies this; 
"... the Christianfaith rests on a revelation that took place in and 
through the historical life, death and resurrection o Jesus of f 
Nazareth. 7his full Christ-event already contained the truth of its 
meaning, a meaning that would be affirmed infaith and developed 
in theology. ft is for this reason that the language of Jesus' 
Incarnation is not mythological, and that it does affirm the 
objective truth about the uniqueness of Jesus as the world's 
Saviour. ' 49. 
There are two problems, however, in invoking the idea of Revelation as the ultimate determinant 
of religious truth. Firstly, it tends to lead to an intellectual cul-de-sac in enquiry, for faiths other 
than Christianity hold equally strong notions of Revelation based on their scriptures or authority 
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figures, which are at variance with Christian notions. Hick's notion of different kinds of truth 
e 
avoids this impasse. Secondly, as we saw in Chapter 1, when the concept of Revelation is 
examined from a philosophical perspective, we find that it cannot be classed as a separate category 
of authentic human knowledge distinct from experience, but is itself part of experience, interpreted 
by reason. For Hick, whose epistemology of religion is partially based on a recognition of the 
veridical character of religious experience, it would be inconsistent to treat some religious 
experience as authentic knowledge of God, while arbitrarily dismissing other experience as 
unauthentic. 50. Because this thinking is grounded in Hick's philosophy of religion, Carruthers 
is probably right in stating that; 
'... his theological reflections are shaped by conclusions he 
reached in his philosophy of religion ... when there is a conflict 
between his philosophy and traditional Christian theology, it is the 
latter that will have to be reexamined. " 51. 
am not sure what Carruthers is implying here; if he is suggesting theology can simply dismiss 
philosophical insights, I would point out that the major world faiths have in fact invariably utilized 
the resources of philosophy to underpin and substantiate their world-views and visions of reality. 
Without implying that philosophy necessarily possesses the vantage point from which to reach an 
adequate theory of religion, I would suggest that any theologian who holds that there is a clear 
demarcation between what can be ýdiscovered about God through human reason, and what can be 
discovered solely through God's Revelation in Christianity, and asserts primacy to the latter, is 
likely to produce a less adequate theory of religion than that of Hick, whose epistemology of 
religion, as we saw in Chapter 1, is based on a synthesis of rationalist and empiricist philosophy. 
If, when we speak of Revelation, we are in fact speaking of the experiences and reflections of men 
and women that have been made possible by God through the religious traditions, we have good 
reason to be dissatisfied with a notion of Revelation that is limited to or made absolute within one 
particular tradition. This is because belief in the absolute status of the revealed truths of one 
tradition, which frequently involves ignoring or undermining the revealed truths of another, 
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ultimately undermines the validity of the whole spectrum of religious experience which is the "raw 
material" of Revelation in the first place. 
The Rang-e of Hick's criticisms of the Doctrine of the Incamation 
It seems probable, from Hick's account in God and the Universe of Faiths, that his rejection of 
traditional incarnational Christology was prompted, above all else, by the theological issue, i. e. 
the implications of the doctrine in grounding Christianity's claim for finality vis a vis other world 
faiths. However, Hick believes there are other problems associated with the interpretation of the 
doctrine which give rise to philosophical and historical objections and these can be formulated in 
terms of certain questions. How is the notion that Jesus was uniquely divine to be reconciled with 
an equal emphasis on his humanity? To what extent does the content of Scripture actually reveal 
that Jesus was uniquely divine? It is clear that criticisms of the doctrine can be categorized in 
terms of philosophical, historical and theological objections, though these categories overlap and 
are intrinsically interlinked, making what is for Hick a cumulative case against the doctrine of 
Incarnation in its traditional formulation. For the purpose of examining his revision of traditional 
Christology, it will be expedient to examine each category separately, however, starting with the 
historical approach. It will not be possible to examine the entire range of opinion as regards 
Christology, for here the literature is vast. In view of the focus of this thesis, the discussion will 
be limited to the views of Hick, and those of his immediate opponents and supporters. 
Historical grounds for criticising the doctrine of Incarnation 
In 1977 Hick wrote of the difficulties which we encounter when we try to speak of Jesus as a 
historical individual who lived in Palestine almost 2000 years ago. "... For New Testament 
scholarship has shown howfragmentary and ambiguous are the data available to us as we try to 
look back across nineteen and a hatf centuries " 52. 
More recently he has pointed out, in reply to Gerald Loughlin's criticisms of the historical 
critical method, that historically, it has been believed for a period of seventeen centuries that Jesus 
himself claimed to be God Incarnate and that, 
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there has thus been a major shiftfrom believing that Jesus was 
God because he said so, to believing it because the New 
Testament is sometimes close to saying so, to believing it because 
the church came to say so ". 53. 
It is the belief of Norman Anderson, however, that Hick "... greatly exaggerates the paucity of 
positive evidence we have about the one to whom he refers as the largely unknown man of 
Nazareth". 54. Hick has recently disclaimed any pretence to be a biblical scholar, but, drawing 
on the work of New Testament exegesis, his stance as regards what the historical Jesus claimed 
for himself remain substantially unaltered. 
... I think it is sa fe to say that there is a general consensus in the 
New Testament studies today, Catholic as well as Protestant., 
conservative as well as liberal, that the historical Jesus, did not 
teach that he was God, or God the Son, the second person of a 
Holy Trinity, incarnate. Indeed, he wouldprobably have regarded 
such an idea as blasphemous". 55. 
Further, 
"... New Testament scholarship has shown that the historical Jesus 
did not claim to be God incarnate and that what we know as the 
doctrines ofthe Incarnation, Trinity and Atonement have escalated 
into theoretical constructions going far beyond the original 
experience to which they are related". 56. 
However, in the light of Norman Anderson's criticism, and in view of Hick's own disclaimer to 
be an "expert" in New Testament studies, it might be profitable to consider, briefly, the quantity 
and quality of the historical evidence for Jesus, and the range of views of New Testament scholars, 
before examining Hick's own Christological affirmations, in more detail. 
Of course, any judgement about whether we have very little or a reasonably great amount of 
evidence about the historical Jesus must, necessarily, be a value judgement; it would, however, 
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be difficult to make a case for there being a great amount of evidence. Moreover, such evidence 
as we do have - the New Testament - is not what modem historical research would consider 
particularly objective evidence, as J. D. G. Dunn has pointed out. 57. This is hardly the fault of the 
Gospels or other New Testament writings, which were not intended to be straightforward historical 
records, but confessions of faith. Nevertheless, the lack of objective evidence, such as might have 
been provided by, for example, a Roman Centurion's eyewitness account of the death and 
resurrection of Jesus, must hamper any quest for a "historical Jesus. " 58. It must be recognized, 
also, that there are certain limitations in a historical approach to the question of whether Jesus was 
uniquely divine, "vere homo and vere Deus. " Historical exegesis could never of itself prove the 
necessity or otherwise of the Incarnation as an appropriate interpretation of the life of Jesus Christ. 
However, it could provide some substructure of evidence which may point towards the Incarnation 
as the only reasonable and complete interpretation of Jesus' life and work. There ought to be a 
substantial substructure of evidence to underpin the doctrine, to help eliminate the fear that a 
historical religion is "floating free" from its historical sources. The problem, however, is that there 
is very far from being anything like a consensus of agreement among New Testament scholars 
regarding what exactly the New Testament sources do point to. As Paul Knitter has graphically 
stated; 
"... to expect to find a unified response among New Testament 
scholars on the question of Jesus' uniqueness would be about as 
naive as to look for a consensus on economic theory among 
Washington Politicians. If we attempt even a general survey of 
contemporary works on New Testament christology we find 
ourselves in a thicket of divergent opinions and academic 
disputes. " 59. 
The Range of Ibeological QVinion regarding the Historical Evidence 
A brief survey of opinion may serve to illustrate this. M. Wiles, believes that, "... any absoluteness 
implicit in the concept of an incarnate divine being is necessarily dissipated by the tentativeness 
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of our knowledge of his life and words. " 60. It is undeniable that there is a certain tension created 
in attributing absolute divinity to a certain historical person, while acknowledging that our 
knowledge of him is fragmentary, incomplete and to a certain extent contradictory. For, if any 
general statement can be made about the Gospel writings, it is that a variety of christologies are 
revealed, and therefore the Incarnation in its traditional formulation could only be one 
interpretation, among several, of the events of Scripture. 
However, it can be argued that the historical enquiry ought not to be restricted to the witness of 
the Gospel writers. New Testament witness leaves us in no doubt about the transforming effect of 
Christ's life upon some people in the First Century world, therefore the historical enquiry should 
be broadened to incorporate evidence associated with this impact upon the receivers of God's 
revelation, and to include the Church's understanding of this throughout the historical ages. This 
argument is strengthened by the fact that it is very difficult to extract a purely "historical Jesus" 
from the Church's understanding of him. 61. The totality of historical evidence must include the 
Church's witness. Given a broader historical context, however, opinion is still divided. New 
Testament scholars such as C. F. D. Moule believe that there is such a radical discontinuity between 
the strictly monotheistic presuppositions of the First Century Jewish world and the Christian beliefs 
which rapidly developed that they are only explicable in terms of the fact that Jesus was the Son 
Incarnate. 62. It is equally possible to argue, however, [using Newbigin's terminologyj that the 
"plausibility structure" of First Century Palestine predisposed the early Christians towards the 
apocalyptic expectation of some unique act of God on behalf of his people, and that the 
development of inearnational Christology becomes explicable against this background, especially 
given the fact that not only Jewish, but Hellenistic influences were prevalent in the context of the 
times. This would be the stance of critics such as M. Wiles. 63. Klaus Runia concedes that, "... it 
is evident to everyone who knows the New Testament that it nowhere offers afidl-scale Christology . 1.1 
a Ja Nicaea or Chalcedon. " 64. However, he comes very near to contradicting himself, since he 
also states, "... it is a matter offact that throughout the whole New Testament we find indications 
of a high Christology. " 65. Indications of such a Christology are not, however, the Christology 
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itself, absolute and unequivocal, free from human interpretation. Knowledge gained by means of 
New Testament revelation is mediated through human experience, as is all knowledge other than 
that which falls into the sphere of definitions and tautologous propositions. Frances Young makes 
this point when she says, "... the traditional formulations, so farfrom enshrining revealed truth, 
are themselves the product of %itness and confession in a particular historical environment. " 66. 
Brian Hebblethwaite, a theologian of a different persuasion in that he upholds a "high" 
Incarnational Christology, nevertheless makes a similar point when he writes; 
"... after all, our only access to who God is and to what God has 
done is through hwnan witness, hwnan interpretation 
understanding and expression ... Even our own experience of God 
is apprehended in the light of an inherited developing tradition 
and is subject, of course, to the limitations of our own powers 
of understanding and expression. " 67. 
What our brief survey of the range of theological opinion seems to suggest is that the doctrine of 
Incarnation is not something that is directly presented in Scripture, but is developed from, and 
subject to, the anthropological conditioning that is integral to all human thought and theological 
development. 
Hick's Christological Affirmations 
Turning to Hick's own interpretation of the New Testament, it is certainly the case that he retains 
, strong Christological emphases in his interpretation of Scripture. The "largely unknown man of 
Nazareth" is nevertheless a man in whom the love of God is manifest to an extraordinary degree. 
"... I see the Nazarene, then, as intensely and overwhelmingly 
conscious of the reality of God. He was a man of God, living in 
the unseen presence of God, and addressing God as "abba, " 
father ... 7hus in Jesus'presence we should have felt that we are 
in the presence of God - not in the sense that the man Jesus 
literally is God, but in the sense that he was so totally conscious 
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of God that we could catch something of that consciousness by 
spiritual contagion. " 68. 
It has been argued that, in fact, Hick's theology retains such strong Christological emphases as 
to render the Copernican Revolution unnecessary, for he still retains an implicit normative 
ontological link between God and Jesus. 69. But clearly, Hick does not believe that what he is 
saying necessitates that Jesus need be literally, or ontologically or uniquely the Son of God as the 
Church professes him to be, though he must be, and is, normative for Christians through their 
anthropologically conditioned Christian experience. As he pointed out, several years before his 
Copernican Revolution, in relation to the text, "I am the way, the truth and the life; no one comes 
to the Father but by me" [John 14. v. 6. ] - the understanding of God as "Abba, " Father, is the 
distinctively Christia contribution to the understanding of God. It is, however, by no means the 
only way of understanding God. 
"... No man cometh to the Father - that is, to God as Father - 
except through the Christ in whom as Son the love of the Father 
is fully revealed. But millions of men and women may in 
Buddhism have come to God as release out of suffering into 
Nirvana; or in Islwn to God as holy and sovereign will addressing 
the Arab peoples through Mohammed; or in Hinduism to God as 
many-sided source and meaning of life. " 70. 
As J. A. T. Robinson has pointed out, such texts as John 14.16., and others, are misused when they 
are taken out of context and used in support of Christian exclusivism, or as starting points for 
evaluating other religions. 71. Hick sees Christ as an eschatological saviour-figure - one among 
other possible eschatological figures - and believes it is possible to affirm this while denying his 
ontological status as "God the Son, " which he believes is philosophically problematic and 
insufficiently revealed in Scripture as to be beyond dispute. It is true, as Klaus Runia states, that 
functional and ontological status is intrinsically linked. 72. A person acts as he does and is able 
to achieve what he does because of the person that he is. Yet it would be possible to assert that 
the action of God, the "agape, " or perfect love, was present in other great religious leaders such 
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as Martin Luther King, or Gandhi, without asserting that they were in any ontological sense 
incarnate of God. The difference is one of degree, rather than kind, as we shall see more clearly 
in the next section which examines Hick's philosophical objections to the doctrine of the 
Incarnation. It is because no absolutely necessary or unique ontological status is established for 
Christ, in Scripture, that I find it impossible to agree with Hebblethwaite when he writes, "... to 
say that the acts of Jesus were the acts of God is to assert the homo-ousin. " 73. One could 
justifiably assert that the acts of Gandhi were the acts of God - and would not thereby dream of 
asserting the homo-ousin. In making this assertion, Hebblethwaite seems to be making an 
enormous leap from what derives from Scripture, to the developed doctrinal structures of the 
Church in the first few centuries A. D. without sufficient regard for the developmental process 
which undeniably took place. 
The Development of Christology in the Early Church 
It was at the Council of Nicaea, 325 A. D. that the early Church Fathers adopted the concept of 
"homo-ousis, " of one substance, in their efforts to find language which would do justice to their 
understanding of the significance of Christ, and this, it must be emphasized, only after bitter 
dispute. 
".. - Yhe development of doctrine in the early church was 
both 
culturally conditioned and determined by the course of controversy 
and debate, not to mention factors such as politics, personalities 
and the chances of history. " 74. 
Frances Young is referring here to the dispute between Arius and Athanasius, regarding the nature 
of Christ [and so nearly won by Arius! ] In fact, on the admission of the Fathers, the notion "of 
one substance" does not explain anything; we have no knowledge"a priori" or through experience, 
of the substance of God, if we mean by substance, "that from which something is made. " 
However, the idea does imply "of one content, " which provided a way of saying that the divinity 
of christ is a unity of content between the Divine Persons, Father, Son and, by Athanasius' 
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inclusion, Holy Spirit. Thus, the doctrine of the Trinity developed, in tenns of an incarnational 
understanding of the nature of Christ. 
In recent times, however, there has been some recognition that what was said, in Greek, about 
Christ in the fourth and fifth centuries A. D. is relatively meaningless today. 'I'he more radical 
suggestion, made by Hans Ming, is that the categories of "hypostasis" "homo-ousis" etc. would 
have been equally alien to, and rejected by, the first disciples of Christ, who were Jews. 
According to Ming, a radical division in the Early Church may be discerned as early as 132 A. D. 
after the destruction of Jerusalem, which isolated the Jewish Christians in the East from their 
Greek contemporaries. Ming, citing the work of Adolf Schlatter and Adolf von Harnack, suggests 
that Jewish Christianity may have been influential in the rise of Islam, for certain, groups, notably 
the Elkesites, preserved a strictly monotheistic notion of God, and rejected the ecclesiastical 
developments concerning "hypostasis" and "Son of God. " 75. Whether or not the rise of Islam 
may have been indirectly dependent upon Judeo-Christianity is not our concern, here, fascinating 
though these suggestions are; what is of importance as regards the historical roots of Christianity 
is the possibility of discerning a real severance in the understanding of Christ which developed in 
the first few centuries A. D. from that of his earliest followers. Such a possibility tends to 
undermine the notion of continuity in the developmental process of christology from its historical 
basis. [And, incidentally, as pointed out by Knitter, creates a considerable tension where Ming's 
own christological affirmations are concerned. 76. ] 
In terms of strict historical evidence, it cannot be shown that the doctrine of the Incarnation is so 
clearly revealed in Scripture as to be beyond dispute. It is one interpretation, among several, of 
the events of Scripture. The idea that Incarnation and Trinity are coherent developments from 
Scripture has been widely explored, however. J. D. G. Dunn, drawing a comparison between the 
period of Early Church history and the Enlightemnent, writes of, "... a natural desire to forge 
more meaningftd and more expressive alternatives out of the available material. " 77. G. D"Costa 
asserts that, "... the a priori assumption that the later interpretations are less valid than the earlier 
ones is questionable. " 78. What cannot be claimed, however, is that we have a set of 
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interpretations that entirely correlate with each other, therefore a non-incamational interpretation 
cannot be ruled out, on the grounds that the historical evidence for Jesus suggests that it is 
consistent with much of Scripture, and that a variety of Christologies were affirmed in Early 
Church history. It is possible, however, that a developmental view of Christology may be 
compatible with a claim for the uniqueness of Christ if, as C. F. D. Moule believes, the more 
explicit Christological statements are a drawing out and articulating of what is already there, rather 
than an evolutionary development of divinity out of a primitive adoptionism. 79. Moule also holds 
that; 
"... it is precisely because God is revealed by arist as a God who 
became incarnate that he is able to save those who sought him or 
who seek him in other ways whether before the incarnation or 
beyond the range of its acknowledgement., " 80. 
He thereby implicitly aligns himself with an inclusivist position. There seems to me, however, no 
necessary link between the concept of "all-loving God, " and God Incarnate; the former does not 
necessitate the latter, and were it to do so, this would, arguably, strengthen the case for an 
all-loving God to have become incarnate in a variety of times and places, rather than in a single 
historical event. None of these theologians, it must be emphasized, is making the claim that, on 
the basis of Scriptural evidence, the doctrine of Incarnation is in any sense "Absolute Revelation, " 
free from human interpretation. Neither do they see it as a self-representation of Christ, deriving 
directly from his own words, but, rather, as a coherent and plausible development of early 
Christian thought. As regards Jesus' own self-understanding, J. D. G. Dunn believes that he saw 
himself as; 
One who was conscious of being God's son, a sense of 
intimate sonship, an implication that Jesus believed or experienced 
his sonship to be something distinctive or unique; but the evidence 
does not allow us to penetrate further or to be more explicit 
there is no indication that Jesus thought or spoke of himsetf as 
having pre-existed with God prior to his birth or appearance on 
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earth. Such setf-assertions appear only in the latest fonn of the 
canonical Gospel tradition and presuppose substantial 
developments in christological thinUng which cannot be traced 
back to Jesus himseV. " 81. 
It is notable that Dunn's assessment of Jesus' understanding of his own personhood in fact bears 
striking resemblance to Hick's own definition of Jesus, quoted above, "I see the Nazarene, then, 
as intensely and overwhelmingly conscious of the reality of God ... " Hick would probably accept 
Dunn's idea of "unique sonship, " provided it could be conceded by Christianity that this is 
mythological truth, and that the father-son concept is simply one way of conceptualizing God, 
among a variety of ways. Dunn is in agreement with Hick that, on the basis of Jesus' 
self-testimony, we cannot be more definite or explicit about the Incarnation, than that Jesus 
experienced a closeness to God which he described in terms of a Father-son relationship. He 
believes it is inappropriate to describe incarnational language as "mythological, " however, for it 
derives directly from the Jewish concept of divine Wisdom, manifested in a being independent of 
God himself, in no sense God personified, yet representing God's Revelation and immanence 
revealed in the Torah. His preference is for viewing this as the language of imagery and metaphor, 
adapted by early Hellenistic Christianity, rather than the language of myth. However, aside from 
the controversial issue of language forms and how we should define them, there seems little 
difference between Dunn's view of Jesus, which emphasizes the sense of sonship he portrayed, 
and the view expressed by Hick. 
Yet the fact remains that Dunn is a convinced Chalcedonian adherent,, while Hick is not: this in 
itself has certain implications. This divergence of opinion seems to suggest that, as far as the 
historical evidence of the life of Jesus is concerned, much of it is used in a circularity to shore up 
the presuppositions of an already established theological position. In other words, if one starts the 
enquiry as an orthodox Incarnationalist, it is perfectly possible to use certain of Jesus' words and 
actions to support the view that the Incarnation is a plausible and coherent development from 
Scripture. Conversely, if one starts the enquiry from a non-Incarnational stance, one will conclude 
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that Chalcedonian christology is by no means implicit in the New Testament evidence. If this is 
the Case, it has undeniable implications as regards the limitations of the historical evidence, as well 
as underlining the anthropological conditioning of all theological thinking, however well respected 
and scholarly. 
The Problem gf Christology and Jesus' Self-consciousness 
The question of Jesus' self-consciousness does imply that there are considerable difficulties 
inherent in a doctrine of Incarnation as it is traditionally understood within a context of Christian 
Revelation. Certain texts, such as John 4.34. and John 8.28. seem to suggest that Jesus revealed 
what was made known to him by God. This must logically lead to a subordinationist [or Arianistj 
christology. Conversely, other texts, such as John 10.30. and John 14.9. seem to suggest that the 
natures of Jesus and God are mutually identifiable, therefore, God is directly revealed through 
Christ and the consequent christology is monophysite. Either way, we seem to be led into 
christological heresy from which the only escape is to detach the christological issue from 
questions of Jesus' self-consciousness. While it is certainly possible to do this, thereby retaining, 
orthodox christological assertions, the consequence is that the foundation of Christian faith must 
become, in effect, the recognition of the life of Christ as God's revelation by the members of the 
believing community. While, as I have stated, it is perfectly possible to defend this view, many 
Christian believers would find this difficult to accept, in opposition to the view that the life of 
Christ himself is the revelation. In order to retain a coherent Incarnational Christology, it appears 
to be necessary to move beyond the consciousness of Jesus, for, as Carruthers concedes, with 
Dunn, such a Christology can only be partially grounded in the consciousness of Christ, who 
almost certainly never taught that he was God Incarnate nor consubstantial with the Father. 82. 
Carruthers asserts the primacy of the Christian faith in grounding the methodology and principles 
of Christology; it is to the Church's faith and teaching that we must turn to know the truth about 
the personhood of Christ, for the Church's norm ensures that our interpretation of Christ is the 
correct interpretation. 83. Citing Anselm's definition of theology as "faith seeking understanding" - 
a definition in itself open to criticism - he elevates the notion of the Church's inerrancy and 
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reverses what should be the methodological principle of faith, that is the Church seeking 
understanding in Christ, for the Church can have no function except that which is rooted in the 
transmission of the message of Jesus, which must be grounded, fundamentally, in the teaching of 
Christ himself. This is by no means to suggest that all and every development within Christology 
since New Testament times is invalid; a developmental process within Christology is inevitable, 
given the time lapse of almost two thousand years. But it is to suggest that Carruthers' 
presupposition that the Church's faith is the higher norm under which Christology must operate 
is a dangerous presupposition which elevates the status of the Church beyond its proper function 
and distorts the relationship between Christ and the Church to an impermissible extent. 
The Concgpt i2f Divine WisdOm 
The question still remains, where should we turn within Scripture, for an understanding of the 
developmental process which lead to the formulation of the doctrine of Incarnation as traditionally 
understood? It is of interest to note that it is the idea of pre-existent Wisdom, deriving from Judaic 
expression and particularly influential upon the Christology of Paul, that is emphasised by Dunn 
as providing the grounding for the development of the doctrine of the Incarnation. In Paul's first 
letter to the Corinthians, the crucified Jesus is depicted as the Wisdom of God. [ I. Cor. 1: 20 -5.30. 
Also, I. Cor. 8: 6.2. Cor. 4.4. Col. 1.15-20. ] Dunn believes the later expression of the divinity of 
Christ is more surely rooted in these passages than in the titles of Christ, for none of them, 
including "Son of God, " would in themselves demonstrate either the divinity or pre-existence of 
Christ. Dunn emphasizes the significance of the idea of Wisdom in the following way; 
"... we can eVress this [Paul's understanding of Jesus as the fidl 
embodiment of Wisdom] as the divinity or even deity of Christ, so 
long as we understand what that means: the deity is the Wisdom 
of God, for the Wisdom of God is God reaching out to and active 
in this world. So the deity of Christ is the deity of Wisdom 
incarnate; that is, to recognize the deity of Christ is to recognize 
that in Christ God manifested himself, his power as Creator, his 
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love as Saviour in a full andfinal way ... Herein we see the origin 
of the doctilne of the Incarnation. " 84. 
This passage is cited by Carruthers in support of a traditional and literal understanding of the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, against Hick's mythological reinterpretation. According to Carruthers, 
"... it is with this identification, as Dunn points out, that we cross 
the boundary between hwnanity and divinity, between inspiration 
and incarnation. " 85. 
However, I believe Carruthers reads too much into what Dunn is saying [and into what is said by 
Paul. ] Above, Dunn seems to be suggesting that the activity and Wisdom of Christ was the activity 
and Wisdom of God, and that an incarnational development of Christology is explicable against 
this background, but he falls short of identifying Christ with God ontologically. Speaking of Christ 
as "the image of God, " [2. Cor. 4.4. Col. l. 15. ] and of "God's fullness dwelling in him" 
[I. Col. 20. ] implies a close relationship, rather than identity, while certain other passages suggest 
the subjection of Christ to God. [ 1. Cor. 15. ] As I suggested above, Dunn's Christology, although 
arriving at more orthodox conclusions than that of Hick, is nevertheless close to Hick's where 
Jesus' self-testimony is concerned, and falls short of the claims made for it by Carruthers. It is 
probable that Hick would not dispute Dunn's conclusion that God manifested himself in Christ in 
fullness [though not in finality] provided this is understood as a mythological way of expressing 
the significance of Christ. Neither Dunn's Christology, nor Paul's, entails the ontological or literal 
identification of Christ with God in the way suggested by Carruthers. 
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Conclusion 
Tle variety and diversity of opinion regarding the strength or weakness of the biblical evidence 
in support of the doctrine of the Incarnation is overwhelming. This lack of consensus makes it 
extremely difficult to make any kind of generalization, beyond the fact that the Incarnation is one 
interpretation of the events of Scripture. An interpretation may be correct or incorrect, we have 
no way of knowing unequivocally. It may be conceded that the doctrine is a coherent and plausible 
development of Christian theology, yet, given the premise of this study, that theology is a human 
activity, it cannot be beyond human error or human dispute. 86. This legitimizes claims such as 
Hick's, to question the Church's traditional formulations. Certainly, there is good reason for 
rejecting the claim that the doctrine of the Incarnation is absolute Revelation itself, free from 
human interpretation, and we would have good grounds for questioning a theological approach 
w ich started from this basis. For although, as I have conceded, historical methodology could not 
of itself prove the necessity or otherwise of the Incarnation as the only appropriate interpretation 
of Scripture, the ambiguity of the historical evidence must cause some degree of doubt regarding 
the absolute nature of Revelation. The mere existence of a substantial body of questioners of the 
Church's traditional teaching must inevitably affect the positions of those who would argue for the 
Incarnation as a revealed truth of Scripture. Legitimate reasons for doubt cast in question those 
who would maintain certainty on the basis of Scriptural Revelation. 87. 
Further, we have noted that on the basis of the historical evidence of the life of Jesus, scholars are 
capable of arriving at quite different conclusions as regards the question of how far the Incarnation 
is implicit in Scripture; this points both to the limitations of the documentary evidence itself, and 
to the significance of human interpretation of that evidence. 
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Philosophical Grounds for criticising the Doctrine of Incarnation 
Recent philosophical objections to the doctrine of the Incarnation have centred upon the 
supposition that the claim that Jesus was both God and man is logically contradictory, that the 
notion that Christ was uniquely divine cannot be reconciled with an equal emphasis on his 
humanity. If this is so, it constitutes a formidable objection to the doctrine. Ultimately, Hick takes 
the stance that the doctrine is indeed self-contradictory, though he examines the issues involved 
in considerable detail in Chapter II of God and the Universe of Faiths before reaching this 
conclusion. This chapter focuses, initially, on the need to render the doctrine more intelligible and 
therefore more acceptable to Twentieth Century Christians. He redefines the doctrine, previously 
expressed by means of a category of substance or being, "homo-ousis, " to a category of purpose 
and action, "agape. " God is "agape, " it is through his activity that his nature and presence was 
manifest to the people of Israel, and it is the same "agape, " or action, that is found taking place 
through the life of Jesus Christ. It can be asserted that the action of Christ was a continuum with 
the action of God, and that the Biblical evidence suggests that Christ was conscious that his love 
for mankind was identical with the love of God himself, without asserting that he was God "in 
substance, " [whatever that may mean. ] It is possible to say of Jesus that he was "wholly God, " 
in that his actions were the actions of God, qualitatively, and as a causal connection, analogous 
with the emission of a ray of light from the sun, but not "the whole of God, " for the divine agape 
of the Infinite cannot be entirely expressed within the limitations of a spatio-temporal existence. 
Hick expresses this in the following way; 
".. - if we say that Jesus' agapeing was numerically 
identical with 
God's Agapeing, we do not mean that Jesus' agapeing was the 
whole of God's Agapeing. The incarnation was, so to speak, a 
temporal cross-section of God's Agapeing; but as a cross-section 
is not the entirety of that of which it is a cross-section, so the 
divine operation seen incarnate on earth was not the entirety of 
the divine operation. It was, to continue to speak quantitatively, 
as much of that operation or nature as could be expressed within 
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the limitations of a particular set of spatio-temporal actions. " 88. 
Despite this attempt, not to deny the meaning of the doctrine of Incarnation, but to render it more 
intelligible philosophically, it is Lash's belief that, "... according to Hick, the Fathers of Nicaea 
taught meaningless nonsense. " 89. In fact, Hick is simply drawing attention to a paradox which, 
undeniably, exists when it is claimed that a historical person has attributes of omnipotence, 
omnipresence and infinity which are characteristics of "the whole of God, " in the Christian 
understanding. Hick expresses this, in a subsequent publication; "... how one person can be both 
eternal and yet born in time, omnipotent and yet with the limited capacity of a human being ... is 
impossible to defend. " 90. Tbus, ultimately, Hick parts company with the Incarnationalists. He 
believes that the intractable philosophical difficulties inherent in the God-man formula are not 
solved by the adoption of an action Christology; "... the assertion that Jesus' agapeing was 
continuous with the Divine Agapeing is no more seýf-explanatory than the assertion that Christ was 
of one substance with the Father. " 91. 
For Hick, the philosophical difficulties of the concept of Incarnation are insuperable. He is right 
in thinking that they cannot easily be overcome; the Church has always understood the doctrine 
of the Incarnation as a paradox, but it is arguable that there is no logical distinction between a 
paradox, an apparent contradiction, and a real contradiction, unless the paradox is capable of being 
developed and elaborated in some way. This would explain why Hick's own attempt to redefine 
the doctrine results, by his own admission, in a stalemate; if the Incarnation harbours a logical 
contradiction, it is inevitably impossible to develop it beyond the simple formula, "God became 
man, " which explains why all attempts to develop the doctrine beyond this, throughout Christian 
history, have been regarded as heresy. 92. 
Probably the most forthright and controversial suggestion that the God-man formula is logically 
incoherent was made by Hick in The My1h of God Incarnate 
"... it remains a form of words without assignable meaning. For 
to say, without explanation, that the historical Jesus of Nazareth 
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was also God is as devoid of meaning as to say that this circle 
drawn with a pencil on paper is also a square. " 93. 
This "square circle" analogy has been criticized by Hebblethwaite, on the grounds that "God" and 
"man" are not precisely defined terms, as are squares and circles. It is Hebblethwaite's contention 
that "God" and "man" are far from being tightly defined concepts. It is difficult enough to suppose 
that we have a full and adequate grasp of what it is to be a human being; we certainly have no 
such grasp of the divine nature. Who are we to say that the essence of God is such as to rule out 
the possibility of his making himself present in the created world as a human being, while in no 
way ceasing to be the God he ever is? 94. Hebblethwaite is right to point out that "God" and 
"man" cannot be precisely defined as word concepts; Hick's analogy is, perhaps, rather 
exaggerated. It is also true that Christianity has asserted, since before Aquinas, that we cannot 
know the ontology of God in its fullness and completeness. But this is precisely why Hick's 
concept of God as both personal and impersonal cannot be ruled out. Elsewhere, Hebblethwaite 
seems to contradict his own acknowledgement of the limitation of our knowledge of God's nature. 
Having stated that it is not for us to say what God can or cannot do, he lays down quite clearly 
in another context, what God cannot do: 
"... if God himself, in one of the modes ofhis being, has come into 
our world in person ... we cannot suppose that he might have done 
so more than once. For only one man can actually be God to us, 
if God himsetf is one. " 95. 
This might be acceptable if the emphasis was replaced, only one man can be God to us, ie. as 
Christians, within a historically and culturally conditioned Christian enviromment. But as it stands, 
this seems to be a clear case of "wanting it both ways. " Hebblethwaite defends the sovereignty of 
God to become a man if he chooses, in defence of traditional Christian incarnational claims, but 
then delimits it in saying that he cannot do so more than once, also in defence of Christian claims. 
Far from having no precise grasp of the divine nature, Hebblethwaite seems to have a grasp that 
is far too great! He also states, in relation to Hick's objections to the Incarnation; 
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"... Hick has to reinforce his relativistic view by going on to urge 
that the notion of one who is both God and man is 
self-contradictory. But this contradiction was only "discovered " 
after he had already adopted a relativistic view of God and the 
Universe of Faiths on other grounds. Such a belated logical 
discovery does not inspire confidence. ' 96. 
This, however, does not seem to be textually accurate. Surely, as we have seen in our brief 
examination of Chapter 11 of God and the Universe of Faith , Hick's belief that the divine 
14 agape" of the Infinite cannot be entirely expressed in a limited human life, is a philosophical 
objection, conceived initially in the formulation of the Copernican Revolution, rather than 
belatedly, however invalid Hebblethwaite believes this objection to be. 
The Kenotic Theory: the opposing views of Rahner and Moff is 
The fact is that the Incarnation, in encompassing the idea of the dual nature of Christ, is inherently 
problematic. We noted, at the beginning of this chapter, that Hick believes that it is impossible 
for the notion that Christ was uniquely divine to be reconciled with an equal emphasis on his 
humanity. In order to be truly human Christ must have been limited in nature, as every other 
human being is limited. To do justice to the true humanity of Christ, the kenotic theory has been 
developed, in response to a fear that developed in the Nineteenth Century, that traditional 
Christology may have inadvertently harboured a docetic notion of Christ. The kenotic theory is 
that, in becoming man, God "emptied" himself of his divinity and, in an exercise of self-I imitation, 
became as any other First Century Palestinian Jew, humanly limited in knowledge and culturally 
conditioned. However, Jesus, the Son is held to have remained metaphysically one with the Father. 
Therefore, the question of how the historical Jesus is identified with the pre-existent Christ remains 
unanswered, for the subjec of the emptying is the Divine Logos, not man; thus, a paradox 
remains. 
it must be conceded, however, that Rahner's Christology goes some way towards answering some 
of the vexed philosophical objections associated with the Incarnation. His Christology, located 
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within his general theology of transcendental revelation, is a detailed and extremely 
well-constructed attempt to make meaningful the idea of the Incarnation to man as he experiences 
himself to be, that is, transcendentally orientated towards the mystery of God. He goes to 
considerable lengths to redefine the "hypostatical union, " the union of the divine and human 
natures of Christ in such a way as to make it more meaningful. The hypostatic union is defined 
in terms of God's self-communication to man becoming absolute and bringing about the absolute 
self-transcendence of man: 
"... We have already envisaged this hypostatic union implicitly 
when we see the history of the cosmos and of the spirit reaching 
thatpoint at which there occurs the absolute self-transcendence of 
the spirit into God and the absolute self-conununication of God in 
grace and glory to all spiritual subjects. " 97 
Jesus Christ, within Rahner 's Christology, is the completion and fulfilment of what we are as 
human beings; viewed in this light, "the Word became flesh" is not a contingent event in history 
but a historical necessity, the logical fulfilment of our human nature. The hypostatic union is seen 
as universal in that God's self-communication through Christ is intended for all people, [here, as 
we shall see later, Rahner's notion of the "anonymous Christian" becomes explicable]- but it is 
also particular in that, for Rahner,. it takes place solely in Christ. The key concept within Rahner's 
Christology is the idea of grace, within a context of offering and recipient. The offer made by God 
to us, through grace, in Jesus, "... is not only established by God but is God himsetf " 98. Thus 
God offers himself to us, and, through the grace in all of us, established by God in our 
God-orientated nature, we receive him. That God becomes man is essential to Rahner's 
Christology precisely because of the God-orientation of man's nature; "... when God wants to be 
what is not God, man comes to be. " 99. 
This, however, is problematic, for it leaves unanswered the vexed philosophical question raised 
by the notion of the immutability of God, coupled with the idea that he can become "what is not 
God. " Whatever else God is, the notion of God as the one who "is" in an absolute unchanging 
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sense, is contradicted by the idea of his becoming "what he is not, " without ceasing to be God, 
if the idea of immutability is to have any recognisable meaning. Rahner does in fact acknowledge 
that this is problematic, but does not offer any explanation of this contradiction other than the 
simple assertion that, "... it still remains true that the Logos became man. " 100. He retreats from 
the philosophical difficulties of the Incamation by the statement, "... here, ontology has to be 
adapted to the message offaith and not be schoolmaster to this message. " 101. Thus, he fafls, 
ultimately, to provide a satisfactory solution to this particular philosophical difficulty. 
An attempt to overcome the difficulties which arise within kenoticism has been made by Thomas 
V. Morris, who, in The Logic of God Incarnate constructs a meticulous philosophical defence of 
the traditional Incarnational formulations. He concedes that the kenotic strategy necessitates 
n1k Abandoning any substantive metaphysical ascription of immutability to God. 102. On these 
grounds, among others, he rejects kenoticism. He believes, instead, we must recognize two distinct 
ranges of consciousness, or two "mind-views" of Christ. 
"... Mere is first what we can call the eternal mind of God the 
Son with its distinctively divine consciousness. And in addition 
there is a distinctively earthly consciousness that came into 
existence and grew and developed as the boy Jesus grew and 
developed. " 103. 
The "two-minds view" is, Morris believes, a distinct improvement over kenoticism; instead of 
1f emptying himself' in giving up metaphysical attributes essential to Deity, God the Son "takes on" 
the nature of humanity. However, the question arises, if Morris is correct, whether we have here 
an acceptable concept of one who is both truly human and truly divine. For surely we want to say 
of Jesus, in terms of his humanity, that he was truly and normally human, acting in a way that is 
compatible with normal human psychology. The Biblical testimony affirms this; Jesus ate, slept, 
wept, was sometimes angry and was humanly compassionate. But Morris' "two-minds" theory 
undermines this quite seriously, I believe. He draws an analogy [which, on his own admission, 
can only be a partial analogy] between the minds of Christ and the minds of the human individual 
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afflicted with the psychological phenomenon of multiple personality, denoting the existence, within 
a single person, of two or more distinctive streams or ranges of consciousness. 104.1 say 
"afflicted" with deliberation, for, as Morr is concedes, the problem with analogizing a "two-minds" 
theory with the phenomenon of multiple personality is that generally the latter is construed as 
being a highly undesirable psychological state for the human to be in. Morris believes, however, 
that when this partial analogy is applied to God the Son, such problems are overcome by the fact 
that the state is entered into voluntarily, and is conducive to God's purposes for humanity. 105. 
It seems to me, however, that the parallel with what is generally considered to be abnormal human 
psychology is both infelicitous and misleading; we want to say of Christ, surely, that he was truly 
and normally human. Granted that the range of human behaviour that can be considered "normal" 
is extremely wide, and notoriously difficult to define, it must surely still be the case that it must 
exclude multiple personality traits. It must surely be considered preferable for the human 
individual to have a single, integrated mind, than a disintegrated mind, or "two minds", and I 
believe what we would predicate of the normal human individual we must predicate of Christ if 
we want to do justice to his full humanity. 
Moreover, although Morris immunizes his "two-minds- theory from the charge of Nestorianism 
by emphasising that he uses the word "mind" to denote what a person has, rather than what he is, 
it still seems to me that his theory comes perilously close to just such a "heretical" position, or, 
at least, could easily be construed in this way. 106. As we have noted above, all attempts to 
expand the bare God-man formula have resulted in the charge of Arianism, Appolinarianism, 
Docetism, Nestorianism, and so on, which seems to underline the fact that the Christian paradox, 
being a paradox that is immune to explanation, is in fact a contradiction, or as Hick would wish 
to assert, a mythological idea rather than a hypothesis that should be understood literally. 107. It 
is interesting to note that, later in the same publication, Morris dismisses Frances Young's 
argument that; 
"... ifJesus was an entirely normal human being, no evidence can 
be producedfor the incarnation. If no evidence can be produced, 
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there can be no basis on which to claim that an incarnation took 
place. " 108. 
He does this by drawing attention to the distinction between being fully human and being merely 
human. Jesus can be fully human without being merely human, according to Morr is, for the 
qualification, "merely" does, certainly, suggest that he is in no metaphysical way different from 
you or I or any other human being. But what is interesting is Morr is' transposition of the term 
ltmere humanity, " when the reference is actually to "normal humanity. " Frances Young does not 
speak of "mere humanity, " but "normal humanity, " which must mean something rather different. 
It must mean thinking and behaving according to acceptable norms of human psychology, 
[however difficult it may be to define these. ] By substituting "normally" for "merely, " Morris 
alters the meaning of what Young is saying: "mere" and "normal" cannot be used synonymously 
or interchangeably, as Morris seems to be suggesting. For it is quite possible to be merely human 
and normally human and conversely, equally possible to be merely human and abnormally human. 
It is precisely the normality of Jesus' humanity that is called into question by the "two-minds" 
theory. 
Hick, in his criticism of Morris' "two-minds" Christology, does not himself object to the idea of 
the human mind as composite rather than unitary. 109. However, he does highlight the difficulties 
inherent in this idea as regards that aspect of Jesus' mind which we might call his will, or moral 
intention. If the determining element of the composite mind is in fact divine [which to my thinking 
rules out the definition of the man Jesus as fully and normally human] then this element must 
necessarily override any tendency of the human will of the man Jesus to sin or error. It follows 
from this that, whether he knew it or not, Jesus was not in fact free to sin, being controlled by 
the Divine mind Of the son Incarnate. Hick has written of the logical consequences of this theory; 
ff ... such a person could not 
be tempted as we are tempted, or 
become good by overcoming temptation, and accordingly could 
not embody our human moral ideal. Nor - in relation to the 
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doctrine of atonement - could his death constitute the sacrifice of 
life ofperfect hwnan obedience to God. " 110. 
It begins to emerge that the difficulties presented by the doctrine of the Incarnation as it is 
traditionally understood, in safeguarding the full humanity of Christ, are considerable. The 
suggestion that the "two minds" theory runs into the kind of difficulties associated with early 
Christian heresy bears comparison with Rahner's own admission that the Chalcedonian idea of the 
"two natures" of Christ may lead inadvertently to an Apollinarian notion of Christ, a notion of a 
man walking about with God inside him, a supernatural being capable of performing superhuman 
deeds contrary to nature. The fact that, strictly speaking, this is a heretical view of Christ has not 
prevented this being the view that has been presented to the faithful throughout the history of the 
Church. I quote Rahner at length: 
"... if the hwnan nature in the doctrine of the Two Natures is seen 
merely in the customary sense of a pure "instrument., OP the 
possessor of this instrument can no longer be thought of as 
Mediator. He would simply be Mediator to hlmseýf Any attempt 
to deal with the question by discussing it in terms of two "moral 
subjects" would still only provide a verbal solution, because a 
"nature " conceived in this way could not provide the foundation 
for a second moral subject - in relation to God, what is more in 
that everything pertaining to a subject in this moral subject [= 
human nature] would be precisely the Logos himsetf, with respect 
to whom the Mediator is supposed to mediate. But is it possible 
today to keep sharply before our minds Jesus'true initiative in his 
hwnan history with respect to God and before God and 
consequently its immediate empirical subject fln distinction from 
the metaphysical Person], by using only the word "nature, " and 
that in sharp distinction from that of the divine Person? Or is it 
not true that the Redemption becomes for all practical purposes 
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simply God's act among us, and no longer the act of the 
Messianic Mediator between us and God? And is it not true that 
the almost unavoidable consequence of all this is a conception 
which undoubtedly dominates the popular mind [without of course 
reaching the stage of consciouslY formulated heresy], and which 
could be put rather asfollows: "'Men our Lord (= God) walked 
on earth Mth his disciples, still hwnble and unrecognised ?" 
Ill. 
Here Rahner seems to suggest that the Early Church Fathers, in their attempt to do justice to the 
significance of Christ, have inadvertentlY presented us with a Christological formulation which is 
in serious danger of undermining his full humanity and insufficiently emphasizes what Jesus 
himself stressed, the presence of God, active and involved with humanity in its limited and finite 
existence. However, this brings us back full circle to kenoticism, for if we accept this kind of 
criticism we are left with no alternative other than Rahner's own kenotic concept of Christ, which 
insists on his full humanity but runs into the kind of problems outlined above, in relation to the 
immutability of God. It would seem that any and every attempt to expand the God-man formula 
leads us into "heresy" or incoherence or both. 
Alternative Christologie 
If we reject the traditional incarnational. formulations on the grounds of the philosophical 
difficulties associated with them, is it still possible to say something positive about God's 
Revelation in Jesus Christ which does justice to its particularity, concreteness and salvific value? 
There has been, as Hick has noted, an immense diversification of the modes of Christian thought 
in recent times. Recent Christological reformulations, which reject the "two natures" or substance 
Christology of Chalcedon, nevertheless stand up against the charge that the particularity and 
historical concreteness of Christianity is necessarily undermined by quite radical reformulations 
of Christian doctrine. It is notable that an emphasis on an ontological approach has lead some 
theologians, such as Paul Tillich, to reject the Chalcedonian formulations which Rahner himself 
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only retains with some difficulty, in terms of his reservations regarding their meaningfulness. 
Tillich's theology centres very much upon the nature of being; God is thought of as "Being itself. " 
[esse ipsum. ] " ... If we speak of the actuality of 
God, we assert that he is not God if he is not 
being-itself. Other assertions about God can be made theologically only on this basis. " 112. 
By his understanding of God as being-itself, Tillich provides an escape route from the vexed 
God-man dispute, for the nature of God is being-itself, not _4 
being. It follows that; 
". -- the question of the existence of God can neither be asked nor 
answered. If asked... the answer - whether negative or affinnative 
- implicitly denies the nature of God. It is as atheistic to affirm the 
existence of God as it is to deny it, God is being itself, not a 
being. " 113. 
Tillich is saying that it is incorrect to assert that God exists, for to do so is to reduce him to the 
level of a being among other beings. Viewed in this way, it becomes impossible to talk of Jesus 
as partaking of the same substance as God, for God himself is freed from the category of 
"substance. " As noted in chapter 2, Tillich strenuously rejects the Chalcedonian formulation of the 
two natures of Christ; 
to 7--, by eliminating the concept of two natures which lie together 
like blocks and whose unity cannot be understood at all, we are 
open to relational concepts which make understandable the 
dynwnic picture of Jesus as the Christ. " 114. 
Jesus is definitive for Tillich . for he is the focus of what he calls the 
"New Being. " He participates 
in the being of God, in the sense of the nature of God, as do all men and women, but he is, 
qualitatively, the best manifestation of the New Being that has been perceived. In the sense of 
normativeness,, therefore, Tillich's Christology is inclusivist, but his Christological model need not 
be, for it does not, logically, rule out the possibility of wbat be calls "godmanbood" appearing 
elsewhere. The concept of "godmanhood" could have a universalist application. For Tillich, the 
believer, Christ is the "godmanhood, " but for religion as "ultimate concern, " it would be quite 
possible for "godmanhood" to appear elsewhere, wherever there is ultimate concern for the 
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meaning of existence and the salvation of humankind. Tillich's Christological model, therefore, 
provides a solution to philosophical difficulties associated with the Incarnation, and paves the way 
for a pluralist theology of religions, in that the absolute superiori1y of the Christian Revelation ng 
longer follows as a lQgical corollary of the Christology itself 
Moreover, in terms of his theological structure as a whole, it is notable that there is much affinity 
between his thought and that of some non-Christian faiths such as Sankara's Advaita. Tillich"s idea 
of the human mind participating in the Ground of its own being, and thus with Being-itself is 
strikingly similar to the non-dualistic Atman-Brahman idea within Vedantin Hinduism. Tillich's 
Christological model, could therefore, be adapted by theologians such as Hick, in support of a 
theology of religious pluralism, as could the Christologies of Donald Baillie and Geoffrey Lampe. 
115. These Christologies, as Hick himself notes, provide more meaningful accounts of the reality 
A 
of God's grace operating fully and effectively in a human life, without the traditional "two 
natures" formulation which Hick believes; 
"... made sense within the philosophical world of the early 
Christian centuries but which has now become little more than a 
mysterious formula which is obediently repeated but. no longer 
bears any intrinsic meaningfulness. " 116. 
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Conclusion 
The nature and status of Christological language is an extremely complex issue; I have argued, 
with Hick, that traditional Incarnational language may be incoherent, and that certain philosophical 
difficulties are not satisfactorily solved even by so well constructed a Christology as Rahner VS. 
There seems to be a case for abandoning the Chalcedonian formulation in favour of a formula that 
may be more meaningful to the modern mind, which will free Christianity from its traditional 
exclusivism vis a vis other world faiths. Hick's "action Christology" provides a way of saying how 
Christ is, definitively, "the way, the truth and the I ife, " for Christians, but need not be for others 
who experience God, or Ultimate Reality equally and authentically by other means. I have also 
suggested that Tillich's Christology, among others, provides an acceptable alternative which need 
not entail that an "a priori" judgement is made, regarding the superiority of Christianity in relation 
to other exemplifications, of God's revelation. Even if the doctrine of the Incarnation is coherent 
- and I have argued that it may not be - Incarnationalists such as Rahner and Hebblethwaite fail 
to provide any real reasons why God, if he can become a man, should have done so only once. 
In many ways, the arguments used by Rahner to increase the relevance of the Incarnation to the 
modem mind, by seeing it as the fulfilment, through grace, of what is our human potential, seem 
to make it less likely that this should occur in a once-only human event. This seems inconsistent 
not only with the Christian axiom of God's universal salvific will, but with the notion of his 
universal love. God is not God, ie. a God who is of real value to the religious believer, unless his 
love for humankind is equal and, therefore, his revelation equally authentically available to all men 
and women. 
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Theological grounds for criticising -the 
Doctrine of the Incarnation 
It has been stated that the theological issue, ie. the implications of the doctrine of Incarnation for 
the salvation of non-Christians, was a primary concern of Hick's, in formulating his Copernican 
Revolution, although, as we have seen, he provides good historical and philosophical reasons, 
-1 also, for rejecting the Chalcedonian formulation. Brian Hebblethwaite concedes that the 
theological issue is, "... the most persuasive reason for demythologising the Incarnation ... this 
global ecumenism makes moral and religious sense. " 117 However, he qualifies this by saying 
that one cannot acWally proceed other than by examining the doctrine itself, and noting that 
Christianity has in fact made unique claims on the basis of it, and that these must be retained if 
the essential character of Christianity is not to be lost. However, if Hebblethwaite is right- and 
exclusivists and most inclusivists would be in agreement with him - the question remains, how 
does Christianity account for the salvation of non-Christians? Or are they condemned to perdition 
according to the ancient exclusivist view, denounced by Hick, that, "... outside the Church, or 
outside Christianity, there is no salvation. " 118.1 shall examine this issue in relation to the views 
of our "representative theologians, ", Lesslie Newbigin and Karl Rahner. 
Lesslie Newbi2i 
Newbigin's stance can be examined with brevity, for in fact he fails to give any real answer to the 
question of the salvation of non-Christians. It is Newbigin's belief that this is simply not a proper 
question. He writes; 
.... I confess that I wn astounded by the arrogance of theologians 
who seem to think we are authorized in our capacity as Christians 
to inform the rest of the world about who is to be vindicated and 
who is to be condemned at the lastjudgement. " 119. 
Thus he is saying that we cannot know if, or how, the salvation of non-Christians comes about; 
this is not a proper issue for Christian discussion and must be left to the grace of God. One cannot 
help but feel, however, that Newbigin is using the notion of the transcendence of God, and 
Page 168 
condemning the "arrogance" of other theologians, to escape this difficult theological issue. 'nis 
is hardly satisfactory; in a self-consciously pluralist world, theology, to be credible, must grapple 
with the tensions that arise in relation to its own axioms, and the salvation of non-Christians. This 
is not to deny that other exclusivist theologians, such as Lindbeck and DiNoia, have attempted to 
deal with this issue, and we shall examine Lindbeck's idea of the post-mortem encounter of the 
non-Christian with Christ in the next chapter, in the context of his cultural -linguistic model for the 
nature of oppositions in religious truth claims. For the present, however, we will focus upon Karl 
Rahner's attempt to provide a viable solution to this problem by means of the well-known concept 
of the "anonymous Christian. " 
Karl Rahner 
In Theological Investigations. Vol. 5. Rahner maintains that Jesus Christ is the definitive revelation 
of God, but that the salvation of non-Christians, if it occurs, must occur because of their other 
religious allegiances, not despite them, since humans are social beings whose beliefs are 
necessarily formed within the context of their social and historical environment. Here again, we 
see the strongly anthropological character of Rahner's theology. He believes that non-Christians, 
who may have accepted God's grace in their hearts may be termed "anonymous Christians", 
anonymous in that they are not consciously followers of Christ, but "Christian" nevertheless, 
because the grace of God they have accepted is, axiomatically, for Rahner, that which is 
definitively revealed by Christ, who is the only means of salvation. 120. Rahner's notion of the 
anonymous Christian draws upon the doctrine of implicit desire, which has a long history within 
the Christian Church, dating from Augustine, and later, Aquinas, who expanded the dictum of his 
predecessor with the observation that explicit confession of the mystery of Christ is not necessary 
for salvation; implicit acceptance may be sufficient for those who have "received no revelation" 
for, "... though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicitfaith 
through believing in divine providence... " 121. However, the role of implicit belief or implicit 
desire is valid only until such time as the individual is conftonted with the Gospel; "... after grace 
had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries of 
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Christ. " 122. Rahner also upholds a belief in the possibility of the salvation of those who, through 
no fault of their own, have not received the Gospel of Christ, and also in respect of the essentially 
provisional nature of the doctrine of implicit desire. Rahner believes Christian mission is not only 
still necessary, but is actually demanded by the "incarnational and social structure of grace and 
Christianity" for through mission and explicit acceptance of the Gospel the anonymous Christian 
may be transformed; "... into someone who also knows about his Christian belief in the depths of 
his grace-endowed being by objective reflection and in the profession offaith which is given social 
form in the Church. " 123. Hick has noted that it remains the stance of the Roman Catholic Church 
to promote explicit conversion to Christianity, for a recent encyclical, "Redemptoris Missio", 
1990, declares that; "... dialogue should be conducted and implemented with the conviction that 
the church is the ordinary means of salvation and that she alone possesses the fidlness of the 
means of salvation. "[par. 55.1124. Rahner's contributions to the doctrine of implicit belief, which 
emphasise its conciliatory nature, and make the categories of persons to whom it is applicable less 
exclusive, are twofold; firstly, he highlights the role of grace in the doctrine of implicit desire, and 
secondly, he differentiates between the Gospel of Christ being made accessible to the individual, 
and the individual's actual understanding of it. Rahner believes that God's grace may be present 
in non-Christian religions. He writes; 
"... Until the moment when the Gospel really enters into the 
historical situation ofan individual, a non-Christian religion [even 
outside the Mosaic religion] does not merely contain elements of 
a natural knowledge of God, elements, moreover mixed up with 
hwnan depravity which is the result of original sin and later 
aberrations. It contains also supernatural elements arising out of 
the grace which is given-to men as a gratuitous gift on account of 
Christ. For this reason a non-Christian religion can be recognised 
as a lahfm religion [although only in different degrees] without 
thereby denying the error and depravity contained in it. " 125. 
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It must be noted that, within Rahner's thinking, the grace that may exist within the non-Christian 
religion is viewed, specifically, as the same grace that is offered through, and originates, in Christ. 
[This is a point we shall return to in detail, in Part 2, where it will be particularly relevant to a 
discussion of the similarity or dissimilarity of the soteriological. doctrines of the religions. ] For the 
present, it will be of interest to examine Rahner's analysis of the relationship between belief and 
understanding in reception of the Gospel of Christ. 
Rahner holds that even those who reject the Christian faith may yet be anonymous Christians if 
they are rejecting that which is imperfectly understood. If Christianity has not reached them, " ... in 
the real urgency and rigour of actual existence... they cannot be held culpablefor unbelief. 126. 
Rahner seems to be suggesting that complete understanding must bring about belief. [Certainly, 
if it does not, and complete understanding is presupposed, the individual must be considered to 
be in bad faith, and could no longer be considered an anonymous Christian. ] But this close linking 
of belief with understanding is problematic, for two reasons. Firstly, as Kellenberger suggests, it 
may be that it is impossible to have explicit belief without complete understanding, belief being 
the hallmark of the individual's understanding of the Gospel. 127. If this is the case, the "extra 
ecclesia" doctrine, as applied to those who understand and yet reject the message of Christ, is 
necessarily defunct, for it can apply to no-one. Conversely, I would suggest, if belief is not 
necessarily predetermined by, and dependent, on understanding, it is clearly possible to conceive 
of the existence of those [possibly born and nurtured within the faith] who believe without 
understanding. What of these? Are they the recipients of God's grace and therefore saved, despite 
the fact that they believe that which they do not understand? Rahner, by his own axioms relating 
to the universality of grace, would have to answer in the affirmative, but he would also have to 
concede that this seriously undermines the Christian axiom of the universal salvific will of God, 
for those believers who believe without understanding would seem to be recipients of what may 
be termed "salvific advantage, " derived, presumably, through the accident of birth. 
The term "anonymous Christian" has been criticized by Hick, who calls it, "too manifestly an ad 
hoc contrivance to satisfy many. " 128. It is also rejected by Ung who believes it to be offensive 
Page 171 
to non-Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and others who, empirically, may have no leanings towards 
Christianity: "... the non-Christian ... cannot be silently adoPted bY Christianity. Man's ftee will 
must be respected. " 129. D'Costa, however, believes that the concept of the "anonymous 
Christian" is acceptable, in that it is an inner reflection, not one outwardly promoted towards 
believers of other faiths: "... it is addressed by a Christian to his or her, and the Church's own 
se? f-understanding. " 130. What is questionable, here, is whether one's own self-understanding 
must not necessarily affect one's attitude towards others, in inter-faith dialogue. Given that the 
theologian and believer is simply a human thinker, how far can he or she isolate a 
self-understanding from an understanding of others with the kind of objectivity that seems to be 
suggested? Rahner, clearly, believes fruitful inter-faith dialogue is facilitated by the idea of the 
"anonymous Christian; " he concedes the possibility of grace in other religions, while 
acknowledging their real differences. Hick, however, believes that in fact, it actually blocks 
dialogue, since the term can be reversed, and Christians can just as easily be labelled "anonymous 
Hindus or Muslims. " 131. 
It does seem, in fact, that Rahner prejudges the outcome of dialogue, and, if this is so, it is not 
easy to see how it can be maintained that truly open-ended dialogue is facilitated. As we have 
noted, he believes that, when truly confronted with the Gospel, other religions must, in the course 
of time, lose their validity, and concede the greater revelation that is in Christianity: 
"... the individual who grasps Christianity in a clearer, purer and 
more reflective way has, other things being equal, a still greater 
chance of salvation than someone who is merely an anonymous 
Christian. " 132. 
It is explicitly stated that the notion of "anonymous Christian" can only be properly applied to 
those "anonymous Christians" who have not heard, or have heard but not understood, the Gospel, 
not to those countless thousands who, having been exposed to the Christian message, nevertheless 
adhere to other faiths. As G-D'Costa has pointed out, it would be extremely difficult to locate an 
instance in which it could be maintained that an individual had been truly confronted with the 
Gospel, to the point of perfect understanding, while nevertheless rejecting it, but it is clear that, 
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if and when such a situation should occur, it would be impossible, subsequently, to regard such 
an individual as an "anonymous Christian. " 133. In answer to the question, "why might such a 
situation occur? " the inclusivist answer must necessarily be that the individual, in freely rejecting 
the authentic revelation of God, was committing a grave sin. This seems tantamount to saying that, 
since the inclusivist knows Christianity to be true, other faiths, while they contain some truth, are 
less true, by logical inference. But the ground between a cogent theoretical position and the 
inferences drawn from it, is filled with pitfalls. On practical investigation, it is frequently found 
that the logical inference does not remain credible, and this is what Hick found, through 
experience, to be the case. 134. Empiricism, while demonstrating that Christianity is a real and 
living force in the lives of many people, enabling them to know God, equally asserts that this is 
the case with other religions. So far as it is possible to judge, through observation, the evidence 
is overwhelming that God is in fact present in the lives of many Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims, 
to an equally authentic extent. This might account for the rejection of the Christian gospel by the 
hypothetical "anonymous Christian, " who, in the words of Troeltsch; 
"... may experience their contact with the Divine Life in quite a 
different way, and may also possess a religion which has grown 
up with them andfrom which they cannot sever themselves so long 
as they remain what they are. " 135. 
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Conclusion 
I have dealt with the exclusivist stance in relation to the question of the salvation of non-Christians 
briefly, since a common response is that we simply do not know if, or how, they are saved: other 
exclusivist responses will be examined in the next chapter. Inclusivists such as Rahner, while 
finding ways of accounting for the salvation of non-Christians, tend to underestimate the 
significance of the anthropological and religious conditioning of the individual, which may in fact 
make it impossible for the potential "anonymous Christian" to be "truly" confronted with the 
Christian Gospel. The mind of the non-Christian is, after all, not a blank page; Rahner himself 
concedes that an individual can only begin with what he is and what he already believes. 136. This 
is not to deny the existence of human free will, nor does it necessitate the total relativism of all 
re ig ous truth. Hick's idea of the innate moral awareness of humankind presupposes that, for 
example, if the non-Christian was a member of an innately immoral and abhorrent sect or group, 
he or she might well be receptive to the Gospel. But if, on the other hand, he or she was an 
adherent of another world faith of venerable traditions, already experiencing God or Ultimate 
Reality as present in his or her life, the Gospel message would appear interesting, perhaps, but 
essentially superfluous. 137. Hick's concern is not to say that whatever is sincerely believed and 
practised is, by definition, true. 138. But he does say that the merit of each phenomenal religion 
must be judged in terms of objective moral criteria, and in terms of its efficacy in promoting the 
moral and spiritual development of the individual. 139. How far it is possible to define "objective 
moral criteria, " in view of the humanist argument that such criteria are purely human constructs, 
it will be necessary to explore in Part 2, after the examination of further problems associated with 
religious pluralism. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CDZ, m2ive. Non Cognitive and Mythological ADDroaches to the Problem of Oppositions in 
Religious Truth ClaiMs 
Hick's radical revision of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation has had inevitable implications 
for Christian self-understanding; it has been suggested that the pluralist hypothesis, in its 
perception of Christianity as one-among-many world faiths, each potentially equally efficacious 
as paths towards knowledge and salvation of God, or Ultimate Reality, overlooks or minimizes 
genuinely conflicting religious truth claims. In doing so, it undermines the status of truth-content 
in Christian belief, encapsulated in essential Christian doctrines, and is thus unacceptable to the 
mainstream of Christianity. [Equally, it involves a reductionist approach to the central truth claims 
of other traditions, and would thus be unacceptable to them also. ] 1. It will be the purpose of this 
chapter to refute this major criticism by examining the nature, status and function of doctrines 
within the Christian faith, in juxtaposition with Hick's thesis that historical and cultural factors 
play a major role in shaping the particular doctrines of a given religious community. 
Hick's Approach to the Problem of Conflicting Truth Claims 
Hick states that; 
"... the basic hypothesis which suggests itseýf is that the different 
streams of religious experience represent diverse awareness of the 
same transcendent reality, which is perceived in characteristically 
different ways by different human mentalities, formed by and 
forming different cultural histories... One then sees the great 
world religions as different human responses to the one divine 
Reality, embodying different perceptions which have beenformed 
in different historical and cultural circwnstances. " 
Although, as we shall see, Hick acknowledges that propositional truth claims are certainly 
encapsulated within doctrinal schemes, the doctrines themselves do not constitute absolute human 
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truth, free from human interpretation. The nature of doctrines themselves is such that they are 
human constructs, subject to the anthropological conditioning of all theological thinking. While 
they may provide paths towards the ultimate truth which is transcendent and beyond human 
knowledge, they are not absolute truth itself, and, however venerable, should not be considered 
immutable. Within Hick's framework of understanding of the status of religious doctrines, the 
Christian doctrine of the divinity of Christ is not viewed as divine in origin, it is viewed as a 
human conceptual formulation, subject to the limitations and possible error of all human thinking. 
Belief in the absolute claims of certain doctrines within a particular phenomenal religion which, 
by logical inference, denies the truth of other groups' claims, is nothing other than a human 
hypothesis which is denied by the most rudimentary examination of the totality of human 
experience. 3. This, as we shall see, is in many ways an extension of Hick's earlier views on 
epistemology in relation to the problem of religious pluralism, and is consistent with his revisionist 
approach to the concept of revelation, outlined in Chapter 1. His thesis is that what is ultimately 
Real may be experienced within the religious traditions in a variety of ways that are nevertheless 
genuine manifestations of the same Reality, and, further, that the ontological status of Ultimate 
Reality is such as to make it possible for both personal and non-personal human accounts to be 
equally authentic. How far this thesis overcomes what appear to be genuinely conflicting religious X- 
truth claims will be the question we shall consider in this chapter. 
Hick acknowledges that, typically, religious communities construct and assert statements of belief 
in natural language; these statements are generally considered to have a cognitive dimension, the 
statements of belief constitute claims to knowledge, and are frequently based upon some alleged 
inerrant text, or authority figure. This notion of the cognitive status of religious doctrines is 
specifically associated with the propositional view of truth; the religious believer, in making the 
statement, I believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth, " is asserting 
the truth of the proposition expressed in that sentence. Clearly, it seems to be possible, given that 
doctrines are about claims for knowledge, for the doctrines of one religious community to be 
incompatible with those of another, for the Christian doctrine as expressed above is clearly 
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opposed by the Buddhist denial of the existence of God. Opposing doctrinal positions are clearly 
existent. However, an anthropological approach to this problem must necessarily emphasize that 
although each group is making claims that are, in essence, expressions of knowledge, the very fact 
of disagreement as to what is or is not "truth" seems to imply that this "knowledge" is provisional 
and less than absolute. 
The basic fact of oppositions in religious doctrines is acknowledged by Hick, in fact he has 
formulated a schema for the examination of their various types and levels. 4. His objective, in 
doing so, is to determine how far they undermine the pluralist hypothesis. Firstly, he writes, there 
are differences of belief concerning straightforward matters of historical fact, an obvious example 
being the Christian belief that Jesus died on the cross, which is refuted by the Muslim belief that, 
they did not slay him, neither crucified him, only a likeness o ýf that was shown to them. " j7he 
Qur'an. 4.156.1 This, and other disputes concerning historical events could in theory be settled by 
historical methodology, ie. through historical reconstruction by means of documentary evidence. 
In practice, however, the fragmentary and inconclusive nature of the evidence available means that 
no amount of scriptural exegesis is likely to result in definitive answers, therefore such matters 
tend to be "settled" by theological considerations. Hick concedes that for some believers, for 
whom the pluralist hypothesis may be inaccessible, these matters may be of crucial importance, 
but for many others they are not of the essence of faith. 5. 
Secondly, there are those truth claims which Hick defines in terms of the idea of "trans-historical 
fact, " which, as we shall see, he believes are better understood as true or false religious myths, 
rather than true or false factual assertions. 6. According to Hick, trans -h isto rical truth claims deal 
with matters that are in principle verifiable or falsifiable, but cannot be verified or falsified 
according to the present state of human knowledge. 7 Some trans-historical truth claims are 
specific to particular religions, and derive from simple historical facts, for example, the doctrinal 
statement "Jesus was crucified" is a historical fact which could, theoretically, be subjected to 
historical methodology for confirmation or disconfirmation, but the more complex theological 
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derivation from this, "Jesus died for the salvation of mankind, " could not be so subjected. 8. 
Nevertheless, it still remains true that, here, we are considering what is ultimately a matter of fact, 
there must in principle be true answers to questions which derive from this and other issues which 
are not specific to particular faiths. For example, all religions make doctrinal statements about 
afterlife, the Western traditions generally affirming the fate of the individual soul in terms of the 
concepts of heaven and hell, while many [though not all] of the Eastern traditions affirm we are 
reborn many times on this earth. Again although there must be true answers to questions posed 
by afterlife beliefs, we are not, in this life, able to confirm or disconfirm any particular set of 
beliefs, although such matters may be subject to eschatological verification. 9. For the believer 
within a particular religious community, trans-historical truth claims are "verified" ie. acquire the 
status of knowledge, with reference to particular scriptures or authority figures. The notion of 
eschatological verification allows that, ultimately, such claims will be verified, beyond present 
existence. In this life, however, specific religious truth claims do not have the status of inerrancy 
or absolute authority for non-believers. No universal acknowledgement of the truth or falsity of 
such religious doctrines is attainable. 10. 
Thirdly, there are what may be termed ontological disagreements, that is, profound differences in 
our ways of conceiving Reality, which manifest themselves in the major split between those faiths 
which conceive the divine as personal and those whose awareness focuses on the impersonal. Hick, 
as we shall see,, approaches this type of conflict from the pluralist presupposition that each of these 
conceptions is a partial, incomplete image of the totality of the Real, which is beyond the limits 
of human understanding and conception. His hypothesis is that; 
"... in conjunction with the principle that it is rational for people 
within each tradition to trust their own form of religious 
experience ... the infinite Real, in itsetf beyond the scope of other 
than purely formal concepts, is differently conceived, experienced 
and responded to from within the different cultural ways of being 
human. ' IL 
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Clearly, Hick is very far from denying the existence of oppositions in religious doctrines. 
However, he differs from many theologians in that he does not believe the fact of conflict of this 
nature is of very great significance. He asserts this because the "knowledge" expressed in doctrinal 
statements is not indubitable. He does not believe salvation can be dependent on the truth or falsity 
of doctrinal statements about which we have no definitive information. We cannot be held culpable 
for ignorance of this kind, therefore it seems implausible to suggest that "knowledge" is necessary 
for salvation/liberation. His general conclusion in respect of the facts of conflicting truth claims 
is th at; 
"... Such beliefs concerning trans-historical fact vary in 
importance within the belief-system to which they belong; and at 
the top end of the scale they may be indispensable to a given 
doctrinal structure. It does not however follow that structure is 
itself indispensable for salvation 17iberation. On the contrary, it 
suggests otherwise: for it seems implausible that ourfinal destiny 
should depend upon our professing beliefs about matters of trans- 
historicalfact concerning which we have no definitive infonnation. 
It seems more likely that both correct and incorrect trans- 
historical beliefs, like correct and incorrect historical and 
scientific beliefs, canformpart of a religious totality that mediates 
the Real to human beings, constituting an effective context within 
which the salvific process occurs. " 12. 
It will be necessary, presently, to examine Hick's thesis in this respect in more detail. However, 
at this point, it may be profitable to examine an alternative approach to the problem of conflicting 
religious truth claims, which, it is claimed, provides an "escape route" to such conflicts altogether, 
by means of a non-cognitive approach to religious language. This approach has been the subject 
of considerable interest in recent times. However, our purpose in examining the non-cognitive 
approach to religious language will be, ultimately, to demonstrate that, far from providing a 
solution to the problem of conflicting religious truth claims, it undermines the notion of religious 
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truth itself, by lapsing into a fideistic or possibly even Feuerbachian approach to religion, in which 
truth claims are viewed as being regulated and determined by the human constructs of language 
and culture, and thus, cease to exist as mind-independent realities. 
An Altemative Approach to Qppositions in Religious Truth Claims: The Non-Cognitive ApProach 
to Religious Language 
An approach to the problem of oppositions in religious doctrines that draws heavily on 
Wittgensteinian insights into the nature of religious language has been developed in recent times 
by G. A. Lindbeck, in The Nature of Doctrine - Religion and Theojogy in a Post-liberal Age. 13. 
Lindbeck is concerned with the possibility of fruitful inter-religious dialogue; he differentiates 
between the cognitive approach to religious doctrines, which views religious beliefs as the 
acceptance of propositional truths, and what he calls the experiential -expressive approach, by 
which religious doctrines are seen as non-discursive and non-informative symbols of the 
interpretation of human experience. 14. He believes some modern theologians, notably, Rahner, 
have adopted an approach which synthesizes these two theories. 15. Lindbeck's own contribution 
to the doctrinal debate is the suggestion of what he has called the " cultural-linguistic alternative, " 
which, he believes, makes possible the understanding and reconciliation of doctrinal disagreement 
without capitulation. In the case of the cognitive approach, this is impossible, because the truth 
claims of doctrines are held to be immutable, while the emphasis of the experiential-expressive 
approach is rejected by Lindbeck, because according to him, it fails to account for the real 
relationship between experience and culture. 
It is Lindbeck's belief that we do not experience first and then express; he reverses this order and 
accords primacy to cultural /linguistic systems which shape and determine what our experience will 
be. Lindbeck's alternative approach treats religions as cultural-linguistic systems in which patterns 
of belief, ritual and action actually constitute the existential self-understanding of the human being. 
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For Lindbeck, religion is a system of cultural-linguistic "rules; " the patterns of religious ritual and 
belief within the system give shape and form to experience. 
. -Religion, one might say, 
is that ultimate dimension of culture, 14 n- 
which gives shape and intensity to the experiential matrix from 
which significant cultural achievements flow. " 16. 
He believes the cultural-linguistic model is able to accommodate and combine features from the 
other models; to say that doctrines are regulative devices is not to deny that they involve 
propositions. Within the cultural-linguistic model, however, propositions are held to be 
"intrasystematic" rather than ontological truth claims, they do not have the status of first-order 
statements of what is the case universally, as would be claimed by some cognitivists. 17. Given 
the view that cultural and linguistic forms shape and in a sense constitute human experience, this 
is an "outside-inwards" approach, as opposed to the experiential -expressive approach, which 
stresses an "inwards-outside" view, that the experience of religion is diversely articulated through 
different religions which nevertheless share a common experiential core. It is Lindbeck's belief 
that there is no common experiential core; religions produce divergent experiences of what it is 
to be human. 
This differs considerably from Hick's understanding or religious experience; Hick is reliant on the 
idea of there being a common-core of religious experience, diversely articulated through the 
phenomenal religions, not only in support of the pluralist hypothesis but in support of the existence 
of God/Transcendental Reality itself. 18. Hick does not deny that religious experiences differ from 
one another; 
"... the religious experiencing of life can itself take differentfonns. 
The world may be experienced as God's handiwork, or as the 
battlefield of good and evil, or as the cosmic dance of Shiva ... and 
so on. These are differentforms of religious experiencing-as. " 19. 
What he does suggest is that such differences are attributable to the different human cultures which 
condition religious experience, and that despite such differences, all religious experience is a 
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response to the one Ultimate Reality. 20. While Hick would be in agreement that what we 
experience is conditioned by the historical and cultural situation in which we find ourselves, he 
would, I believe, fall short of asserting that what we experience is absolutely determined by the 
historical, cultural and linguistic framework. To assert otherwise would not only deny the 
possibility of a common-core of religious experience, it would also considerably undermine the 
primacy of religious experience as an epistemological doctrine. 
However, the implication of Lindbeck's thinking does seem to be that religious experience is 
ultimately determined by culture and linguistics. Within Lindbeck's thinking, the dominant 
direction of influence in the complex interrelationship between culture, experience and linguistic 
expression, is always and invariably ftom language and culture. He writes; 
". .. A religion is above all an evernal word, a "verbwn externum " 
that moulds and shapes the self and its world, rather than an 
expression ... of a preexisting setf or preconceptual experience. " 
21. 
Thus, according to Lindbeck, the linguistic framework, ritual and practice of one's inherited 
religious tradition will determine how one experiences religiously. On these terms, it must be 
impossible to engage with, or learn from, any faith tradition other than one's own, for one cannot 
enter into the "experiential heart" of a faith tradition unless one has adopted it. Thus, the ultimate 
result of Lindbeck's thesis, which emphasises the incommensurability of faiths, is a fideistic 
position. 22. John Milbank, who also holds strong notions of the incommensurability of faiths, 
directs his criticisms of Lindbeck's thesis towards its fideistic implications. Milbank believes 
Lindbeck is right to insist that it is through the narrative of revelation that God is identified for 
us. 23. However, he believes that Lindbeck misunderstands the structural complexity of narrative, 
and develops a kind of "meta-narrative realism" by which the Gospel narrative is severed from 
its historical roots. According to Milbank, Lindbeck grafts "paradigmatic functions" upon the 
Gospels, which thereby become stories privileged by faith, the regulators and interpreters of all 
other stories. Milbank believes this is to lapse into fideism; the Christian narrative, in being 
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incorporated into a variety of conceptual schemes and social situations, is unable "... to exert a 
critical influence upon its Cultural receptacles, norfor these in turn to criticize Christianity. ' 24. 
Ultimately, according to Milbank, what is genuinely historical cannot become paradigmatic without 
diluting its specificity and temporal and historical character. 
One could even argue further, that Lindbeck's thesis leads, ultimately, to a Feuerbachian position 
in which it is difficult to sustain a realist conception of God as the object of experience. To argue, 
as Lindbeck does, that religious experience is actually constructed and determined by culture, 
rather than influenced by culture, is ultimately to empty experience of any authentic claim to 
cognitive content. If Lindbeck is right, and linguistic structures and religious "rules" actually 
construct reality and the existential self-understanding of he or she who experiences, by what 
criteria could religious experience be held to be authentic experience? It is arguable that what is 
experienced could only be the culturally and linguistically conditioned human projection of he or 
she who experiences. Thus, an assertion of the primacy of culture/linguistics in determining the 
experience of religion ultimately leads us to a Feuerbachian position in which such experience is 
to be viewed simply as a human construct, projected via the determining factors of culture and 
language. Ultimately, a realist conception of the object of experience becomes untenable, if that 
object is constructed by the "rules" of religion and the cultural A ingu isti c structure. 
The suggestion I am making is that Lindbeck's view, that the cultural linguistic or doctrinal system 
is prior to, and determinative of experience, is highly contentious. It is his belief that it is through 
the "rules" of religion that reality and value systems are constructed. He makes a useful analogy 
between learning the rules of religion and learning the rules of language, which conforms with the 
work of linguists such as Noam Chomsky, who has shown that, without certain word concepts, 
meaning itself is prohibited. 25. The Innuit child, for example, who possesses many different 
word-concepts to express the idea of "snow, " is able to attach a very much greater range of 
meaning to this concept than is the English language speaker. Word-concepts, thus, seem to be 
instrumental in shaping thought. Yet it could equally be argued that experience functions to 
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necessitate the formulation of a wider range of word-concepts. Word-concepts symbolize reality, 
but reality itself in the sense of meta-linguistic experience may be the key factor in the construction 
of linguistic systems. The point could be illustrated by a purely fictitious story. Suppose, for 
example, the existence of a simple society entirely dependent on the snake for economic survival. 
The people of this sociev., hunt the snake, eat snake meat, use snake skin for clothing and snakes' 
teeth for tools. [They would, presumably, make use of snakes' bones if there were any! ] This 
entirely snake-dependent community would presumably develop a vocabulary of "snakedom": they 
would have words for snake meat in its raw and cooked forms and words to describe snakeskin 
in its natural and cured forms. They might also acquire a complex linguistic system in relation to 
the metaphysics of the snake, and snake-worship, that would be inexplicable to persons living 
outside this community. The point surely is that, were such a linguistic system to develop, the key 
factor in its formulation must be the experience of the people of the community. Words 
encapsulate and describe experience because of the necessity of communication of shared 
experience, which is a requisite for communal survival. This example, though an extreme and 
entirely fictitious one, is nevertheless illustrative of the fact that experience cannot easily be 
discounted in the formulation of linguistic structures. 
It is probable that a complex reciprocal relationship exists between linguistic expression and 
experience; what we seem to have here is a "chicken-egg" situation in which it is by no means 
easy to be sure that one always precedes the other or to determine a dominant direction of 
influence that is necessarily and invariably operative. How can Lindbeck be so sure that the 
dominant direction of influence is from language and culture? The problem that arises, if he is 
right, can be illustrated in the context of the particular doctrine that is of interest to us, that of the 
Incarnation. If it is the case that the cultural linguistic system shapes and determines the nature of 
experience, this leads, logically, to a situation in which Christians would be obliged to affirm the 
prior existence of a linguistic framework which was determinative in the later expression of the 
Easter experience. In other words, they would have to say that the previously existent 
doctrinal /linguistic conceptual ization of "an Incarnate Son of God" shaped and determined the 
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disciples' experience of Christ's life and death and the subsequent thinking of the Early Church. 
While it has certainly been argued that the thought forms of the Ancient World functioned in this 
way, most Christians would want to dispute this. They would want to affirm, rather, that the 
doctrine of the Incarnation deriyes from the attempts of the Early Fathers to find language which 
would do justice to the uniqueness of Christ and assert his ontological status as Son of God. In 
other words, they would want to say that, at least in this important instance, experience was the 
primary determinative influence. 
Lindbeck himself uses the doctrine of the Incarnation as a "test case" for his cultural/linguistic 
theory. He suggests that the Nicean formulation was in fact an agreement among the Early Church 
Fathers to speak in a certain way, of Christ, rather than to attach ontological significance to him 
as " vere deus and vere homo "; "... The ancient formulations may have continuing value, they do 
not, on the basis of the rule theory, have doctrinal authority. " 26. This seems to be very close to 
saying that the words used by the Fathers at Nicea were devoid of meaning outside a limited 
Christian context. Lindbeck's understanding of human language, our only means of obtaining a 
consensus of meaning, in fact presupposes that no consensus is obtainable. Word-concepts, within 
the cultural/linguistic system, are deprived of real content, they become labels conveying little 
information about what they label. But unless words do symbolize experiential or propositional 
reality, they become mere ciphers, incapable of expressing human thought forms beyond a limited 
cultural context. The logical conclusion of Lindbeck's thesis, it would seem, is that language 
would come to be seen as the strait-jacket of human thinking, rather than its tool. 
Lindbeck's thesis, which gives primacy to linguistic structures, in fact severely undermines the 
doctrine of the Incarnation as most Christians would assert it; similar problems would be 
encountered with any doctrinal position, given the entailment of the cultural /linguistic system that 
words cease to be genuine referents to experiential or propositional reality. in fact, relying as it 
does on the fideistic Wittgensteinian approach to religious language, it is not easy to see the 
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advantages of a cultural linguistic approach to religious doctrines, or how it is claimed that this 
approach facilitates inter-religious dialogue. 
Lindbeck states that, Christians could help the adherents of other faiths "... to purib and enrich 
their heritages, to make them better speakers of the languages they have. " 27. Yet, by his own 
axioms, if it is impossible to "speak the language" of a religion except by adopting it as one's 
own, it is very difficult to see how this could be so. This aspect of Lindbeck's thesis also renders 
somewhat implausible, his "solution" to the question of the salvation of non-Christians. His 
suggestion is that non-Christians will have a post-mortem encounter with Christ, offering them the 
chance of salvation. 28. But in terms of the determining influence of the cultural-linguistic 
structure upon religious understanding, it would be impossible for the non-Christian to make a 
decision for or against Christ, being, as it were, excluded from the possibility of entering into the 
Christian paradigm. 29. 
Lindbeck's thesis is of interest in that it provides an explanation of why doctrinal disagreements 
may occur. However, it seems to work on the presupposition of a complete inevitability in this 
respect. An explanation may bring about greater understanding. However, a greater understanding 
may not necessarily lead to a greater degree of reconciliation, but, on the contrary, may lead to 
the acceptance that there will inevitably be a stalemate in inter-faith dialogue. Herein lies the root 
of the difference between the approaches of Hick and Lindbeck to the problem of opposing 
religious truth claims; the difference lies in the assertion that apprehensions of religious truth are 
influenced by historical/cultural conditions [Hick] and the assertion that these apprehensions are 
constructed by historical /cultural conditions. [Lindbeck. ] In the former case, there remains the 
possibflity that the human subject may be able to acquire an awareness and understanding of the 
facts of historical and cultural conditioning, and therefore, through reflection, to exert judgement 
and freedom of will within these confines, in relation to his or her apprehensions of religious truth. 
This possibility seems to be excluded in the latter case. If this is so, it is very far from easy to 
see how inter-faith dialogue can be more easily facilitated. Ultimately, it seems that Lindbeck's 
thesis "falls between two stools. " It purports to facilitate inter-faith dialogue, while nevertheless 
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adhering to strong notions of the incommensurability of faiths, through the cultural -linguistic 
model itself, which must s&iously impede such intended dialogue. Equally, it is subject to the 
criticism of exclusivists, for its fideistic implications, which dilute the propositional content of 
Christian truth claims. 
Hick rejects approaches to the problem of conflicting truth claims which are inclined to increase 
the "intelligibility gap" between the believer and the non-believer. He writes, in relation to a 
similar neo-Wittgensteinian approach to religious language adopted by D. Z. Phillips; 
"... 7he teaching of Jesus, for exwnple, could then no longer be 
seen as declaring in common language truths which are of infinite 
importance to mankind but which are also capable of being 
questionedfrom an agnostic or atheist standpoint. " 30. 
He questions the cultural/linguistic stance which in fact presupposes a radical discontinuity 
between the believer and the non-believer, which, literally, makes it impossible for them to speak 
the same language. Inter-faith dialogue cannot be facilitated, according to Hick, by an approach 
which treats religious language as protected discourse, for if non-cognitivists are right, it is clearly 
impossible for the Christian or Buddhist or Muslim to stand, as it were, outside the linguistic 
framework which is responsible for constructing and determining the person that he or she is. The 
non-believer cannot be persuaded of the value of an alternative "religious language, " given the 
thesis that values are themselves constructed by the determinative influence of cultural linguistics. 
This would seem to imply the acceptance of an inevitable stalemate, in dialogue. 
The Cognitive Approach to Qpl2ositions in Religious Doctrines 
Hick has consistently refused to subscribe to the Wittgensteinian "escape route" of a non-cognitive 
approach to religious doctrines. 31. He has maintained the view, up to the present time, that; 
"... although we cannot look into the minds of the seminal 
religiousfigures of the past, or the body of believers from century 
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to century, within the great religious traditions, it nevertheless 
seems to me transparently evident that they have understood their 
own and one another's core language in a realist way... it seems 
to me abundantly clear that the core of religious language has 
normally been understood and is today normally understood by 
believers and disbelievers alike as basically cognitive. ' 32. 
In a very real sense, Hick claims to be a cognitivist, but a problem clearly exists for any 
theologian who would assert the cognitive import of religious language, given the basic fact of 
opposing truth claims. W. A. Christian, in an important study of the types and levels of oppositions 
in religious doctrines has demonstrated convincingly that doctrinal statements frequently call for 
assertions of cognitive belief. 33. In such instances it can be clearly shown that oppositions in 
religious doctrines are far from easily overcome. Christian illustrates this with reference to 
examples of doctrinal positions which seem, superficially, not to be opposed, because they refer 
to recommended courses of action within different frameworks of reference. For example, the 
doctrinal statement, "The New Testament teaches us to respond rightly to God, " which suggests 
a course of action,, [follow the New Testamentj is not obviously opposed to the Buddhist doctrine, 
"the dharma is the path to Nirvana, " [follow the dharmaj since the referents are within different 
conceptual frameworks. It might be possible, theoretically, to follow the dharma and to follow the 
New Testament, unless the courses of action proposed involve the individual in obvious 
contradiction. But in practice, doctrines recommending personal action are interconnected within 
coherent schemes which also encompass doctrines which assert belief. 34. No one could, without 
absurdity, propose that an individual should "respond rightly to God" unless he was also asserting 
that God exists. It may be taken as a central truth claim, within Christianity, that a personal God 
exists, and that an individual, after death, may survive to be admitted to his presence. Within 
Therevada Buddhism it is a central truth claim that there is no God. Many other examples of 
conflicting truth claims of this type can be accumulated, as we have already noted in terms of 
Hick's own schema; the individual self either does or does not exist, the Universe either is or is 
not eternal. A cognitivist approach to religious doctrines cannot deny the existence of genuinely 
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opposing truth claims and as we have seen, Hick is very far from denying the basic fact of 
oppositions in religious doctrines on a phenomenological level. 35. His solution to the problem 
of conflicting truth claims can only be assimilated from within the context of his philosophical 
enterprise as a whole. This involves the following propositions which, though intrinsically 
interconnected, may be dealt with separately for the sake of demonstrating a cumulative argument. 
I- That the philosophical distinction between the "phenomenal Real " and the " noumenal Real" [or 
the Real as it is "an sich"I suggests that all human responses to the Real are partial and incomplete 
truth assertions. 
2. That such truth assertions may be cognitively true without being literally true, ie. they may be 
religious myths, which may nevertheless be described as "true myths" since they are based upon 
assertions which ultimately may be shown to be factually true. It will be my purpose to 
demonstrate that mythological truth is parasitic upon factual truth, but that an assertion may be 
cognitively true without being literally true. 
I T'hat the possibility of cognitive truth without literal truth can be illustrated by means of the idea 
of eschatological verification. 
4. That the truth or falsity of a doctrinal position held by a particular religious community does 
not necessarily invalidate the soteriological effectiveness of that religious community. 
1. The Relationship between the Real "an sich" and its Personae and Iml2ersonae 
We saw in chapter 3 that Hick uses Kant's broad theme of the recognition of the part played by 
the cognizing set of the human mind in its perception of the environment, and applies this to the 
epistemology of religion in support of the pluralist hypothesis. This involves a distinction between 
the Real as it is in itself, the "noumenal Real" as it exists independently of our perception of it, 
and the "phenomenal Real" as it appears to human consciousness. 36. According to Hick, the 
nournenal Real can be authentically experienced as a range of both theistic and non- theistic 
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phenomena, "Heavenly Father, " "Brahman, " "Sunyata" etc. These constitute the partial and 
incomplete human images of the Real "an sich" which is, "... so rich in content that it can only 
be finitely experienced in the various partial and inadequate ways which the history of religions 
describe. " 37. 
There is an explicit recognition in this epistemological model, that all the concepts of God or 
Infinite Reality, whether conceived personally or impersonally are partial, incomplete images and 
that it simply is not given to human beings, in this life, to know the totality of the Real "as it is 
in itself, " beyond human interpretation of it. The relationship between the Real "an sich" and its 
multiple phenomenal appearances makes possible Hick believes, mythological speech about the 
Real. For it is not possible, given the constraints suggested by this epistemological model of the 
limitation of human knowledge, for the doctrinal positions of the various religions to encapsulate 
absolute or literal truth. 
This is not to deny that doctrines have been presented as literal truths, in the sense of theoretical 
truths which are capable of being verified. And it remains the case that there must in principle be 
true answers to such questions as "Is the Universe eternal, or did it have a beginning? " "Does the 
individual live only once or is he or she reincarnated after death? " But the point is that we do not 
at present know the answers to these questions. Despite the tendency of religious traditions to 
assert answers to these questions in statements of doctrine that are generally understood as 
statements of fact, we have no universal consensus for such knowledge. Given this reality, several 
alternative possibilities exist; either such statements are true or they are false or they are partially 
true and partially false. Hick inclines to the latter view, that they are best understood as partial, 
incomplete and non-theoretical truths, or true religious myths. 38. 
It will be necessary, presently, to examine the idea of a "true religious myth" more closely, against 
the charge that it is self-contradictory, ie. a denial of the cognitive import associated with the 
concept of a truth claim. Firstly, however, it is necessary to deal with certain objections to Hick 9s 
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Kantian substructure which underpinned his Copernican revolution and subsequent philosophy of 
religious pluralism, making possible, for him, the idea of "true mythology. " in 1983 it was 
suggested, in criticism of the Copernican Revolution, that it was unreasonable to demand this kind 
of revision of Christian thinking when it may turn out that a Ptolemaic Christian view of some sort 
is valid. 39. Hick replied to this in Problems Of ReliLyious Pluralism in terms of the very evident 
fact that, although any theoretical position may be valid, this should not deter us from formulating 
an alternative hypothesis if there seem to be good grounds for supposing that the original 
hypothesis [ie. a Ptolemaic Christian eschatological view] is incorrect. 40. Hick might make a 
similar reply to a more recent critic, P. J. Griffiths, who, in An Apology for Apologetic makes a 
similar point regarding what he calls Hick's "universal perspectival ism"; 
"... While it may indeed be the case that ultimate reality is, in and 
of itsetf, just the kind of thing that can be characterized and 
mediated in the way suggested [as transcending all our 
characterizations of it].. the prior probability of this being true 
seems distressingly low; some powerfid collateral reasons to 
support it are needed. " 41. 
The "powerful collateral reasons" suggested, but rejected by Griffiths, that "universal 
perspectival ism" is desirable in that it promotes world harmony, and that the individual from one 
religious community frequently recognizes "good, sincere and grace filled individuals" in another, 
are not, I believe, the reasons Hick would use to defend the philosophical basis of his religious 
pluralism, much as he would affirm these statements in themselves. The validity of the 
philosophical and theological speculation, that each human conception of "the Real" is a partial, 
incomplete image, is rooted in the facts of religious pluralism and the need to account for the 
diversity and variability of human responses to the Real. Critics such as Almond and Griffiths 
seem to deny the validity of theological speculations about a question of paramount interest. Stated 
simply, why is it the case that we have so many diverse and seemingly incompatible human 
characterizations of the Real? Surely the very fact of religious pluralism calls out for some 
theological explanation as to why this is so. As W. Cantwell Smith has put it; 
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"... modern theologians have addressed the question of the 
appropriate attitudes of Christians to non-Christians but have 
given little attention to accounting for the religious diversity of 
mankind in the first place. " 42. 
A philosophical framework which attempts to account for this cannot be dismissed as a 
"distressingly low probability-, without some alternative explanation of the religious diversity of 
humanity. Griffiths does not attempt to supply this. The validity of the Kantian philosophical 
framework lies in the fact that it conforms to human experience that our perception of entities, 
while inextricably linked with what those entities are, "an sich, " is in fact partial and incomplete. 
To recall the analogy used to illustrate this in Chapter 3, if I perceive a snowflake I do not 
perceive it with the precision and exactitude that examination under a microscope would reveal, 
yet there is nevertheless a one-to-one correspondence between the snowflake viewed 
microscopically, and the snowflake viewed by human vision. Both are "the snowflake", the same 
entity. Likewise, human perception of a "silvery ball in the sky, " is a very partial, incomplete and 
in many ways erroneous conception of the moon, but this does not alter the fact that the perception 
is clearly linked to the moon "an sich. " As Hick has written; 
"... one can say that the Real is experienced by human beings, but 
experienced in a manner analogous to that in which, according to 
1-1 - Kunt, we experience the world: namely, by informational input 
ftom external reality being interpreted by the mind in terms of its 
own categorial scheme and thus coming to consciousness as 
meaningful phenomenal experience. 43. 
In this way a means is provided of dealing with the fundamental philosophical question, "how is 
it that human beings know what they claim to know.? " A means is also provided of accounting 
for the variety and diversity of human religious response, a pressing and very much neglected 
theological issue. A profession of partial, incomplete knowledge, which is confirmed by human 
experience, is not a profession of unbelief, though it does imply a certain degree of agnosticism, 
regarding the Real "an sich, " for it is an acknowledgement that all human conceptions and 
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perceptions of the Real are likely to fall short of that which is limitless and exceeds the scope of 
human conceptuality and language in this life, [but may be confirmed or disconfirmed 
eschatologically. ] The existence of God, or Ultimate Reality, is however, a presupposition of the 
philosophical and theological enterprise itself, for as Hick writes; 
'... We have affirmed the nownenal Real as the necessary 
presupposition of the religious life. Trusting in the basically 
veridical character of the stream of religious experience and 
thought in which we participate, and extending that acceptance at 
least to the other major streams, we have postulated the Real as 
the ground of this varied realm of religious phenomena. Indeed, 
we have already committed ourselves to such a postulate in 
rejecting the view of religious experience as simply human 
projection. " 44. 
Thus, he clearly distinguishes his position from that of the atheist or naturalist, who view religious 
thought and experience as a matter of delusion or projection; for Hick, the basic conviction is that, 
through a plurality of religious experience, contact with a Transcendent Reality is mediated. 
A further critic of Hick's Kantian framework is Christoph Schw6bel, who writes; 
"... this conception seems in danger of undermining what it sets 
out to preserve, that is, the plurality of religions as it is grounded 
in their distinctive and concrete particularity. " 45. 
I believe, here, Schw6bel points to the essence of the problem; there must always be some 
difficulty, for Christianity, in reconciling the tension between its universalist and particularist 
aspects. We saw in chapter 2 how unsatisfactory and one-sided are the attempts of exclusivist 
theologians such as Lesslie Newbigin to provide a synthesis of universalist and particularist aspects 
of Christianity by means of the doctrine of election, for this can only be achieved with recourse 
to Biblical fundamentalism. It can equally be argued, as I have done in chapter 4 that inclusivists 
also, while emphasising the particularity of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, have some 
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difficulty in explaining how this is nevertheless revelation for all humankind. However, I feel 
Schw6bel is unnecessarily pessimistic about the consequences for Christian particularity, of the 
pluralist hypothesis. It must surely be the case that the distinctive and particular nature of 
Christianity must always be preserved in the person of Christ as saviour, not in any doctrinal 
position at attempts to straitjacket this personhood within what is ultimately a human construct. 
As Hick has written, regarding the essence of the Christian faith; 
"... Christianity is the way of lVe and salvation which has its 
origin in the Christ-event. It will continue as a way of salvation 
so long as men and women continue to flnd salvation - that is., 
spiritual life and health - through it. " 46. 
2. Cognitive Truth without Literal Truth? - Religious Doctrines as True Rgligious M31hs 
The pluralistic hypothesis holds that doctrines which support the religious life of particular 
communities may be conceived as true religious myths. Hick makes a distinction between these 
and literal truths which are true for everyone. 47 However, this need not entail that all cognitive 
import is removed from religious myths, for as we saw in the section entitled "Mythological 
Language, " at the beginning of chapter 4, Hick holds that true myths are embedded in a context 
of genuinely factual belief. The profound leyel of truth they contain is dependent on a connection 
with objective reality, for; 
"... Such myths are distinguished from whimsical or arbitrary 
exercises of the poetic imagination by their relation to a 
fi-amework of factual belief which they supplement and adorn 
what might be called valuable or significant myth is necessarily 
parasitic upon non-mythological beliefs. " 48. 
Hick, as we have noted, would wish to affirm the cognitive status of [some] religious truth 
assertions; for him, an assertion is cognitive in nature if it meets certain criteria of empirical 
verifiability and if, at least in principle, it is possible to outline the circumstances in which such 
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an assertion could be shown to be true or false. it is important to stress however, that while he 
affirms the factual character of some religious assertions, he nevertheless allows ample scope for 
non-cognitive religious discourse. There is, he believes, a complex admixture of both cognitive 
and non-cognitive elements. 
It is vitally important to maintain the genuinely factual 
character of the central affinnations of the Christianfaith ... given 
a basic structure offactual belief, there is ample scope for the 
nonfactual language of myth, symbol and poetry to express the 
believer's awareness of the illimitable mysteries which surround 
that core of religiousfact. " 49. 
Thus, within this schema, which makes a distinction between cognitive /non-cognitive assertions, 
but which outlines the interrelationship between them, Hick could assert [cognitively] that Jesus 
was so fully God's agent and mediator that, through him, one may come to know God and his 
salvation, and that this statement is capable of being verified in post-mortem experience. Equally, 
he could assert [non-cognitively "per se" but based upon cognitive factj the truth of the religious 
myth, that Jesus is the Son of God. Hick seems to want to say that a religious assertion can be 
cognitively true, [or at least dependent on a cognitive truth] without being literall true. Is this 
possible, or is it a contradiction in terms? 
Hick has recently clarified this point in response to Loughlin's statement that "... neither myth nor 
metaphor has cognitive content. " 50. 
According to Hick, this is a misunderstanding, and it is worth quoting him at some length on this 
important point. 
V- 
., r or an utterance to have cognitive content is, I take it, for it 
to be true or false. It is clearly possible to make true and false 
metaphorical statements ffor example, "Hitler was a demon' and 
"Hitler was an angel"]; and to make true and false mythological 
statements ffor instance, "Jesus was God incarnate " and "Hitler 
was God incarnate. VI have argued that the doctrine of the 
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incarnation is metaphorically or mythologically true, although 
lanking in any precise literal content .. I regard the incarnational 
myth as ... one that is capable of being spelled out non- 
mythologically. Its non-mythological meaning is something like 
this: that Jesus was so open and obedient to God that God was 
able to act through him in relation to those whom Jesus 
encountered. Jesus could have said what the 7heologica 
Germanica [ch. 101 tell us that all Christians should learn to say: 
"I wouldfain be to the eternal Goodness what his right hand is to 
a man. " Ais, in my view, is the concrete meaning of the 
statement that God was incarnate in Jesus. " 51. 
Hick must be right in drawing attention to Loughlin's mistake in asserting that neither myth nor 
metaphor has cognitive content. This mistake can be illustrated by means of a very simple 
example. The very simple metaphorical idea, "it's raining cats and dogs" would convey, to most 
English people, the idea of heavy rain. They would certainly not expect to look out of the window 
and see cats and dogs, but equally, they would not expect to see clear skies and brilliant sunshine. 
The incidence of heavy rain would, however, confirm the metaphor as being cognitively true. 
Clearly, Hick is correct in denying the criticism that metaphorical or mythological truth is devoid 
of cognitive content. 
The idea of cognitive truth without literal truth could be further illustrated in the following way. 
We saw at the beginning of this chapter that cognition involves knowledge; statements of doctrine 
involve the claim that something is known, although the truth or falsity of the knowledge 
expressed in a statement of doctrine may not be capable of being verified or falsified here and 
now. It remains the case, nonetheless, that a propositional view of truth is implicit in the 
formulation of statements of doctrine. But would the cognitive content of a doctrine of the 
salvation of Christ be radically altered if a distinction was made between a mythic and a literal 
expression of the proposition that he was Incarnate of God? The mythic/literal distinction might 
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lead us to express the doctrine of the Incarnation, linked with a doctrine of salvation, in the 
following different ways: 
1. The mythological idea of an Incarnate Son of God expresses MY knowledge of salvation through 
Christ. 
2.1 know salvation can be obtained through Christ because he was, uniquely and ontologically, 
the Incarnate Son of God. 
In the first statement, the link between knowledge and salvation is Christ, independent of his 
ontological status as Son of God. In the second statement, it is immediately apparent that the 
salvific nature of Christ is intrinsically linked with, and dependent upon, his ontological status as 
Son of God. But it does not seem to me that the cognitive content [ie. the knowledge expressed] 
is greatly altered, at least, not in terms of the idea of salvation. And as we shall see in the final 
section, it is the soteriological effectiveness of religions, not their doctrinal structures, which Hick 
believes is of ultimate importance, for, 
"... such beliefs concerning matters of trans-historicalfact vary in 
importance within the belief-system to which they belong; at the 
top end of the scale they may be indispensable to a given doctrinal 
structure. It does not however follow that structure is itsetf 
indispensable for salvationl7iberation. " 52. 
What seems to me to be necessary, however, before we reach the point of affirming, with Hick, 
the possibility of cognitive truth without literal truth, is to examine further the idea of cognitive 
truth without literal truth by means of Hick"s notion of eschatological verification. 
3. Eschatological Verification: a "test case" for the idea of Cognitive Truth without Literal Truth 
it is Hick's belief that the cognitive status of religious language is dependent on there being, 
ultimately, a means of verifying the truth content of statements made about God [Ultimate Reality. 
A positive theology of death is, for him, a necessary adjunct of his entire theological enterprise, 
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for he takes very seriously the attack of logical positivists, whose fundamental assertion is that talk 
about God is cognitively meaningless, for the affirmation "that God exists" seems to make no 
experienceable difference to human life. 53. Hick is in agreement with the basic empiricist position 
that "to exist is to make a difference, " 54. Therefore he does not retreat into a non-cognitive 
approach to religious language, [Braithwaite, Cupittj for he believes that the question posed by 
the empiricist challenge - what experienceable difference does it make that God exists? - is a 
perfectly legitimate question requiring a literal answer. The answer, he believes, lies in the notion 
of eschatological verification; experienceable confirmation of the religious character of human 
existence will be beyond this earthly life, in the eschaton. 55. 
The notion of eschatological verification is not to be viewed, according to Hick, as a "last ditch" 
attempt to meet the challenge of contemporary scepticism, but is a drawing out of the logical 
implications of the traditional Christian teaching of a "life everlasting, " and a necessary corollary 
of faith in the teaching of Christ himself. In God and the Universe of Faiths he asserts that there 
would be something very strange in an individual's committing himself to Christ as a revelation 
of God's love to men and women, while rejecting so fundamental a part of his teaching as 
commitment to the existence of an afterlife, and that no New Testament scholar denies that this 
was an integral part of Jesus' conception of God's purpose for human beings. 56. Further, in 
Problems of Religious Pluralism; 
"... the life everlasting is in my view one of the essential claims by 
which Christian theism stands or falls; and that there are such 
cruxes is of course the nub of the theistic response to the 
verification Ifalsification challenge. " 57. 
It is immediately apparent that Hick's references to Christian theism are potentially problematic 
vis a vis a pluralist hypothesis: while traditional Christian theism certainly asserts the survival of 
personal, individual consciousness, other faiths, including Therevada Buddhism and certain strands 
of monistic Hinduism make no such assertions, but on the contrary, deny notions of individual 
survival beyond death, and uphold beliefs which are unacceptable to Christianity. For example, 
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the Advaitin view that the collective human self is ultimately identical with God is clearly opposed 
to the notion of the survival of individual consciousness, to be admitted to God's Heavenly 
presence, within Christianity. It has been suggested that this constitutes a fatal flaw in the pluralist 
hypothesis, and, further, that Hick's concept of eschatological verification, together with his 
defence of the cognitive status of religious language, involve him in a profound contradiction. 58. 
It would appear to be the case that, ultimately, one rather than another religious prediction of 
afterlife existence will conform more nearly to the truth that is apparently to be verified in the 
eschaton, if the demands of cognition in relation to religious language are to be met. If the status 
of afterlife affirmations is that they are held to be literally true, Hick does seem to be pushed into 
a position in which, by defending the cognitive status of religious language, while promoting the 
theory of eschatological verification, he is in a position of self-contradiction. Hick cannot assert 
that all human conceptions of afterlife existence are equally and literall true and valid [in defence 
of pluralism] and assert the principle of eschatological verification [in defence of the cognitive 
status of religious language] without contradiction. 
If, however, the status of after-life affirmations is that they are myLhologicall true, this may allow 
Hick to maintain an open-ended view of the final eschatological state, while the demands of 
cognition are met by the affirmation that there will be, beyond death, an afterlife in some form 
which is capable of being perceived and experienced by human consciousness, ie. is in principle 
capable of being verified. In the last analysis, I shall argue, the naturalistic option is refuted, and 
the demands of cognition are met, by just such a notion of eschatological verification, with the 
proviso that after-life affirmations should be viewed as true religious myths. My purpose is two- 
fold; firstly to attempt to demonstrate that Hick's theology of death, while it has certainly 
undergone considerable modification in the course of his career, particularly with respect to the 
theory of eschatological verification, remains internally coherent and compatible with a pluralist 
theology of religions. Secondly, I shall attempt to show that the theory of eschatological 
verification can be used to illustrate the viability of the idea of cognitive truth without literal truth. 
If doctrinal affirmations of after-life beliefs are viewed as true or false religious myths which are 
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in principle subject to confirmation in after-life existence, they are capable of satisfying the 
demands of cognition, despite the fact that it must be acknowledged that such confirmation or 
disconfirmation cannot take place in this life. To achieve this, it is necessary to examine Hick's 
afterlife beliefs in some detail. 
In Death and Eternal Life 1976, Hick made suggestions regarding what possible pareschatological 
and eschatological "scenarios" might be like. He stresses that theological speculations regarding 
afterlife existence can only be tentative, for we are moving from the sphere of the known to the 
unknown. 59. All that we can do is employ the use of reason to criticize the various theologies 
of death developed by the great faiths, from the basis of some general theological and 
philosophical conception of human nature and the place of men and women in the Universe. Hick 
bases his views on the premise that life is a soul or person-making process, the "telos" or purpose 
of this life is to transcend ego-centredness and to attain a state of human perfection: life is a 
movement towards this goal. 60. He consistently emphasizes, however, in this work and in several 
other publications, that it is a perceivable fact that very few individuals succeed in attaining this 
goal; those who do are known by the great faiths as saints, bodhisattvas, jivas. Others make some 
progress through their varied life experiences towards moral and spiritual perfection, but many 
others, often through no fault of their own, fail to develop to any great extent what is their 
essential human potential. 61. 
It is because of Hick's conviction that God's loving purpose for humanity is only very partially 
and- imperfectly fulfilled in this life that he affirms the necessity of a pareschatological state. His 
theology of death encompasses a number of strands of thinking; it is based on a philosophical 
conception of humanity and its place in the Universe, and draws on essential Christian belief in 
the existence of an afterlife, deriving from Christ's teaching, but draws also on the insights of 
those religions which affirm an intermediate state or states, between this life and the end of our 
temporal existence, particularly the wisdom of the "Bardo Thodol. " 62. In this last respect Hick's 
theology of death differs considerably from traditional Christian views that the fate of the 
Page 208 
individual is decided at the time of death. He speculates that this life may be one of a series of 
limited phases of existence, each ending in its own "death, ", which gives shape and coherence to 
finite human existence, for death, he believes, is an essential boundary without which individuality 
could scarcely be conceived to exist. 63. The essential purpose of each existence, however, 
remains unchanged; the individual progresses, slowly or rapidly, towards that state of 
ego-transcendence which allows him or her to become, "more and more a person and less and less 
an ego. " 64. Hick does not believe, however, that in the eschaton, or final state of affairs, there 
will be a total absorbtion of human individuality into the godhead, in accordance with the monistic 
atman=brahman philosophy. Ego transcendence is not envisaged as the annihilation of human 
individuality, for in the eschaton; 
"... the individual's series of lives culminates eventually in a last 
life beyond which there is nofurther embodiment but instead entry 
into the common Vision of God, or the eternal consciousness of 
the atman in its relation to Ultimate Reality. " 65. 
In this respect Hick's theology of death conforms more closely with the dualistic beliefs of 
Christianity and other theistic faiths, than with the beliefs of the great faiths of Indian origin. 
To summarize Hick's position as expressed in Death and Eternal Life it would seem that he 
affirms, unequivocally, the existence of a life after death in some form which is only loosely 
specified, but is based on a philosophical conception of the nature of this present existence in 
relation to God's loving purpose for humanity. However, it is undeniable that his position in 
relation to eschatological verification has been modified considerably in the course of his career, 
both before and since this publication. In God and the Uniyerse of Faiths he asserts that we cannot 
resort to agnosticism regarding the nature of afterlife, simply declaring that in some unimaginable 
way God's loving purpose for humanity will be fulfilled. 66. Words such as "the sure and certain 
hope of resurrection to eternal life, " relate unambiguously to a belief in the continued existence 
of the individual after bodily death; according to Hick to suggest otherwise is to use language 
"irresponsibly and meaninglessly, " ie. non-cognitively. In Death and Eternal Life, while 
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emphasizing that the nature of afterlife is a matter of theological speculation, he ultimately aligns 
himself more closely with Christian belief in personal, individual survival beyond death, than with 
the beliefs of monistic faiths. 67 In Problems of Religious Pluralism however, he argues for an 
open-ended eschatology, and toleration of eschatological uncertainty; 
" ... it seems likely that the different expectations cherished within 
the different traditions %411 ultimately turn out to be partly correct 
and partly incorrect ... it may well be that the final state will prove 
to be beyond the horizon of our present powers of imagination. ' 
68. 
In his latest major work, An Interpretation of Religion, 1989, he states that. the pluralist hypothesis 
does not have to commit itself to any one particular prediction of the eschaton. The pluralist 
hypothesis as it has now evolved affirms that eschatological mythologies may serve to evoke in 
us a right expectation to the limitless good of ultimate human destiny without any of them being 
fully adequate, or more adequate than another. 69. The sticking point of the principle of 
eschatological verification is not, it would now seem, that one human conception of the eschaton 
should be more adequate, or nearer to the truth than another, but that, ultimately, a religious, 
rather than a naturalistic interpretation of the Universe should be capable of being verified in a 
future which may well be beyond the range of human imagination and conception. There is no 
denying that, in adopting this position, Hick is implicitly if not explicitly rejecting the stance he 
adopted in God and the Universe of Faiths and in Death and Eternal Life. 
Hick, it would seem, is now prepared to accept a considerably greater degree of agnosticism in 
relation to afterlife beliefs than would have been the case earlier in his career. The examination 
of his own theology of death reveals that he is in fact arguing for considerable revision of 
traditional Christian doctrines [although, he is in fact more "traditional" in this respect than several 
contemporary theologians, both Catholic and Protestant, who affirm the doctrine of Incarnation 
while adopting theologies of death which are in some cases very far removed from realist 
conceptions of after-life belief in any sense. ] 70. But the questions which concern us at present 
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centre upon the issue of the internal coherence of Hick's own theology of death. Is it possible for 
Hick to maintain his defence of the cognitive status of religious language, via the principle of 
eschatological. verification, whHe adopting an approach to the nature of afterlife existence which 
now rests upon agnostic presuppositions? In doing so, is he not adopting a stance which is 
self-contradictory9 The question has been formulated in the following way, in relation to Hick's 
affirmations regarding the afterlife, as expressed in Death and Eternal Life: 
"... how can lHick] claim that these non-theisticfaiths as they now 
exist are equally salvific and equally true in their beliefs and 
experience? Are they salvific despite their beliefs and experience? " 
71. 
The answer to this last question must I believe be a qualified "yes, " but it involves making two 
distinctions, firstly between literal truth and metaphorical truth, and secondly between truth and 
salvation. Clearly, it cannot be the case that eschatological predictions are equally true [or true at 
all] if the demands of cognition in relation to religious language are to be satisfied, if they are 
regarded as literal truths. for they can and do contradict one other. The individual who makes the 
statement., "I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come, " is clearly 
stating something he or she believes to be true of life beyond this earthly existence. In using this 
language literally, he or she is making a statement which is believed to be true. And, ultimately, 
the statement must be true or untrue, the dead either will or will not be resurrected. But if such 
a statement is regarded as a mythological truth, ie. an affirmation of some future existence beyond 
death, the precise nature of which is unknown and unknowable in this present existence, but such 
that it is capable of being confirmed in the after-life, then I suggest that this would be a case which 
illustrates the fact that mythological language is capable of meeting the demands of cognitive truth, 
without being literally true. How might this work in practice? Any suggestions can of course only 
be purely speculative, for, as Hick emphasises, this is a realm that is totally beyond present human 
experience. 72. But certain conditions, presumably, continued consciousness and memory of past 
beliefs, would have to be present, in order that after-life experience should meet the requirements 
of the verification principle. Purely speculatively, therefore, I would contend that if, beyond death, 
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instead of finding oneself in the company of saints in the Heavenly Kingdom, or confronted with 
the beatific vision of God, one found oneself [whether embodied or disembodied] in the presence 
of, or absorbed into, the divine reality in such a way as to be beyond doubt, while conscious of 
past memories of the ways in which this experience differed from preyious anticipations, then this 
would constitute a case in which one's previous religious convictions would be confirmed as being 
cognitively true without being literally true. 
It is Hick's present belief that afterlife beliefs are best interpreted in this way, and that; 
0 our pluralist hypothesis holds that whilst such beliefs may in 
a particular phase of history be mythologically true for the 
particular group whose religious life they support, they do not 
have the literal truth that would constitute them true for 
everyone. " 73. 
This does not entail a denial of the cognitive content of mythological truth claims, rather, it is an 
illustration of the idea that the principle of eschatological verification can be utilized to substantiate 
the idea of cognitive truth without literal truth. 
Secondly, it is arguable that salvation need not be dependent on the truth or falsity of statements 
of after-life belief. Hick believes that faiths themselves, as paths by which the individual 
progresses, in his terminology, from self-centredness to Real ity-centredness, may be salvific, 
despite the truth or falsity of their eschatological predictions. Why should it be the case that 
salvation is dependent on the truth or falsity of eschatological doctrines which cannot be verified 
or falsified in this life? Eschatological guesswork, I would suggest, with Hick, is a poor 
determinant of soteriological effectiveness. 74. If he is correct, it seems to be consistent with a 
viable pluralist hypothesis for Hick to maintain an open-ended view of the final eschatological 
state, while the demands of cognition are met, via the principle of eschatological verification, that 
there will be, beyond death, an afterlife in some form which is capable of being perceived and 
experienced by human consciousness. What remains to be examined, however, is the final aspect 
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of Hick's thesis in relation to the problem of conflicting truth claims, that the truth or falsity of 
a particular tradition's doctrinal affirmations - whether in relation to the afterlife or otherwise - 
need not invalidate the soteriological effectiveness of that particular faith community. 
4. The Soteriological Efficacy of Religious Faiths 
To sum up so far, it seems that Hick takes the stance that religions do make truth claims, and that 
these are cognitive truth claims, although some of them are best understood as true or false 
religious myths, within a philosophical structure which presupposes that all human truth claims 
are partial and incomplete. The cognitive status of such truth claims is in principle capable of 
being confirmed in after life experience, through the idea of eschatological verification. He holds 
the belief that religious doctrines have cognitive status because he believes this is how they actually 
function within world faiths. It is Hick's contention that the religious language employed to 
express doctrinal truth claims is the kind of language used to express truth content, not merely to 
express a way of feeling, or a decision to behave in a particular way. 75. To say other than this, 
is in Hick's view, to deny the intent of the religious believer in his or her use of language. In the 
case of Christianity, "... Christian language, in the actual speech of a living community, 
presupposes the extra-linguistic reality of God. " 76. However, he is also saying that the truth or 
falsity of religious doctrines is not of ultimate importance. Doctrines constitute the humanly 
conditioned "lenses-- through which Ultimate Reality is partially perceived, but they are simply 
human constructs and as such, cannot encapsulate absolute and complete truth. It is to be trusted 
that they help and support the individual believer in his or her progress towards 
salvation/liberation, but they can only serve as a means to an end. They do not themselves 
constitute a religious purpose. The religious purpose of salvation, liberation or enlightemment is 
not dependent on the truth or falsity of doctrinal claims which we have no means of verifying or 
f-a-Isifying in this life, for; '... it seems implausible that ourfinal destiny should depend on our 
professing beliefs about matters of trans-historical fact concerning which we have no definitive 
information. " 77. 
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It is Hick's belief that the common factor among world religions is their soteriological structure, 
and that they should be judged according to their efficacy in promoting the spiritual and moral 
development of the individual; 
,v... the basic criterion fforjudging religions] is the event to which 
they promote or hinder the great religious aim of 
salvationl7iberation, that limitlessly better quality of human 
existence which comes about from a transition from 
setf-centredness to Reality-centredness. " 78. 
It is Hick's present belief, outlined in An Intnretation of Religion that, as far as human 
judgement is able to discern, each tradition is in fact more or less equally effective in bringing 
about such a transformation. 79. This view has, however, been criticized by P. J. Griffiths in An 
Apology for Apologetics who suggests that Hick's criterion for judging world faiths is inadequate 
and that, in reality, what he calls "Universalist Perspectival ists " are pushed into the position of 
acknowledging the equivalence of all doctrinal positions, for they deny the need for discrimination 
between desirable and undesirable doctrinal positions. He writes; 
w some religious communities, apparently, constitute an effective 
context for the salvific transformation of their adherents, while 
others do not. But we are never told how to distinguish thefonner 
ftom the latter, nor what argments may be brought to bear in 
support of the distinction we must make. " 80. 
In fact, Hick has frequently acknowledged the need for critical discrimination in the assessment 
of doctrines in world faiths and other quasi-religious movements; "... to say that whatever is 
sincerely believed and practised is, by definition, true, would be the end of all critical 
discrimination, both intellectual and moral. " 81. More recently, he has suggested, "... the 
possibility of a systematic moral criticism, within each tradition, of its own inherited doctrines. " 
82. 
He believes the pluralistic hypothesis points to this Possibility, but does not develop it to any great 
extent. Griffiths acknowledges that Hick employs a certain criterion for judging the efficacy of 
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religions as salvific contexts - that they should be seen to be bringing about the transformation in 
their adherents, from ego-centredness to Reality or God-centredness - but believes that) "if it is 
a formal criterion then it cannot do the work it is intended to do. " 83. However, Griffiths uses a 
rather inappropriate example to illustrate this conviction. He writes; 
"... observably, a sincere and devoted member of the S. S. or 
Jonestown community is often capable of actions that appear, 
dramatically, not to be ego-centred - even to the point of 
self-sacrificial death. ýVhat distinguishes the self-sacrificial death 
of a stormtrooper in the service of the thousand-year Reich from 
that of a Christian martyr on the cross? Clearly, not the degree 
to which the egocentricity of each has been transformed into 
reality-centredness; rather, it is the radical difference in the way 
in which reality is conceived by each. " 84. 
Griffiths is surely right to point out that a Nazi stormtrooper would have beliefs, values and 
conceptions of reality entirely at variance with those of a Christian martyr. What is questionable 
is whether Hick, or anyone else, would accept that these examples necessarily constitute clear 
cases of transformation from ego-centredness. On the contrary, self-sacrificial death could easily 
be considered an exceptionally egocentric action, depending on the circumstances and motivations 
of the individual in question. Does this mean Griffiths is correct in suggesting that it is impossible 
to judge the transformation of the individual from ego-centredness by his or her actions, and that 
it is by doctrinal beliefs and truth claims that we must be guided? No, since he chooses the very 
odd example of self-sacrificial death as an action which might denote the transformation of the 
individual from self-centredness, an example which would be in itself open to much dispute. In 
reality, he undermines his argument by illustrating it in this way. Hick has rightly pointed out that 
the shift from self-centredness to Real ity-centredness is capabfe of expression in diverse forms of 
life. 85. He would claim, for example, that it is discernible in the lives of Gandhi, and Mother 
Theresa, but through universal perception of their selfless devotion and compassion to others, 
rather than through the dubious example of self-sacrificial death. In such cases, it would not be 
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at all easy for Griffiths to dispute the widespread respect for such individuals, and recognition of 
their "saintliness". which must be based on upon a consensus regarding their ego-denying actions, 
rather than upon the beliefs held by each, for, as Griffiths would concede, there would be 
undeniable differences in the way each conceived reality. Griffiths criticisms do, however, 
highlight the need to examine the concept of soteriology in more detail; what, precisely, does Hick 
mean by it, and how is it to be discerned and evaluated? Hick's pluralism, as we have seen, relies 
heavily upon the idea that there is a common religious concern among world faiths, that each seek 
the salvation or liberation or enlightenment of the individual and that thus, a common 
soteriological structure may be discerned. The soteriological effectiveness of religious communities 
is, he believes, of greater importance than the truth or falsity of doctrinal positions held by them. 
However, as we have seen, some theologians, including Lindbeck, have suggested that there is no 
common experiential core to be discerned among the world faiths, and this would seem to imply 
structural diversity rather than common ground. Even if there is similarity in soteriological 
structure, how we must then ask, is the soteriological effectiveness of the various world faiths to 
be discemed and evaluated? 
The Idea of Soteriology Examined 
It is Hick's belief that the comparison of religions, in any sense, would be impossible if they did 
not exhibit a common structure. 86. This common structure is soteriological in a broad sense, in 
that it provides a means of transition from the present, unsatisfactory state of the human condition, 
to an infinitely better one, beginning in this life and proceeding to an unimaginably better in the 
future, as an eschatological vision. 87. This view, although emphasized to a greater extent in 
Problems of Religious Pluralis and An Inteipretation of Religio , is implicit 
in God and The 
Universe of Faiths, where Hick states; 
"... I have been suggesting that Christianity is a way of salvation, 
which, beginning some two thousand years ago, has become the 
principal way of salvation in three continents. 7he other great 
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faiths are likewise ways of salvation, providing the principal path 
to the divine reality for other large sections of humanity. " 88. 
Hick, as we have noted, now defines salvation or liberation as, 
"... the realisation of that limitlessly better quality of human 
existence which comes about in the transition from 
self-centredness to Reality -centredý7, " 89. 
He believes that religions have more or less value aceprding to whether they promote or hinder 
this fundamental aim. 90. 
It will be helpful, at this point to examine the notion of "being transformed from self-centredness 
to Real ity-centredness " in more detail, before accepting it at face value, for it seems to be a form 
of words which is in need of further definition. What transformation, precisely, does the individual 
undergo, and how do we know that it is taking place? Further, in speaking of "Reality- 
centredness, " is Hick postulating an underlying reality for all religions, which would be subject 
to the criticism noted at the beginning of this chapter, that such a view seriously disregards the 
real differences among religions? 
Hick hasl I believe, given content to the idea of individual human transformation from self- 
centredness, in that it is an observable feature in the lives of those believers who, through their 
religious visions of reality, acquire the virtues of goodwill, loving kindness and compassion 
towards others, to a marked extent. It is a referent to those; 
"... in whom the signs of salvation or liberation are strikingly 
visible and who are accordingly known as bodhisattvas, gurus, 
mahatmas, masters, saints... Mis is of course a stipulative 
definition - as is any other proposal for the use of the term. But 
it connects the broad hypothesis being developed ... with the 
worldwide phenomenon ofspiritually impressive individuals whose 
lives are predominantly centred in some manifestation of the 
Real. " 91. 
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Hick is, I believe, postulating an underlying reality "an sich" for all religions, but it is important 
to note that, while he does seem to be claiming that all religions are relat to this reality, this 
does not necessarily imply that each individual believer experiences the same reality. Clearly, 
individuals do not do so; the Christian, in experiencing an awareness of God, would strongly deny 
that this was an experience of Emptiness [sunyatal in Buddhist terms. Hick has made this point 
explicit in reply to a criticism by Cobb, who, in his concern to do justice to what he perceives as 
the clear differences in the conceptual images and soteriological aims of the religious traditions, 
has written; 
".. - Why not allow, at least as a working hypothesis, that what is 
named as "Yahweh" and "the Father of Christ", is not the same 
as what is natned as "Emptiness"2 Such a hypothesis would not 
imply that one is real and the other is not. Quite the contrary, it 
could mean that each has just the reality and character attributed 
to it by those who are recognized authorities in the two traditions. 
We could acknowledge that both are transcendent in very 
important ways without identifying them. " 92. 
Hick has, however, made it clear that he has no wish to identify the concepts of God and sunyata, 
or any other religious concepts that are clearly so far from being the same. He is in agreement 
with Cobb that these concepts are not identical, but, he believes, constitute different "lenses" 
through which the Ultimately Real is humanly experienced. He believes that; 
Ot religious experiencing of life can ltseýf take different forms. 
7he world may be experienced as God's handiwork, or as the 
baulefield of good and evil,, or as the cosmic dance of 
Shiva ... 7hese are different 
fonns of religious experiencing-as. " 
93. 
in this way, he draws upon the epistemological doctrine of knowledge he first developed in Faith 
and Knowled , that religious 
faith is to be regarded, as is all experience, as interpretation. 94. 
In addition to this insight, however, is the conviction that each humanly interpreted experience is 
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related to the same Ultimate Reality. If we can accept the Kantian distinction between the 
noumenal and the phenomenal real, which, as I have argued, conforms to human experience that 
our perceptions of entities are different from but intrinsically related to what those entities are in 
themselves, then I believe we can accept these two aspects of Hick's religious pluralism as 
complementary, for, this hypothesis allows us to makes sense of the fact of religious diversity. 
According to Hick, we are able to recognize the soteriological function of the great world faiths 
primarily through an innate human awareness of moral value, which, as we saw at the beginning 
of this thesis, is subscribed to by Hick as inclining us to a religious rather than a naturalistic 
interpretation of the Universe, [without actually refuting the naturalistic hypothesis. ] 95. This 
innate human capacity allows us to make moral judgements. Though moral codes are culturally 
variable, there does, according to Hick, seem to be an innate human capacity to distinguish 
between beliefs and actions which are morally harmful to the individual and to others, and those 
which are morally beneficial. 96. The actual founding of a religious faith, frequently in opposition 
to the prevailing moral and ethical codes of the time, is dependent on there being some great 
religious leader, usually named, but in the case of Hinduism, unnamed, whose teaching is 
perceived by others to be superior to generally accepted codes. In addition, people have found 
through the experience of living in accordance with such teaching, that it is indeed the case that 
God, or Absolute Reality, however conceived, is mediated to them by means of the faith. 97. Hick 
believes that, in their times, each of the great religious teachers was motivated by dissatisfaction 
with prevailing beliefs and practices, thus, their religious concerns were ultimately soteriological, 
and here we find common ground. 98. By these statements, Hick clarifies his view that the 
primary function of religion is soteriological, and that, in a variety of ways, each tradition 
facilitates the salvation or liberation or enlightenment of the individual adherent. 
Disceming Soteriological Effectiveness: Some Possible Objections 
it would seem, from this analysis, that the soteriological effectiveness of faiths is to be discerned 
and evaluated "by the fruits of the spirit, " ie. the adherents of a particular faith ought to be seen 
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to be more advanced in their transition from self-centredness to Real ity-centredness, than their 
non-religious contemporaries. Several problems arise, in relation to this conclusion. Firstly, 
subjective human judgements seem to be involved in making any kind of evaluation of heightened 
moral awareness. Secondly, human judgement in such matters is inevitably subject to human bias; 
we may be disinclined to perceive "saintliness" in other traditions, by virtue of loyalty to the 
creeds and practices of our own faith. The limitation and subjectivity of human judgements 
regarding the soteriological effectiveness of world faiths is fully acknowledged by Hick. He states 
that although in principle it ought to be possible to assess and grade religious phenomena, we 
cannot assess and grade the great religious faiths as totalities. 
"... For each of these long traditions is so internally diverse, 
containing so many different kinds of both good and evil that it is 
impossible for human judgement to weigh up and compare their 
merits as systems of salvation. It may be that one facilitates 
human liberation1salvation more than others, but if this is so it is 
not evident to human vision. So far as we can tell, they are 
equally productive of that transitionftom seV to Reality which we 
see in the saints of all traditions. " 99. 
According to Hick, we are able to recognize and respect particular individuals throughout the ages, 
who are known as bodhisattvas, gurus, mahatmas, masters, saints. 100. This is because the "fruits 
of the spirit" are universally recognisable. However, we are unable to assess in any precise way 
the religious systems which have produced such people, because of the internal complexity and 
diversity of these systems and because of the limitation in human judgement, which is often 
distorted by credal and communal loyalty, usually to the tradition of our birth. However, implicit 
in what Hick is saying is the fact that "saintliness" is a generic term, since it is observable as a 
phenomenon throughout the religions. We seem to be in a position of being able to recognize 
it saintliness" but of being unable to define the conditions which produce it. However, surely a 
common effect presupposes some degree of common cause; it ought in principle to be possible to 
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formulate objective criteria for the self-examination of the beliefs and practices of the world faiths, 
and Hick suggests this but does not develop the idea. 101. 
Although Hick has not developed, to any great extent, proposals for evaluating the soteriological 
eff I ectiveness of world faiths, he has, I believe, built up a formidable argument for the existence 
of a soteriological structure common to them. Soteriology, in its broadest sense, is a common 
human concern, and one that seems to have been of primary importance in the founding of world 
faiths. The universal phenomena of "sainthood" is an observable although immeasurable product 
of the function of world faiths, in bringing about a heightened spiritual and moral awareness in 
certain persons, which is recognisable by ordinary individuals in their own experience. It is 
soteriology that makes possible some kind of comparison between world faiths, for it is an area 
of "common ground. " 
Despite these arguments, however, some theologians object to the idea of there being a common 
soteriological structure discernible in world faiths, on the grounds that the various notions of 
"salvation, " "liberation" and "enlightenment" as used within the world faiths, do not mean the 
same thing and therefore cannot be used interchangeably. It is, for example, Pannenberg's belief 
that; 
"... unfortunately the notion of salvation as presently available in 
tenns of experiential transfonnation does not square with the 
biblical evidence. It has no basis in the New Testament usage of 
the tenn. " 102. 
Pannenberg seems to believe that the concept of salvation as experiential human transformation 
is inconsistent with the biblical usage and that a specific Christian concept cannot be compared 
with apparently similar concepts which are used within other world faiths. He believes "salvation" 
must be used solely and exclusively to express the idea of the immanence of God's Kingdom, 
citing Luke 11: 20. to illustrate this. 103. But while it is true to say that generally in the Synoptic 
Gospels, the idea of salvation is intrinsically linked with the activity of Christ himself and the 
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coming of the Kingdom of God, it is also undeniable that certain aspects of Jesus' response to the 
questions, "... what must I do to receive eternal life? " IMatthew 19.16. Mark 10.17. Luke 18.18.1 
and, "who, then, can be saved? " IMauhew 19.25. Mark 10.26. Luke 18.26. ] point clearly to 
human choice and human responsibility as intrinsic to the salvific process. This is what Hick 
would want to describe as the transformation from self-centredness to Reality or God-centredness, 
which takes place in human beings through the various phenomenal religions. 
Some other theologians, including Rahner, recognize that, distinct from a specifically biblical 
usage, salvific concern is a genuine human existent, a human preoccupation that arises from the 
orientation of men and women towards God. He writes in terms of what he calls a "searching 
Christology"; 
"... In fteedom and orientation towards definitiveness, man is 
concerned with himself as a single whole. He should allow the 
whole and singleness of his existence to appear before him and be 
answerable for this in freedom. He should, in other words, be 
concernedfor himself andfor his "salvation. " 104. 
While Rahner would hold that Wvation is obtainable solely [although inclusively] through Christ, 
he allows a conceptual understanding of salvation that is anthropologically orientated. Pannenberg, 
however, seems to want to locate the concept of Wvation so firmly within a structure of biblical 
texts confined to Christianity, that, by definition, no comparison can be made between Christian 
salvation, and "liberation" or "enlightenment" as understood within other faiths. But, if he is 
making the point, against Hick, that religions are not alike, and that they do not share a common 
soteriological structure, this surely cannot be done simply with recourse to the biblical usage of 
the term; more powerful collateral reasons are needed, and Pannenberg does not supply these. 
It is interesting to note that John B. Cobb, another contributor to the same volume of essays in 
opposition to religious pluralism, who would agree with Pannenberg that there is more diversity 
than common ground to be discerned in a comparison of world faiths, nevertheless believes that 
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comparing and finding arguments for and against conflicting religious doctrines is an unproductive 
exercise; 
"... laying out the conflicting doctrines and developing arguments 
for and against each is a questionable preoccupation. Instead,, it 
is best to listen to the deep, even ultimate, concerns that are being 
expressed in these diverse statements. " 105. 
According to Cobb, when these religious concerns are analyzed, we may find that even clearly 
contradictory doctrinal statements can to some extent be reconciled. He illustrates this with 
reference to the Buddhist denial of the existence of God, and the Christian affirmation of his 
existence. The Buddhist denial is an expression of the insight that attachment blocks the way to 
enlightenment, while the Christian affirmation is an expression of belief in a Being worthy of trust. 
But this need not be "attachment" in the Buddhist sense. Cobb concedes that a greater 
understanding of the central concerns of other world faiths does not eradicate the basic fact of 
oppositions in religious doctrines, but what is interesting is his illustration of the results of a 
change of preoccupation and emphasis. When we abandon preoccupation with conflicting doctrines 
and turn instead to religious concerns, we are immediately led back to soteriology. Implicit in 
Cobb's insights is a recognition of the common religious purpose and concern for the ultimate 
destiny and salvation of humankind. This recognition is shared by other theologians who would 
be in agreement with Hick's belief that religions share a common soteriological structure. 106. 
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Conclusio 
The question of soteriology and related issues concerning the commonality and diversity of 
religions are indeed difficult theological matters which are the subject of much current debate. In 
this chapter I have argued, with Hick that the basic fact of oppositions in religious doctrines does 
not necessarily constitute a barrier to the pluralist hypothesis. The Kantian philosophical 
framework provides a way of asserting the partial, incomplete nature of humanly constructed 
religious truths, that, being less than absolute and complete truths, can justifiably and appropriately 
be described as true [or false] religious myths. These may be cognitively true without being 
literally true, and the idea of eschatological verification could in principle be capable of 
demonstrating this. Further, the truth or falsity of the doctrinal positions held need not invalidate 
the soteriological effectiveness of the great world faiths. However, it will be necessary to revisit 
some of these issues in the next chapter, in the context of a search for shared ethical criteria 
among the religious traditions, for in this sphere the charge is that pluralists such as Hick tend to 
sublate the distinctive soteriological doctrines of other faiths, and, illegitimately, attempt to 
accommodate them under the Christian "umbrella" of "salvation", in an attempt to discern a 
spurious commonality. Our enquiry in the next chapter will centre upon the question of how far 
it is in fact true to say that the religions share "common ground", towards the establishment of a 
viable theory of common ethical concerns among the faiths. 
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'SDI-erigloggy and Ethics: in search of commonality among World Faiths 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis I outlined Hick's philosophy of religious belief and described it as a 
synthesis of empiricist and rationalist theories, incorporating an argument for the validity of 
religious experience and an argument for innate human awareness of that which is morally good. 
I also suggested, however, that he has retreated somewhat from his original stance that the idea 
of innate human awareness of that which is morally good can be used to underpin an argument to 
substantiate a religious world-view; Hick now concedes that this awareness is compatible with a 
naturalistic perspective. In this way Hick's theology has developed in greater alignment with some 
humanist and secular world-views. Despite his concession that an acceptance of objective morality 
may be consistent with a naturalistic perspective of the universe and all that is in it, Hick has 
however retained the view that a crucial dimension of the religious world-view is its relation to 
moral values. In the development of his theology of religious pluralism, he has considered the 
possibility of assessing and grading religions, posing as a preliminary to this, two important 
questions: 
1. Is it possible to compare and assess religions at all? 
2.1f it is possible, what kind of criteria would we use, in doing so? 1. 
Here, I shall consider his treatment of these questions in detail and attempt to demonstrate that the 
internal coherence of his theology of religious pluralism is reinforced by his emphasis on religious 
experience and moral judgement as the means by which human beings should consider these 
issues. 
Hick's assessment of the world religions is, as we shall see, primarily a survey of past events and 
makes no detailed attempt to prescribe an agenda for future development; it has been his aim to 
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attempt to judge the religions as they have existed in their historical situations. His conclusion, that 
while we can to some extent assess and grade religious phenomena, we are unable to assess and 
grade the religions as totalities is also necessarily retrospective. 2. However, Hick's emphasis on 
the use of moral criteria - the judgement that looks to "the fruits of the spirit" - as applied to 
religions, points a way forward, and is in basic alignment with the recent work of theologians such 
as Knitter and Pieris, who have begun to develop a pragmatic agenda for interreligious encounter, 
in line with what has been called Liberation Theology. The proposals of liberation theologians 
centre upon the possibility of a consensus among faiths, concerning global issues of such central 
importance that they are capable of transcending differences of belief, practice and culture. 
This is not to claim that there is at present a high degree of interreligious co-operation between 
the theologians of religions and those who advocate liberative praxis as their prime concern; 
Knitter notes that liberation theology, which originated in Christian communities, has until recent 
times been introspective in outlook; 
"... Too many Latin American theologians of liberation fe. g. 
Segundo and Sobrinq] are closed to the liberative and 
revolutionary potentials of non-Christian religions. A worldwide 
liberation movement needs a worldwide interreligious dialogue. " 
3. 
A. Pieris believes that, 
"... the irruption of the Third World [with its demands for 
liberation] is also the irruption of the non-aristian world. 7he 
vast majority of God's poor perceive their ultimate concern and 
symbolize their struggle for liberation in the idiom of non- 
Christian religions and cultures. Therefore, a theology that does 
not speak to or speak through this non-Oiristianpeoplehood [and 
its religions] is a luxury of a Christian minority. " 4. 
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Precisely why, and in what ways, the theologies of liberation and of religious pluralism may be 
mutually enriched and supported by a cross-fertilization of ideas and increased interreligious co- 
operation, we shall examine in more detail, in relation to Knitter's thesis, in due course. At this 
point we should simply note that it is possible to discern clear links between Hick's own tentative 
suggestions for '... systematic moral criticism, within each tradition, of its own inherited 
doctHnes, " and the proposals of liberation theology. 5. As we shall see, liberation theologians 
propose a soteriocentric approach to the theology of religions very similar to that suggested by 
Hick, and outlined in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Such a soteriocentric approach has decisive 
implications for the reinterpretation of central Christian doctrines, such as that of the Incarnation, 
I 
which Hick has consistently advocated since 1973.6. It will of course be necessary to examine 
criticisms of such a soteriocentric approach. Ultimately, it will be necessary to reply to those 
critics who argue that the route towards a "global human ethic" is strewn with difficulties and 
verges on being morally vacuous, in that it overlooks deep ambiguities in the conception of 
"human liberation, " and relies too heavily on post-Enlightenment liberal ethics, which, in their 
generality, minimize the particularities of the religions as they exist as living faiths. 
Hick's Thesis: "On Grading Religions. " 
Firstly, Hick asks, what shared criterion is there, among religions, which makes it possible to 
compare them at all? Clearly, if they have nothing in common, it would be impossible to make 
any kýnd of comparison. 7 Religions, he believes, share a common structure which is basically 
soteriological, ie. all are concerned with providing a transition from a fallen, unsatisfactory human 
condition, to a limitlessly better one, all offer a path to salvation, liberation or enlightenment. 
Soteriology is thus the basic criterion by which religions may in principle be compared and judged. 
8. This comparison is made possible by human beings in their human judgement in three ways; 
1. In relation to their own religious experience. 
2. By means of rational scrutiny of the belief systems of others. 
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3. By moral judgement of the "fruits of the spirit, " the working out of religious belief systems by 
individuals in human history. 
Hick believes that, 
we need to look both at the ideal fruit, visible in the saints of 
a given tradition, and also at the ordinary life of millions of 
ordinary people as it takes place within the actual history of that 
tradition. " 9. 
Leaving aside, for the present, the critics of the notion of a "common soteriological core, " [some 
of whose criticisms have been examined in Chapter 5, and others which we shall explore in due 
coursej we should note, with Hick, that in practice as well as in principle, human beings have 
always exercised judgement regarding religious phenomena. The history of the development of the 
religions bears witness to the principle and the practice of assessing and comparing the merit of 
religious phenomena in terms of beliefs, practices, rituals, scriptures and theologies. Not all 
religious phenomena have been judged, historically, as being equally meritorious. 10. In most 
cases, the very founding of a religious faith has been dependent on there being some great 
religious leader [or, in the case of Hinduism, some anonymous Scripture] who is critical of some 
of the beliefs and ethical practices which constitute the norms of his time, and who is capable of 
offering a new vision of religious awareness and ethical practice. 11. This vision is capable of 
capturing the imagination and allegiance of ordinary men and women, who believe themselves to 
be responding to one who is a mediator of the divine. 12. The kind of judgement exercised by 
human beings in this way is, Hick believes, primarily a moral judgement, for, 
"... although detailed moral codes often differ widely from society 
to society and meta-ethical theories are highly various and often 
incompatible, there does seem to be a universal capacity to 
distinguish [though always within the frwnework of certain 
assumptions] between benefitring and harming, and a tendency to 
bestow moral praise upon actions which benefit and blame upon 
those which hann others. " 13. 
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Also, 
'... the ethical insights of the great teachers are visions of hwnan 
life lived in earthly aligmnent with the Real ... we can discern the 
utterly basic principle that it is evil to cause suffering to others 
and good to benefit others and alleviate or prevent their 
sufferings. " 14. 
Hick is arguing that human beings, in their innate capacity to recognize and distinguish between 
beliefs and actions which are morally praiseworthy, and those which are to be condemned, are 
behaving in accordance with an awareness that is intrinsic to being human and is rooted in human 
nature in its relation to the divine nature. The kind of judgement exercised in this way, is, 
moreover, very far from being ephemeral or transitory in character, it has decisive effects upon 
subsequent human experience. Human beings find that living their lives in accordance with the 
particular religious teaching and vision, promoted and practised by the founder of their faith, 
leads, slowly or rapidly, to a conviction that God, or Ultimate Reality is reached by means of the 
faith made available to them. 
" ... as people have taken the step of 
living in tenns of this vision, 
they have in fact been transformed [whether suddenly or 
gradually] and so have received a first hand assurance that 
Reality has indeed been mediated to them. " 15. 
In this way, and in alignment with his general philosophy of religious belief, Hick describes the 
way in which moral judgement and religious experience are brought into play by human beings 
when they attempt to assess and compare religions, such a comparison being made possible by an 
often unconscious recognition that religions exhibit a common structure that hinges on the notion 
of soteriology. It is now time to examine in more detail, Hick's analysis of the precise means 
employed by human beings, in undertaking a comparison of this kind. Afterwards, it will be 
necessary to examine certain criticisms of Hick's thesis "On Grading Religions", which centre 




-Comparison with one's own Religious Tradition 
The vast ma ority of ordinary people, Hick asserts, naturally assess and judge other religions in i 
relation to their own faith, assuming their own tradition to be "the way, the truth and the life. " 
"... naturally one makes one's own tradition the touchstone by 
which to judge others. For, in all our judging, assessing, 
accepting and rejecting, we can only start from where we are, 
using such degree of truth as we have [or believe that we have] as 
our stepping stone to further truth. " 16. 
However, Hick believes that there are good reasons for being dissatisfied with the strategy of 
judging traditions solely by the criteria of one's own tradition, for this may imply too great a 
dependence upon religious conditioning associated with birth and upbringing. Hick has frequently 
asserted that religious allegiance is highly dependent on the accident of birth. 17. Though a small 
percentage of people convert from one faith to another, the vast majority remain committed to the 
faith of their birth. Hick calls this, "... the genetic and environmental relativity of religious 
perception and conunitment. " 18. 
Thus, according to Hick, the reflective person may be disinclined to sever the process of 
judgement at this point, and to rely upon this means of judging faiths, for this would amount to 
an acceptance of the conditioning of human judgement by genetic and environmental factors 
outside one's control; in effect it would be an acceptance of a considerable limitation of human 
judgement. While this does not logically oblige the individual thinker or believer to look further 
for criteria with which to judge faiths, Hick does believe this is likely to make him or her 
dissatisfied with what he calls "genetic confessional ism" as a conscious strategy. 19. This is further 
supported by his view that the founding of the great faiths themselves bears witness to the 
judgement of their founders upon the traditions of their birth and upbringing. 
"... Yhe general religious backgrounds of ancient India and the 
ancient Middle East respectively were of course importantly 
relevant. But human discriminative capacities must also have been 
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at work, operating in accordance with at least implicit criteria, in 
the initial response of these great religious figures; and the 
question is whether we can uncover these criteria. " 20. 
Thus Hick affirms that there must be implicit principles of judgement, or objective criteria 
independent of the religious conditioning of the individual, which can be brought to bear upon the 
question of evaluating religious traditions. He then proceeds to question whether it is possible to 
discern the substance of these criteria. 
2. Rational Scrutiny of the Belief Systems of gther Faiths 
As outlined at the beginning of this thesis, Hick's philosophy of religious belief is rooted in an 
acceptance of the veridical. character of religious experience to the individual whose experience 
it actually is. However, he does not believe it is possible to speak of the rationality [or 
irrationality] of experience itself. 21. The primary religious experiences of Jesus Christ, Gautama 
the Buddha and the Hindu saints, which lie at the heart of the great traditions which have been 
built around them, were fundamentally overwhelming personal experiences which cannot easily 
be subjected to rational scrutiny. 22. Hick believes we can to some extent attempt to assess by 
ration udgement the intellectual quality of the philosophies and theologies which have developed 
wi in the great faiths; here we would be assessing by means of criteria such as the internal 
consistency of the faiths' theologies, and the adequacy of theological interpretation in relation to 
the primary religious experience and basic vision of reality upon which the faith is founded. [In 
these respects, Hick professes to be equally impressed by the quality of the intellectual theories 
to be found within the faiths. ] 23. But the tool of reason cannot be applied to the primary religious 
experiences themselves, nor to the truth content of the visions of reality which have been built 
upon them. The truth content of complex belief systems, ie. the cognitive status of religious truth 
claims is subject to verification eschatologically. This is an empirical rather than a rational test; 
the nature of absolute reality will become known to us, if at all, by observation and experience, 
rather than by reason. 24. Such tests as we can apply to religious visions of reality in the here and 
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now are basically pragmatic. We can try to assess how far they actually assist the believer in his 
or her path from self-centredness to Real ity-centredness. Thus we can ask, are they soteriologically 
effective? 25. 
This leads us to Hick's third criterion for the grading of religions, judgement made on the basis 
of "the fruits of the spirit. " 
3. Moral Judgement of "The Fruits of the Spirit. " 
Hick believes that the religious and moral ideal of love, compassion and generous goodwill, which 
manifests itself by a radical lessening of egocentricity and a reaching out to all humanity in selfless 
love, is central to the religious teaching of all the great faiths. 
"... 7he transformations of human existence which the different 
major visions produce appear, as we see them described in their 
scriptures and embodied in the lives of their saints, to be equally 
radical in their nature and equally impressive in their outcomes. 
lu . 1-ch involves a voluntary renunciation of ego-centredness and a 
setf-giving to, or setf-losing in, the Real -a setf-giving which 
brings acceptance, compassion, love for all humankind, or even 
for all life. " 26. 
He cites examples of the teachings and scriptures of the great faiths, which enjoin upon their 
adherents the virtues of loving kindness, compassion, mercy and so on, which in principle should 
lead to believers acting in ways that are ethically similar, despite their differences in belief. 27. 
He believes that in theory an emphasis on "soteria" - the shared concerns for the alleviation of 
human suffering and the promotion of human welfare - offers a promising ground for the 
assessment of religions, for this criterion emphasizes praxis and therefore produces results which 
we are able to observe and assess empirically. This is because, "... the fruits of the spirit are 
universally recognised and respected whereas the value of credal and communal loyalty 
presupposes the accident of birth at some one particular time and place. " 28. Thus, according to 
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Hick, it is by looking to the actions of men and women in history, [both ordinary human beings 
and those special individuals who have been acclaimed as saints] that the religions may in principle 
be assessed and judged. 
What we find in practice, however, is that ultimately we are unable to make a judgement that one 
faith rather than another has a "superior record" in this respect. 29. All have been productive of 
saints, both active and contemplative; all may provide a soteriological context in which ordinary 
men and women may make the transition from ego-centredness to Real ity-centredness. This is the 
religious ideal, but the reality falls short of this standard. 
tradition, idewed as a historical reality spanning many 
centuries, is an unique mixture of good and evil, embodied in the 
lives of saints and sinners, sometimesforming liberating but more 
often oppressive social structures., giving birth both to human 
nobility and to human beastliness, to justice and injustice, to 
beauty and ugliness. " 30. 
Difficult as it is to assess the relative merits of the great faiths as intellectual systems, it is even 
more difficult to assess them in terms of their adherence to or violation of what Hick has called 
the Golden Rule; 
"... when we seek to go beyond the identification of particular 
phenomena as good or evil, to make ethical judgements 
concerning the religious traditions as totalities, we encounter 
large complicating factors which must give pause to any project 
for the moral grading of the great worldfaiths. " 31. 
Because of the internal complexity and diversity of the great faiths, and the fact that they cannot 
be viewed as isolated entities apart from the historical and cultural milieu in which they have 
grown up and developed, Hick concludes that it is impossible to assess and grade religious 
traditions as totalities. 32. He does however concede that it is possible to submit particular 
religious phenomena and particular religious doctrines to critical judgement. 
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There can be "... systematic moral criticism, Mthin each tradition, of its own inherited doctrines. " 
33. Here, I believe, we may discern the nucleus of a possible meeting point between the theology 
of religious pluralism and the theologies of liberation, which we shall examine in more detail in 
due course. 
Criticisms of Hick's Thesis: "On GradiLig Religions. " 
1. Arguments supporting the view that "external" traditions must be judged by the "intemal" 
standards of the critic's own traditio . 
Hick, as I have noted, rejects the strategy of assessing and judging religious traditions by the 
criteria and standards of the individual's own tradition. He believes that to do so is to accept that 
the substance of one's faith, one's most cherished beliefs and practices, may be little more than 
the products of the accident of birth and subsequent religious conditioning. He asks; 
ff... can one be unquestioningly confident that the religion which 
one happens to have inherited by birth is indeed normative and 
that all others are properly to be graded by their likeness or 
unlikeness to it? " 34. 
It is important to note that Hick is not suggesting that such unquestioning confidence always and 
necessarily exists when the believer affirms the truth claims of the tradition of his or her birth, but 
he does seem to be saying that if and when religious affirmations are rooted in this kind of 
unquestioning confidence, this implies a lack of critical discernment. For if religious loyalty is 
determined by factors outside the individual's control, critical judgement is necessarily limited and 
impaired. The unacceptability of what he has called "genetic confessional ism" inclines [though it 
does not oblige] the reflective person to search for objective criteria by which to evaluate his or 
her own tradition, as well as the traditions of others. 35. 
However, some theologians do not accept this view, and believe that some form of the strategy 
rejected by Hick is the only possible approach to the judgement of faiths, and the only way to 
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prevent inter-faith dialogue from descending into a morass of relativity. The theologian may also 
hold that it is impossible to approach dialogue from any perspective other that which is rooted in 
the theoretical basis of his or her faith; to fail to do so constitutes a betrayal of the truth claims 
of that faith. This, for some Christian theologians, implies an obligation to approach dialogue and 
the judgement of faiths from a christocentric perspective. 
One such theologian is Newbigin, who has criticized what he believes is Hick's dichotomy 
between the "confessional" and the "truth-seeking" approach to dialogue. Hick has written; 
"... at one extreme there is a purely confessional dialogue in which 
each partner witnesses to his own faith, convinced that his has 
absolute truth while his partner's has only relative truth. At the 
other extreme is a truth-seeking dialogue in which each is 
conscious that Transcendent Being is infinitely greater than his 
own limited vision of it, and in which they accordingly seek to 
share their vision in the hope that each may be helped towards a 
fuller awareness of the Divine Reality before which they both 
stand. " 36. 
Newbigin is right to question the implications of this if, as he believes, Hick is suggesting that 
those who "confess" a particular faith necessarily fail to be truth-seekers. However, in this 
criticism of Hick, Newbigin takes insufficient note of the fact that, here, Hick is referring to the 
whole spectrum of possible'Christian approaches to dialogue; the possibility has to be accepted 
that, at the furthest extreme such an approach, as and when it exists, does imply a failure to 
exercise critical judgement of the individual's own faith in relation to others. 37. Newbigin's own 
stance is even more unsatisfactory; he writes, 
no standpoint is available to any man except the point where 
he stands; ... there is no platform from which one can claim to 
have an objective view which supersedes all the subjective faith- 
commitments of the world'sfaiths ... every man must take his stand 
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on the floor of the arena, on the same level with every other, and 
there engage in the real encounter of ultimate commitment with 
those who, like him, have staked their lives on their vision of the 
truth. " 38. 
This, I believe, is a premature rejection of the search to find objective criteria by which to judge 
faiths, which fails to take seriously Hick's reasons for insisting on the need to do so, and has 
important implications for Newbigin's own theology of religions. Simply, it leaves too many 
important questions unanswered. Probing further, one might ask, for what reasons do individuals 
"stake their lives" on their vision of the truth? How do they obtain such visions and how do they 
know they are true? Newbigin's answer would probably be rooted in the facts of Christian 
revelation, centring on the testimony of the New Testament witnesses. However, such a reply 
would not succeed in providing a satisfactory answer to Hick's suggestion that "confessional ism" 
may be rooted in the religious conditioning of birth and upbringing. As I suggested in Chapter 2, 
Newbigin's concessions to the historical relativity of human knowledge and human belief are 
inconsistent. He accepts that; 
"... there are no "truths of reason"' except those that have been 
developed in a historical tradition... every exercise of reason 
depends on a social and linguistic tradition which is, therefore 
something which has the contingent, accidental character of all 
historical happenings. " 39. 
However, he also holds that, 
"... within the Christian tradition the Bible is received as a 
testimony to those events in which God has disclosed ["revealed"] 
the shape of the story as a whole, because in Jesus the beginning 
and the end of the story, the Alpha and the Omega, are revealed., 
made known, disclosed. " 40. 
Newbigin writes as if the testimony of the biblical witnesses in some sense transcends the 
limitations of truths of reason which, by his own axioms, are specific to particular historical and 
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cultural situations. In holding to the absolute status of Christian revelation and the absolute truth 
revealed therein, Newbigin seems to exempt the biblical testimony from the qualifications which 
he would impose upon all other historical testimonies, and, as I have argued, fails to account for 
the possibility of genetic and environmental conditioning in the confessional stance of the biblical 
witnesses, which may [and only may] have predisposed them towards an incarnational 
interpretation of the events of scripture. 41. One must, logically, accept the thesis of the 
anthropological conditioning of religious thinking in relation to all believers and witnesses, or not 
accept it at all. What one cannot do with consistency, is accept it selectively, as Newbigin seems 
to do. 
Another theologian who affirms the necessity of judging faiths by the criteria and standards of his 
own faith "in a nuanced form" is D'Costa, who has more recently outlined his reasons for 
rejecting ternative approaches, specifically in relation to texts by H. Netland and K. Ward. 42. 
The purpose of D'Costa's paper is not primarily, to defend his own stance, but to demonstrate, 
in relation to the chosen texts, that the search for common neutral criteria by which to judge faiths 
is doomed to failure, for such criteria are always and necessarily tradition specific. 43. D'Costa's 
thesis is that, "... in relation to the increased specificity of an alleged neutralproposal its neutrality 
diminishes " and also that, "... in relation to the decreased specificity of an alleged neutralproposal 
its usefulness diminishes. " 44. 
Persuasive though his arguments are in relation to the texts he criticizes, it remains the case that 
the renunciation of the search to identify objective criteria for the evaluation of faiths is premature, 
and implicitly, constitutes a failure to deal with the argument raised by Hick with relation to the 
very important possibility of faith being determined by "genetic confessional ism. " In fairness to 
D'Costa, it is not his main purpose, in this particular paper, to defend his own preferred approach 
to the evaluation of faiths, though he does note certain criticisms which have been directed towards 
it. He notes that the judgement of faiths by the criteria of one's own faith has been labelled 
" jingoistic" in association with a reactionary trend against political, economic and religious 
imperialism in a post-colonial age, and that certain sociological, anthropological and philosophical 
arguments have centred upon the impossibility of comparing traditions at all, given the high levels 
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of incommensurability between them. 45. The question of the incommensurability of faiths is one 
we shall have to return to shortly, as being of crucial importance to a thesis which suggests the 
possibility of a global theology of religions based on shared moral criteria. At this point however, 
I wish simply to note that D'Costa does not mention what I believe is the most serious indictment 
against the theory that faiths must be judged by the standards and criteria of the theologian or Cp 
believer's own faith, which centres upon Hick's notion of "genetic confessional ism. " To recap, 
Hick's belief is that, 
"... the possibility mustpersistently recur to any intelligentperson., 
who has taken note of the broad genetic and envirownental 
relativity of the forms of religious commitment, that to assess the 
traditions of the world by the measure of one's own tradition may 
merely be to be behaving, predictably, in accordance with the 
conditioning ofone's own upbringing. Yhese considerations do not 
logically oblige anyone to look for other criteria for assessing 
religious phenomena than simply their congruence or lack of 
congruence with thefeatures of one's own tradition. But they do, 
I think, make it difficult to be happy with what might be called 
genetic confessionalism as a deliberate view. " 46. 
It may be argued that this position of Hick's is itself tradition specific and that it arises because 
of particular theological presuppositions, for example, Hick's conviction that an all-loving God 
would not have revealed himself in time and place to one specific group of people, and that every 
human apprehension of the divine is partial and incomplete. Thus, it may be argued, a pluralist 
conception of Ultimate Reality is presupposed, and grounds the theological enterprise from its 
outset. To some extent, this would be a valid criticism, in that the anthropological approach to 
theology freely acknowledges the significance of cultural and historical conditioning, including the 
conditioning of its own time and place. What this argument overlooks, however, is that the very 
fact of acknowledging this significance is to acknowledge, equally, the significance of genetic 
confessional ism, and thereby to seek to move beyond its confines as a deliberate strategy. It could 
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equally be argued that all theological enterprises start from the basis of some presuppositions, and 
ought therefore, to submit themselves to critical scrutiny of them; the position of genetic 
confessional ism, as a deliberate view, must be a denial of such critical scrutiny. 
This is not to suggest that D'Costa, or any other Christian theologian who adheres to a 
christocentric approach to the evaluation of other faiths is primarily motivated, or motivated at all, 
by what Hick has called genetic confessional ism, for in fact D'Costa and others have advanced 
persuasive reasons for retaining their christocentric stance elsewhere. 47 But I am suggesting that 
the failure to produce a persuasive counter-argument dealing with this specific objection of Hick's 
is a serious omission. Unless and until there is a counter argument which suggests that Hick's 
objection is invalid, the argument for the need to find objective criteria for the evaluation of faiths 
must remain. For if Hick is right in suggesting that theologians and believers may be conditioned 
in this way, then they also must perceive the need to attempt to judge faiths by some kind of 
external criteria, or accept the thesis of the anthropological conditioning of all theological thinking, 
including their own. It is precisely because of the fact of genetic and envirommental relativity in 
relation to religious commitment, which clearly supports the view that most believers remain 
committed to the religious tradition of their birth and upbringing, that the need to judge faiths by 
some kind of external criteria arises. 
2. Criticism Of the Notion of Common Soterioloaical Structure 
The conclusion Hick has drawn from his survey of the merits [and demerits] of the great world 
faiths is relatively non-controversial; it would be a brave theologian who would assert that we are 
, A% able to produce a "league table" of religions, based on observable ethical merits. There has, 
however, been considerable criticism of Hick's attempt to make this kind of comparison in the first 
place, in particular with respect to the notion of "soteriological effectiveness" or "a common 
soteriological coreff to be discerned within the religions. Critics suggest that the generic term 
"Soteriology" cannot be used to encompass the concepts of "salvation" "liberation" or 
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"enlightenment" for the same thing is not meant by each; there is no "common soteriological 
core. " 48. Further, that the notion of " soteria" itself is vague and theoretically unfounded in the 
religions themselves. 49. 
Some of these criticisms have already been considered; we saw in Chapter 5 that Pannenberg 
believes that the Christian concept of "salvation" must be located within a specifically Christian 
context, and cannot be considered synonymous within the concepts of "liberation" and 
"enlightemment", found within the Eastern traditions. 50. Also, that it is Lindbeck's view that 
religions, in their diversity, manifest no common framework that can be loosely defined as 
of soteriological. " 51. This view is echoed by David Tracy; 
"... Mere arefwnily resemblances among the religions. But asiar 
as I can see there is no single essence, no one content of 
enlightenment or revelation, no one way of emancipation or 
liberation, to be found in all that plurality. " 52. 
The essence of this kind of criticism is not simply the variety of soteriological aims discernible 
among the faiths, however, but their incompatibility. Philip Almond has written of pluralism's 
"principle of soteriological equality, " which results, he believes, in a tendency to blur the 
distinctive features of the soteriological doctrines of other faiths, and finally results in an 
undifferentiated concept of salvation, to which no tradition, including Christianity, would 
subscribe. 53. LA. DiNoia shares this view, also emphasising the primacy of the traditions" 
comprehensive doctrinal structures, which foster patterns of cognitive and affective dispositions, 
and provide shape for overall patterns of life, towards prescribed religious goals. He holds that; 
"... it is misleading to extract soteriological fragments from the 
various patterns of life commended by other communities in order 
to show that all of them aim at salvation, because salvation in 
some form, or Christian salvation implicitly, is what all religions 
seek in their doctrines and life. " 54. 
DiNoia believes the criticism of "extracting soteriological. fragments" can be levelled at both 
inclusivist and pluralist theologians, but more particularly at pluralists. However, I would argue 
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that the reverse is true, and that this charge [if it is valid at all] must be most applicable to 
inclusivist attitudes towards the soteriological aims of other faiths. Hick, as we noted in Chapter 
5, in relation to Cobb's dissatisfaction with the idea of a "common ineffable referent" as the focus 
of religious soteriologies, fully acknowledges the variety of soteriological. aims, which, 
nevertheless, he believes are mutually compatible rather than mutually exclusive. 55. He has 
adopted the formula of writing of "salvation, liberation or enlightenment, " to underline his 
acknowledgement that precisely the same thing is not meant by each concept. Inclusivists, 
however, are less concerned to account for the diversity of traditions, and focus, rather, upon the 
possibility of grace in non-Christian traditions, seeking to accord a modified salvific role to non- 
Christian faiths. We saw in Chapter 4 that within Rahner's theology, non-Christians may attain 
it salvation in Christ, " while nevertheless pursuing soteriological recommendations that are specific 
to their own faiths [and which, according to Almond, DiNoia et. al. cannot be accommodated under 
the Christian conceptual "umbrella" of salvation. ] Rahner's notion of the anonymous Christian 
certainly implies that, through grace, there is a hidden salvific core in non-Christian faiths, and 
explicitly states that salvation, if it is obtained, is definitively, the same salvation made available 
through grace in Christ. 
Pluralists, on the contrary, are considerably more open to an acknowledgement of the variety and 
diversity of soteriological aims, and are less concerned to impose alien soteriological goals upon 
the faiths. Pluralists such as Hick have sought to overcome the kind of objections raised by 
Almond and DiNoia by the proposal that no specific or non-specific religious end-point, 
Attainment of Nirvana/Enlightenment, Union with the Blessed Trinity/Salvation, perfectly 
describes ultimate reality, but only aims at describing it, for, 
".. -what is ultimately Real is beyond human conception and 
human grasp in this life. .. the Real is so rich in content that it can 
only be finitely experienced in the various partial and inadequate 
ways which the history of religions describes. " 56. 
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Also, " ... the divine nature is infinite, exceeding the scope of all hwnan concepts, and is capable 
of being experienced as personal Lord and as non-personal ground or depth of being. " 57 DiNoia 
is unconvinced by this, however, since, " ... conceptions of the end of lifefunction as objectives that 
specio dispositions, activities and patterns of activity nonetheless. ' 58. DiNoia seems to reject the 
possibility of evaluating religious traditions in general, and religious soteriologies in particular, 
beyond the confines of the doctrinal structures which give outward shape to the religious 
communities' understanding of the nature of reality. He does not envisage that it may be necessary 
to seek beyond a simple surface conflict in doctrines, eg. Trinity/Nirvana, to the underlying 
religious experience which is only partially encapsulated within a doctrinal structure. But as I have 
argued, with Hick, in Chapter 1, if doctrines are ultimately human constructs, related to but less 
than the totality of religious experience, then such a search is called for. DiNoia does not explore 
the possibility, suggested by Hick, that where there is genuine love, compassion and goodwill, 
these fruits of the spirit are manifestly observable by human beings, and that there is thus, a 
pragmatic test available to us by which religious soteriologies may be judged, at least in theory. 
DiNoia's own solution to the problem of evaluating other faiths' soteriological aims, without 
revising them or lumping them together under the tradition-specific Christian "umbrella" of 
salvation, in fact takes us very little further forward. He believes, 
" ... appropriate Christian valuations of such qualities could 
be 
ftamed in terms of an "eschatological " rather than a present 
salvi c value. Yhe specific ways in which the presently observable fi 
and assessable conduct and dispositions of non-Christians will 
conduce to their future salvation are now hidden from view and 
known only to God. " 59. 
Also, 
other religions are to be valued by Christians not because they 
are channels of grace or means of salvation for their adherents, 
but because they play a real but as yet perhaps not fidly 
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specifiable role in the divine plan to which the Chilstian 
community bears witness. " 60. 
This amounts to saying, firstly, that the real eschatological worth of soteriological doctrines is 
unknown to us, but known only to God. Surely, however, if this true, it must be true of human 
knowledge in relation to all soteriological doctrines; we cannot "know" indubitably, the worth of 
our own specific soteriological doctrines, while also claiming it is impossible to know the worth 
of others, if we -wish to claim any consistency in the epistemology of knowledge. Secondly, the 
notion of "a real but as yet not fully specifiable role in the divine plan" is also problematic. If 
something cannot be specified, it is almost impossible to know that it is real, and DiNoia can have 
very little, if any, ground for optimism regarding the intrinsic worth of such non-specifiable 
religious roles. The idea is that a religious role "... can be understood to be a providential one 
findirectly contributory] though not salvific [directly contributory]" 61. This, however, seems to 
a very vague and insubstantial role to be ascribed to God's divine providence, and lacks content 
in that it explains nothinj as regards the real nature and function of such roles. 
Having examined the criticisms of some of those who reject the notion of common soteria among 
the faiths, I would argue that even if it is held that soteriology does not constitute a common core 
among the faiths, it has not been shown conclusively, that it cannot be considered a common, 
though phenomenologically diverse aspect of faiths; this approach does not entail disregard for, 
or disrespect towards, the particular soteriological aims of the traditions, nor does it ascribe to 
them aims that are alien to their doctrinal structures. It is simply an observation relating to certain 
common preoccupations shared by the traditions; their concerns may be said to centre upon human 
nature and human destiny in relation to what is ultimately real, even though they conceive the 
human predicament and the true nature of reality somewhat differently. We can scarcely exclude 
the idea of soteriology from Christianity, for example, without denying a great deal of Jesus' 
teaching centred upon the idea of "The Kingdom of God. " It will be necessary, presently, to 
examine the implications of a "Kingdom Centred" hermeneutic, in relation to what certain 
liberation theologians see as the implications of this upon central Christian doctrines. For the 
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present, however, it may be worthwhile to examine more closely the implications of rejecting the 
concept of soteriology as common ground among the faiths. 
Soteriology as Common Ground 
The suggestion I wish to make is that those theologians who deny the existence of a common 
soteriological structure among religions do seem to encounter a major problem in advocating 
interreligious dialogue. On what basis can such dialogue take place, if "common ground" among 
the religions is denied? If disparate traditions are deemed to be completely incommensurable then, 
logically, it cannot follow that they can have any reason to engage in dialogue. Judgements of the 
levels of incommensurability vary, and, presumably, no theologian who advocates interreligious 
dialogue can hold the view that the disparity between traditions is such as to render them 
incomparable, for the acceptance of such a high degree of incommensurability would imply that 
dialogue would indeed be a fruitless exercise. The question which needs to be asked, clearlY, is 
what exactly does constitute commonality among the traditions? Put simply, what is it that makes 
some Christians and Buddhists wish to engage in dialogue as opposed, for example, to Christians 
and supporters of Manchester United Football Club? The fact that dialogue takes place between 
certain groups of persons and not others, presupposes a mutual recognition of certain common 
concepts. The basic requirement of some common ground as a prerequisite for dialogue has been 
argued for by Hick, as we have seen, and also by Knitter. 62. Both these theologians suggest that 
the criteria for discerning common ground centres on the notion of common soteria. If the notion 
of common soteria constituting common ground is rejected, there remains a need to define what 
else might be deemed to constitute common ground. 
As I have suggested, those theologians who hold the view that religious traditions are completely 
incommensurable must, logically, distance themselves from interreligious dialogue; this is in fact 
the stance of John Milbank, who believes that the variety and diversity of religious beliefs and 
practices is so great that no genus that can be called "religion" can be discerned. 63. He writes, 
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comparative religion should give way to the contrasting of 
cultures ... the practice of dialogue incorporates the asswnption 
that religion is an area of universal human concern that we can 
consider, contemplate and talk about. " 64. 
For Milbank, this is a false assumption. He defends his distancing from the "scenario" of inter- 
faith dialogue by the suggestion that those who participate may be guilty of an ethnocentric desire 
to uncover other routes to their own definitively religious goals. 65. However, as we shall see 
when we examine the issue of shared ethical concerns among the faiths, there is in fact greater 
consensus regarding shared goals and common ethical concerns than Milbank concedes, although 
he is clearly correct in pointing out the diversity of their beliefs. 
What seems to emerge from the debate regarding commonality or diversity among the faiths, and 
the possibility or otherwise of engaging in dialogue, is that there is in fact no consensus among 
those who are nevertheless in agreement in their rejection of religious pluralism. [Sufficiently so, 
at least, to contribute to the same volume of essays. ] 66. The implication of this is that there is 
a crucial need to uncover and examine the criteria of commonality among the faiths in greater 
depth, to question in what sense soteria might be deemed a sphere of common ground and to ask 
what possible alternative criteria may be discerned by those who reject this notion, while 
nevertheless advocating dialogue. This is a matter we shall need to return to shortly, after 
examining the arguments of those who, with Hick, believe that religions do exhibit structural 
similarity which may be broadly defined as soteriological. It is worth noting that several other 
theologians are in agreement with Hick, that religions do exhibit a common soteriological 
structure, and that the essence of religions is one of repairing the unsatisfactory state of the human 
condition and generating a new human fulfilment. 67. Knitter writes, 
"... To assert that all religious soteriologies begin by identifying 
a dissatisfying or broken state of human affairs which they then 
try to repair may sound sweepingly simplistic. But it is, 
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fundamentally, true. And it does imply that all religions, in a vast 
variety of ways, do seek to fix or promote human wetfare. ' 68. 
Although he concedes, with Tracy, that around this soteriocentric core there is nevertheless a 
bewildering plurality of religious beliefs and concerns which may be as contradictory as they are 
varied, he believes that this plurality need not rule out a soteriocentric approach to the 
understanding of religions. 69. And surely it must be the case that the frank avowal of the 
existence of plurality - even opposition - is nothing more than a recognition of the anthropological 
conditioning of all theological thinking in a pluralist world. In other words it means saying that, 
as a Christian, I know that I will approach dialogue from a Christian perspective, for it is 
impossible for me to do otherwise, if I am to remain the person that I am. The same must apply 
to my partner in dialogue, whether he or she is a Hindu or a Buddhist or a Jew or a Muslim. It 
means recognising that there can be no such being as a totally unconditioned religious believer, 
and acknowledging the significance of this conditioning. It means recognising the truth that exists 
in an acknowledgement that Jesus is central and decisive for the Christian, but also relative, 
despite the tensions produced by this paradox - 
The paradox of personal commitment to Jesus, and genuine and complete openness to the religions 
of others brought about by recognition and acceptance of the relativism of Jesus, is at the heart 
of a pluralist theology of religions. The facts of a religiously plural world clearly indicate that 
Jesus is in some very real and inevitable sense, relative to the experience of Christians alone. An 
acceptance of this relativism opens up the possibility of liberating Christianity from the thorny 
question of the uniqueness of Christ, upon which so much theological dispute has centred. 
Traditional christology could be redefined in terms of a new centre based on those issues which 
concerned Christ absolutely in his historical lifetime, and formed the substance of his teaching, 
and which still concern the world today, in its search for a global ethic. In other words, there 
could be a shift from christocentrism to anthropocentrism, a shift which implies a greater emphasis 
upon the substance of the Gospel teaching as it impinges on the lives of human beings in their 
human conditions, as opposed to the doctrinal structures which have been built upon it. 'nese, as 
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I argued in Chapter 5, are ultimately human constructs, subject to the anthropological conditioning 
of all theological thinking. Christianity, in adopting an anthropologically orientated centre, would 
then be truly open to the search for mediators of what is called within Christianity, "the will of 
God , it outside the tradition. This suggestion is not made simply to smooth the path of inter-faith 
dialogue - though it could certainly help to do so - but is rooted in observation and human 
experience of what is undeniably a pluralist world, and reflection on the unanswered question, why 
should this be so? 70. It does however ultimately imply a rejection of a Christocentric approach 
to inter-faith dialogue, so tenaciously held by some Christian theologians. 71. 
As I suggested above, a crucial question seems to hinge on the matter of what constitutes 
commonality among the traditions. The disputed issue has centred upon the notion of soteriology, 
view as a structural similarity. Critics have questioned whether commonality of structure 
constitutes sufficient ground for dialogue, and whether it implies commonality of goal or purpose. 
D'Costa has written, in relation to Ward's recent work in support of religious pluralism based on 
shared moral criteria, that he, "... simply jwnps from assuming a common structure [a movement 
towards a supreme objective value] to conflating that structure with content, and therefore a 
common goal. " He calls this a "... classical case of a category mistake; the confusion of the 
categories ofform and content. " 72. 
However, it seems to me that what we have here is in fact three categories, form, content and 
purpose/goal, and that it may clarify the issue of discerning commonality and/or disparity among 
the traditions to consider these ideas within the framework of a threefold categorical distinction. 
For example, we may define the religious "form/structure", within Christianity, as the outward 
and visible phenomena of the Church itself, the people of God, envisaged as the Body of Christ. 
Its "content" consists of the patterns of liturgy and worship institutional ised therein. Its 
to purpose/goal" might refer, within Christianity, to the apprehension of the beatific vision, beyond 
death. Similar analysis could be applied to other world faiths, or to other institutions. An analogy 
may serve to illustrate the point. Educational establishments, schools, colleges or universities, may 
be deemed to manifest structural similarity, towards a common but only partially conceived goal 
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[for what, m its entirety, do we encompass in the idea of "an educated person" ?I rMe content of 
such establishments, in terms of what is actually taught, may however, be radically dissimilar. Tbe 
point is that, if similarity of structure is presupposed, this may point to similarity or dissimilarity 
of purpose/goal, via similar or dissimilar content, for, given a threefold categorical distinction, 
the permutations naturally increase. 
In the case of the religions, I would suggest that we may discern something of the same kind. 
Similarity of structure may lead to similarity of goal - an understanding of, and communion or 
union with Transcendent Reality, which is beyond human grasp in the mundane world - via 
dissimilarity of content. Within this schema, the "soteriological emphasis" is shifted from the 
category of structure to the category of purpose or goal. My suggestion is that it may be the case 
that a certain amount of theological disagreement centring on the soteriological issue has been 
caused by the emphasis on soteriology as a structural similarity among faiths, [Hick, Knitter] when 
in fact "common soteria" may be best understood within the category of purpose or goal, rather 
than within the category of structure. A shift in the understanding of faiths as soteriological in 
purpose or goal, rather than soteriological. in structure may, I believe, help to clarify the concerns 
expressed in this particular theological issue. This is not to suggest, however, that such a shift in 
emphasis entirely eradicates the problem of whether or not soteriology may be considered common 
ground among the faiths. One theologian who does seem to view soteriology as a category of goal 
or purpose is Netland, however, he is in basic agreement with Pannenberg, Lindbeck, and DiNoia, 
that the notion of common soteria, viewed as a religious goal, does not function in this way. 
"... Certainly the major religions are all concerned in some sense 
with the theme of "salvation "- that is, the "transition from a 
radically unsatisfactory state to., a limitlessly better one"... But 
Hick minimizes differences in conceptions of salvation by speaAlng 
as if all religions share a common soteriological goal and a 
common understanding of what constitutes salvation. " 73. 
It is Netland's contention that, since the major religions analyze the human predicament in 
different ways, their notions of salvation, enlightenment or liberation equally, differ; each is 
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applicable only to the respective faith's conception of the human condition. Hence, the notion of 
soteriology cannot be detached from the question of exclusive truth claims. Here, Netland seems 
to share the views of DiNoia, for he states, 
N ... a given religion can be regarded as soteriologically effective 
only if its diagnosis of the human condition is accurate and if its 
proposed way of achieving the intended soteriological goal %411 
indeed bring about the desired effect .. the question of the truth of 
basic beliefs about the human predicament, and the ways of 
release ftom that predicament, cannot be avoided. " 74. 
Netland is arguing that the traditions' conceptions of the human condition predetermine their 
conceptions of soteriology. If, as the Christian holds, the human condition is characterized by 
ienat on from God as a result of human sinfulness, salvation is conceived as being made possible 
by the saving action of Christ. Conversely, [in Netland's view] if, as the Buddhist holds, the 
human condition is in fact one of ignorance of the true nature of reality, in association with 
craving and desire, liberation will be achieved by following the Noble Eightfold Path. The primacy 
of religious truth claims, particularly as they relate to differences in the ways of conceiving and 
responding to the divine Reality [ie. awareness of the divine as personal or impersonal I is 
emphasised by Netland as determining the traditions' diverse conceptions of soteriology. In this 
respect Netland's thesis is similar to that of DiNoia, which we examined above. 
What is questionable, however, is whether it is necessary to adopt an attitude of exclusive 
disjunction in relation to these opposing truth claims, and hence to the nature of soteriology, as 
an alternative to Hick's analysis, which suggests that they are partial and incomplete human 
responses to the totality of religious truth. 75. The Christian conception of the human predicament 
as characterized by alienation from God is not necessarily contradicted by an additional insight that 
it is also one of ignorance and preoccupation with craving and desire, for it could be held that the 
"sinfulness" of craving and desire significantly increase this same alienation. Likewise, the 
Buddhist insight into the nature of the human condition is not contradicted by the conception of 
Page 256 
humanity as alienated from God: if "God" is conceived as that which is ultimately Real, ignorance 
of Him/Her/It is not radically dissimilar from alienation from Him/Her/It, though the difference 
in the conception of Ultimate Reality as personal or impersonal clearly remains. 76. Central to 
Netland's thesis is the belief that where the truth claims of Christianity are deemed to be 
incompatible with those of other religious traditions, the latter are to be rejected. 77. However, 
my contention is that here, he does not succeed in demonstrating the kind of incompatibility which 
would invalidate the idea of a "common soteriological purpose" as applicable to the religions as 
they function as living faiths, though it must be conceded that the substance of what may be 
termed their "soteriological recommendations" remains tradition specific. 
Netland's argument, as I have stated, centres upon his conviction that the fact of oppositions in 
religious doctrines rules out the possibility of viewing soteriology as common ground among the 
faiths, for the significant ontological claims about reality, upheld by the faiths, are also held by 
them to be essential for salvation, liberation or enlightenment. He rejects Hick's view that, 
"... both correct and incorrect trans-historical beliefs, like correct 
and incorrect historical and scientific beliefs, can form a part of 
a religious totality that mediates the Real to human beings, 
constituting an effective context within which the salvific process 
occurs. " 78. 
Nettand believes that, 
"... the suggestion must be rejected that many disagreements over 
doctrinal belief are unimportant since they are irrelevant to 
salvation. That correct belief [among other things] is essentialfor 
salvation is accepted in most religions. " 79. 
This may be disputed in two ways. Firstly, it is not necessarily the case that correct belief is held 
to be strictly necessary for salvation within Christianity, at least, not according to Rahner's 
theology in relation to the theory of the anonymous Christian. Secondly, as I suggested in Chapter 
5, the problem here, clearly recognised by Hick, but overlooked or minimized by others, including 
Netland, is that we simply have no indubitable way of knowing which of the disputed doctrinal 
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claims made by the religious traditions are actually true; there are no answers, according to the 
present state of human knowledge, to such questions as, "is the universe eternal, or did it have a 
beginning? " which would amount to definitive knowledge capable of commanding a general 
consensus outside the specific faith community which upholds a particular "answer" to questions 
such as this. Therefore, it is very far from easy to dismiss Hick's belief that, " ... it seems 
implausible that ourfinal destiny should depend upon ourprofessing beliefs about matters oftrans- 
historicalfact concerning which we have no definitive information. " 80. Nor is it reasonable to 
reject his suggestion that, 
Ot we shall always hope for new evidence or new argments 
which will make the truth plain to all; but in the meantime we 
should regard the matter as one about which it would be unwise 
to be unyieldingly dogmatic. " 81. 
If, as I believe he is, Hick is urging the religious traditions to modify their stance regarding 
doctrinal conflict, in effect, recommending the pluralist option as a viable alternative in the 
theology of religions, it must be conceded that this is a radical proposal. Nevertheless, it is not 
one that can be easily dismissed by the faiths, while they are unable to resolve the disputed issues 
of doctrinal conflict, except with recourse to ecclesiastical or scriptural authority. For as we shall 
see, when we examine the influence of post-Enlightenment rationality and post-Enlightenment 
ethics upon the modern world, such questions as "what grounds has the religious believer for 
affirming his or her faith? " are not answered, but only removed one stage further away, by appeals 
to doctrinal structures and institutional authority. 
The Limitations of Hick's thesis: "On Grading Religions. " 
Hick's thesis as I have outlined it is very generalized; he emphasises the shared concerns which 
he claims all religions demonstrate for the promotion of human welfare, but he does not spell out 
in detail the precise content of these ethical concerns. His analysis, as I stated at the beginning of 
this chapter, is primarily retrospective; it is to the religions as they have actually existed in human 
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history that he has looked, in his attempt to assess and judge them on the basis of their "moral 
fruits. " This thesis is moreover, heavily dependent on a presupposition of moral objectivity - that 
there are some moral norms which are universally accepted - and it is by no means the case, 
within moral philosophy, that there is a general consensus on this "realist" conception of morality 
itself. 82. It will be necessary, presently, to attempt to refute the prevailing scepticism which holds 
that there are no moral principles which are true and valid beyond reasonable doubt and therefore 
universally binding. However, it is clearly the case that, even given a presupposition of moral 
objectivity, Hick's thesis requires some development, and the content of "shared ethical concerns " 
needs to be spelled out in more precise detail, if we are to begin to develop a useful consensus 
among the faiths, for a theology of religious pluralism based on shared ethical criteria. Hick states 
that, 
"... it would be anachronistic to look for doctrines of universal 
human rights and a theology ofpolitical or economic liberation in 
the "ages offaith " when political power and responsibility were 
beyond the horizon of all except those at the top of the social 
hierarchy. " 83. 
He thereby implicitly acknowledges that the religions as they have existed in their historical 
situations have not had, and could not be expected to have had, the kind of concerns which 
impinge on human consciousness today, nor an awareness of what might be called structural evil. 
It appears that there may be scope here for inter-faith dialogue, in order to define the nature of 
ethical concerns in a new age of sociological consciousness. Hick has noted the radical shift in 
consciousness which may be discerned in the modern world. 
"... this new consciousness presupposes an historical situation 
which is itsetf new, namely one in which power, and hence 
political responsibility have been dispersed in the democratising 
movements of the last two or three centuries. Until the modern 
period human liberation could usually only mean the innerfreeing 
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of the individual, a transformation that was expressed outwardly 
in acts of individual charity. ' 84. 
Today, however, given a greater understanding of the dynamics of socio-economic life, and the 
recognition that the social order of a given historical period does not exist by divine appointment, 
Hick believes the call is for a recreation of human society on a basis of justice and equality. 85. 
What he has not done, however, is to formulate a precise agenda for this proposed reformation 
of the social and economic structures of the world. 
Such reforming proposals are, indeed, deceptively simple in their formulation, and may easily fail 
to take into account that it is by no means easy to define precisely what we mean by the notions 
of justice, equality and liberation. Critics point out that any agenda for the recreation and 
reformation of the social and economic structures of the world based on these principles runs the 
risk of descending into a morass of generalization and abstraction. D'Costa has rightly pointed out, 
in relation to the recent work of Ward, that to probe a transcendental understanding of the concept 
of "value", and the possibilities of seeking value, does not actually take us any nearer to 
discovering what the material content of value might be. 86. It is also his view that, since religions 
circumscribe their world and their understanding of what it is to be human, it is necessary to root 
the ideas of "liberation",, "justice" or "human welfare" firn-fly within the confines of the paradigms 
and norms which shape the traditions. I 
This criticism has been directed specifically towards Knitter's developing thesis towards a 
liberation theology of religions. 
"... the paradigmatic and normative sources of a tradition shape 
their understanding of what the human condition is and what it 
ought to be. Hence, promoting human wetfare is an unhelpfid 
common denominator as it specifies nothing in particular until 
each tradition addresses itsetf to what is meant by "human" and 
the "welfare" of human beings. n 87. 
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However, as I hope to demonstrate, Knitter's proposals for a theology of liberation do in fact 
manage to circumvent the pitfalls of abstraction and to provide a meeting point for the theologies 
of liberation and religious pluralism, in ways that may be acceptable for the faiths as they find 
themselves in a self-consciously pluralist historical situation. 
An Ann& for 
_a -Global 
Theology of Religions based on Ethical Criteria. P. Knitter: HAOM 
M. BrUbrooke 
An agenda for a theology of religions based on shared ethical criteria has been proposed by Paul 
Knitter, who believes the contemporary world provides a new "kairos", a unique global context 
for interreligious encounter, centred upon a common concern for issues of human welfare which 
are of such vital importance that they transcend differences of religion and culture. 88. 
Interreligious dialogue would be based, not on an artificially contrived, universalist religious 
viewpoint, but upon a shared concern for "soteria" or liberation from the evils of human 
experience. Knitter's schematization is, essentially, an evolutionary development within his 
theology of religious pluralism. In No Other Name he proposed a shift from ecclesiocentrism to 
christocentrism to theocentrism in an attempt to avoid affirming the normativity of the Church, 
or Christ, as truth criteria, for the multireligious realities which impose themselves upon Christian 
consciousness clearly suggest to him that there are other ways of salvation, experienced and 
articulated in diverse forms. Therefore, to assert the normativity of Christ, "... seems to contradia 
our present experience. " 89. In response to criticisms that the notion of "theos" is 
incommensurable with the belief systems of certain faiths, such as Buddhism, he has now moved 
a stage further. 
"... If Christian attitudes have evolved ftom ecclesiocentrism to 
christocentrism to theocentrism, they must now move on to what 
in Christian symbols might be called "kingdom-centrism ", or, 
more universally, "soteriocentrism. " For Christians, that which 
constitutes the basis and the goalfor interreligious dialogue, that 
which makes mutual understanding and cooperation between the 
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religions possible... that which unites the religions in common 
discourse and praxis, is not how they are related to the 
church ... or how they are related to Christ ... nor even how they 
respond to and conceive of God, but rather to what extent theY 
are promoting soteria [in Christian images, the basileial to what 
event they are engaged in promoting the human wetfare and 
bringing about liberation with and for the poor and nonpersons. " 
90. 
He also believes that, "... where religions do not share a concern for the wetfare of humanitY, 
dialogue is impossible, perhaps not worthwhile. " 91. 
Knitter's current theological stance derives very much from his increasing interest in the proposals 
of liberation theologians and his conviction that there can and ought to be a natural affinity 
between liberationists and pluralists. An increased interchange of ideas between these two groups 
may be mutually sustaining and enriching; there can be a fruitful synthesis of ideas and concerns. 
92. Latin American theologians of liberation need to become more aware of the liberative potential 
of non-Christian faiths, and need to espouse the cause of pluralism, he believes. This is because, 
0 economic, political, and especially nuclear liberation is too 
big a job for any one nation or culture or religion. A 
crosscultural, interreligious cooperation in liberative praxis and 
a sharing of liberative theory is called for. " 93. 
Similarly, he believes pluralists have much to gain from an emphasis on liberative praxis, which, 
in focusing upon essentials, can function for pluralism as a preventative against the tendency for 
dialogue to be debilitated and reduced to relativist pap. 94. He outlines several reasons for holding 
this view. Firstly, he believes the approach of liberationists to dialogue, via what he calls the 
"hermeneutics of suspicion, " helps to prevent those engaged in dialogue from interpreting scripture 
and doctrinal formulations in the light of their own interests, and as a means of promoting them. 
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He asks, 
"... how much has traditional theology of religions, especially its 
christological basis, served to cloak or condone unconscious 
ideological desires to maintain superiority, or to dominate and 
control, or to devalue other traditions culturally or religiously? 
Why, really, have Christians been so insistent on maintaining the 
doctrine of extra ecclesiam nulla salus ["outside the church, no 
salvation "], or the claim that Christ has to be the final norm for 
all other religions? " 95. 
Secondly, against those who argue that there is no common essence among religions, or shared 
starting point from which to engage in dialogue, liberative ideas provide a starting point or 
common context centred around "... the preferential option for the poor and the non-person. " 96. 
Thirdly, a soteriocentric approach provides objective criteria by which religions may assess and 
judge themselves and each other, against the nuanced form of fideism which results from the claim 
that it is inappropriate to assess religions by criteria which are not meaningful within a given 
tradition. Unless we are prepared to undertake some form of assessing and grading religions, as 
attempted by Hick, we cannot escape from the pitfalls of radical scepticism or complete relativism. 
97. 
Clearly, in promoting a soteriocentric approach to dialogue, Knitter is asserting the primacy of 
praxis over theory. Indeed he states, "... liberation theology insists that praxis is both the origin 
and the confirmation of theory or doctrine. All Christian beliefs and truth claims must grow out 
of and then be reconfirmed in the praxis or lived experience of these truths. " 98. 
He has formulated an agenda of practical concerns which, he believes, are of such universal 
importance that they transcend differences of doctrinal belief and are able to provide a grounding 
for religious theory and a starting point for dialogue. He highlights three areas of global concern. 
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1. The Injustice of Socio-Economic Oppression 
Knitter believes that the outrage and injustice of poverty and oppression, based on distinctions of 
race, class and sex, is consciously felt by the religions today in a new and unique way. TIe 
violations of human rights which manifest themselves as poverty, starvation, illiteracy and 
unemployment impinge upon our consciousness as never before, through an awareness brought 
about by mass communication. This is the first area of universal religious concern, the cause of 
social and economic justice. 99. 
2. The Nuclear Threat 
Knitter also believes there is a universal call for peace, which cannot be brought about without a 
radical change in our ways of thinking and being. This call for peace impinges on our 
consciousness as never before, since the threat of nuclear attack has awakened our awareness to 
the possibility of the mass destruction of humanity. 100. 
3. The Need for Ecological Liberation 
Thirdly, Knitter draws attention to the need for ecological liberation; in the post-industrial world 
we are becoming aware of the exploitation and potential destruction of the eco-system upon which 
we are all dependent. There is a universal human call to address this problem before it is too late. 
101. These three issues constitute the areas of global concern, which, Knitter believes, provide an 
opportunity for the religions to encounter one another on a basis of shared interests. 102. Since 
formulating this agenda of shared ethical concerns, Knitter has extended his thesis in Jesus and the 
other Names: Christian Mission and Global Responsibilay and in One Earth. Many Religions: 
Multifaith Dialogge and Global Responsibilky. He now calls for a "... correlational globally 
responsible theology of religions" within which dialogue between members of different religious 
communities can take place on a basis of absolute equality and mutual respect. 103. Against 
inclusivists, Knitter is insistent that useful dialogue can only take place if each participant is 
completely open to listening to, and learning from, the truth claims of others. This presupposes 
that one cannot engage in dialogue with the pre-conviction that Jesus is the full, final and 
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unsurpassable manifestation of God in history. Inclusivists theologians, he maintains, have failed 
to explain how this kind of Christological stance allows for a truly correlational dialogue. 
"... It is one thing to enter the dialogue with solid truth claims; it 
is quite another to place on the table of dialogue truth claims that 
are staVed Mth the divine seal of approval as final and 
unsurpassable " 104. 
The essence of Knitter's present stance, which underpins his theology of religions and facilitates 
truly open dialogue is that " ... a correlational dialogue has to presume that there can be, and most 
likely are, many true religions". 105. Contrary to the inclusivist position, he believes such a stance 
is not a denial of the particularity of Christian truth claims; 
contrary to what is generally thought, in a correlational model 
for calling religions to dialogue, differences are maintained, 
recognized, cherished, - they are not boiled away in order to create 
some kind of common religious soup ". 106. 
Thus, the notion of "many true religions" entails that the world's religious traditions share truth, 
but express truth, through the particularity of their historically and culturally conditioned doctrinal 
structures, very differently. Differences are seen as complementary rather than contradictory, 
however, 
"... If the Buddhist is transformed into a person more at peace 
with himsetf and others through the image of no-self, and if the 
Christian is similarly transformed through her experience ofbeing 
a new-self in Christ Jesus, the evident contradiction between no- 
self and new-self must, in some way, be complimentary; the 
Buddhist and Christian can speak and share, and be better offor 
doing so". 107. 
Here, Knitter very much echoes the view of John Cobb ...... the Buddhist could in principle 
acknowledge the reality of something worthy of trust and worship without abandoning the central 
insight that attachment blocks the way to enlightenment. And the Christian could come to see that 
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real trust is not attachment in the Buddhist sense. Both would thereby have learned what is 
important to the other without abandoning their central concerns". 108. Both Knitter and Cobb 
have moved beyond the surface conflict of opposing doctrinal structures, to a deeper realisation 
of the complementary character of apparently conflicting truth claims, and, it would seem to a 
vision of the possibility of religious truth in a variety of religious contexts. 
Dialogue continues to be viewed by Knitter as a moral imperative in the face of human need and 
human suffering; "... the need surgesforth, painfully and implacably, from the reality oftervasive 
and unnecessary both hwnan and ecological". 109. Although Knitter calls upon the religions to 
address these issues as an absolute moral priority in dialogue, the dialogue itself is not to confined 
to "the religions". Humanists will experience it as the responsibility and calling they feel when 
they realise that evolution has reached a point where we must now play a key role. The entire 
evolutionary proms on Earth will be impeded, or at least set back, unless we humans exercise 
our intelligence and our freedom responsibly and morally. (We shall see, in the final chapter, how 
such views are shared and endorsed by other theologians such as Kaufman, and secular humanists 
such as Reiman, who both place emphasis upon the issues of global concern which Knitter 
considers to be a priority, in inter-faith dialogue). 
Many of the concerns outlined by Knitter are shared by Hans Kiing in Global Responsibili1y -I 
Search of a New World Ethic. It is Ming's conviction that: 
"... the one world in which we live has a chance of survival only 
if there is no longer any room in it for spheres of differing, 
contradictory and even antagonistic ethics. Mis one world needs 
one basic ethic. 7his one world society certainly does not need a 
unitary religion and a unitary ideology, but it does need some 
norms, values, ideals and goals to bring it together and to be 
binding on it. " 110. 
Ming also makes the imPortant point that the religions of the world - as distinct from secular 
humanist ethics - have a unique role in grounding a universalist agenda of moral norms, 
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particularly in relation to world peace, for although it is undeniable that there can be morality 
without religion, 
"... there is one thing that those who have no religion cannot do, 
even ýf in fact they want to accept unconditional moral norms for 
themselves: they cannot give a reason for the absoluteness and 
universality o ethical obligations. W7w remains uncertain is why I ?f 
I shouldfollow such nonns unconditionally. ie. in every case and 
everywhere - even where they run quite contrary to my interest. 
And why should everyone do this? ... Even a duty for hutnankind 
to survive can hardly be demonstrated conclusively in a rational 
way. "I IL 
Thus he cites the "categorical imperative" [Kant] for the grounding of a distinctively religious 
ethical code that is capable of obtaining a universal consensus. 
Where Knitter goes one step further than Ming, however, towards a pluralist theology of religions 
based on ethical criteria, is in spelling out what he sees as the implications of certain ethical 
proposals, for christological understanding. Citing the work of Latin American liberation 
theologians such as Jon Sobrino and Juan Luis Segundo, Knitter states that the soteriocentric model 
for dialogue calls for a new interpretation of the person and teaching of Jesus. 112. The crucial 
questions we must ask ourselves, in interpreting Jesus, must centre upon what he himself believed 
was of ultimate importance. "... Me ultimate for Jesus is the Kingdom of God - that is, God in 
relation to the human condition in the world we live in, as distinctfrom God in relation to God's 
self. " 113. The implication is that Jesus himself is not to be understood in terms of any kind of 
"absolute" which may be undermined through the methodology of historical exegesis, he is not to 
be understood in terms of the traditional New Testament titles, nor as the Son of God. Jesus - who 
refused to be defined - must be understood in terms of what he himself believed to be of absolute 
importance, the concerns encapsulated in the symbol of the Kingdom of God. Hence, according 
to Knitter and the liberation theologians he cites, the Kingdom-centred hermeneutic has decisive 
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implications for the understanding of christology. 114. The claim is that a degree of understanding 
of what Jesus meant by "the Kingdom", a commitment to the creation of a new world based on 
justice and freedom from oppression in all its manifestations, is a prerequisite for an understanding 
of Jesus himself. Thus, Segundo writes, 
". .. human beings who are not ready to set up certain human 
values as criteria prior and superior to any specific religion are 
incapable of recognizing the significance and importance of 
Jesus. P? 115. 
Within the framework of thinking pioneered by some liberation theologians and endorsed by 
Knitter, there is a call for a radical shift from christocentrism to soteriocentrism, [or what I have 
called anthropocentrism. ] An understanding of what they believe to be Jesus' message and Jesus' 
priorities ecomes prior to and determinative of, an understanding of Jesus himself. Stated simply 
by Knitter, "... unless we first meet the God present in our neighbour, we will never recognize the 
God of Jesus. " 116. 
In Jesus and the Other Names Knitter continues to cite the Latin American Theologians, Juan 
Segundo and Jon Sobrino, in support of the theological stance they have taken in emphasising the 
teaching of Jesus and its relevance to present day awareness of the facts of human suffering, above 
the status of the person of Jesus. 117. This theological stance, Knitter believes, is beginning to 
reverberate into the wider community of Christians; 
I think there is a growing awareness among many Christians of 
a discrepancy between their doctrine and their ethics - between 
the view of the other given by their beliefs and the conduct toward 
the other required by their ethics. It is a clash between orthodoxy 
right beliefs - and orthopraxy - right behaviour. 118. 
Where such a clash exists, Knitter clearly suggests that orthopraxis must be the Christian's 
priority. Thus, Knitter has moved considerably further towards a pluralist theology of religions 
based on ethical criteria than Kfing would be prepared to go; it is unlikely that Ming would 
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endorse Knitter's christological revision nor his radical emphasis on soteriology, for he has stated 
that, 
"... the Christian community may allow itself to be persuaded to 
replace an ecclesio-centrism with a Christo-cenMsm or theo- 
centrism... but they are hardly likely to take up some vague 
soteriocentrism. Practice should not be made the norm of theory 
undialectically and social questions expounded as the basis and 
centre of the theology of religions. " 119. 
The relationship between religious theory and practice is one we shall shortly need to examine in 
more detail, for Ming, here, provides us with no overwhelmingly convincing reason for the 
precedence of christocentrism over soteriocentrism - other than what is located, presumably, in 
ecclesiocentrism. Unfortunately for Ming, it has become increasingly impossible in the post- 
Enlightenment world, to answer the fundamental question, what grounds has the rational person 
for affirming his or her religious belief? - solely with recourse to the authority of the Church, or 
scriptural testimony. This is a matter we shall return to shortly, in the context of the 
interrelationship between post-Enlightennient liberal ethics and religious affirmations. 
For the present, it is worth noting that the priorities of Knitter and others are echoed in a 
publication edited by Marcus Braybrooke, Sttpping Stones to a Global Ethic. In his overview of 
the present day inter-faith movement he states, 
"... to meet the contemporary challenge, the interfaith movement 
needs to become more practical. .. Religious people need to make 
clear that their commitment to the search for truth and the 
defence of human rights is stronger than their group loyalty - 
costly as this may be ... the emphasis has to be on the search 
for 
a global ethic. " 120. 
The main purpose of Braybrooke's book is to assemble the texts of declarations made by 
international bodies within the interfaith movement and to examine what kind of consensus may 
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be emerging among the world faiths on shared ethical values, despite doctrinal differences. 
Undoubtedly, an examination of the declarations made by five World Conferences on Religion and 
Peace held between 1970 and 1989 reveals that there is considerable consensus where the practical 
issues of the promotion of world peace and care for the ecological welfare of the planet are 
concerned. 121. There is also considerable agreement as regards the fundamental importance of 
human rights, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United 
Nations in 1948, and affirmed within all the major religious traditions. Article I of the U. N. 
declaration affirms that, "... all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 77wy 
are endowed with reason and conscience and shall act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood. " 122. Clearly, however, the history of international and interfaith conflict since 1948 
reveals an immense gulf between the ideology expressed in this statement, and its practical 
application in human affairs. The existence of this gulf is indisputable; its existence poses several 
questions which it will be expedient to examine separately, although they are intrinsically 
interconnected. 
1. Do the religions actually mean the same thing when they speak of universal human rights and 
human liberation, or are such notions "tradition specific"? 
2. Is it possible to ground morality in universal human reason, or is the level of generality 
expressed in such ideas as "universal human rights" so great as to be morally vacuous and 
conceptually meaningless? 
3. Does the level of generality reflect the fact that in affirming this statement, the religions are 
influenced primarily by post-Enlightenment liberal ethics rather than by the specific beliefs and 
concerns of their own traditions? Are we seeing here, an unacceptable attempt to ground theory 
in praxis, rather than the reverse? 
These are the vitally important issues which will come under examination in our final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Ethical Criteria for a Global-Th logy of -Religions 
At the end of the last chapter several interrelated questions were posed, which it will be vital to 
answer satisfactorily, if the proposal for inter-faith dialogue within a pluralist framework on the 
basis of an acknowledgement of shared ethical concerns is to be seen to be viable. To recap, 
objections to such a proposal centre upon the fact that such notions as "human rights" and "human 
liberation" are too generalized; the religions, it is claimed, circumscribe their world and their 
understanding of what it is to be human. Given the incommensurability of the faiths' understanding 
of the human condition, there is no universally acceptable platform from which agreement upon 
ethical issues can be reached. 
Such a stance implies a rejection of the idea that morality is grounded in human reason; according 
to such critics, our notions of what is moral are themselves tradition specific; there is no such 
thing as "moral realism", outside of the faiths' understanding of morality, and beyond the 
historical and cultural conditioning of societies' views upon such issues. Attempts to ground 
notions of what is moral in "universal human reason" are thus doomed to failure. Furthermore, 
in relation to the religions, ideas associated with modem liberalism tend to minimize the 
fundamental tenets of traditions in their paradigmatic and normative forms, thus there is an 
unwarrantable intrusion upon the religions, of ill-defined post-enlightenment liberal ethics. ýMese, 
in brief, are the issues I shall address in this final chapter. 
The Meming of Human Rights and Human Liberation within the Religio . 
In 
----, 
Global Ethic Braybrooke cites the teachings of the world faiths in support 
of the view that the idea of human rights is to be found in all the major faiths. 1. Tlis is in 
Wignment with Hick's belief that, '... love, compassion, generous concernfor and commitment to 
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the weýfare of others is a central idealfor each of them. " [the religions. ] 2. Hick further defines 
this commitment, and centres it anthropocentrically, by stating that, 
the basic ethical principle of the great traditions - is not an 
alien ideal imposed by supernatural authority but one arising out 
of our hwnan nature [ though always in tension with other aspects 
of that nature 1, reinforced, refined and elevated to new levels 
within the religious traditions. " 3. 
Against this, it has been argued that there is in reality no theoretical basis of commonality in the 
idea of human rights among the faiths, and that the term is itself ill-defined and deeply ambiguous. 
"Human Rights" can only be grounded in the underlying understanding within the faiths of what 
it is to be human. Beliefs regarding issues of practical human rights are dependent on, and must 
be rooted in, the theoretical bases of faiths, ie. in their truth claims, grounded in what they believe 
actually constitutes human nature in relation to the divine nature. 4. 
In reply to this it could be argued, however, that theoretical support for human rights is 
inseparable from the practical issues which constitute the essential concerns of religions, for, in 
talking about human rights, we are by definition talking about what is right for humans. Therefore 
we are talking about practical matters. For this reason, any attempt to assert the primacy of theory 
over practice is neither possible nor desirable. Clearly, there is ample evidence that the grounding 
of praxis in theory has not always borne fruit, for religions have frequently failed to promote the 
ideals they support theoretically in an active and purposeful way. 5. 
The existence of an immense gulf between religious ideals and religious practice is undeniable and 
its existence points to the failure of religions to produce what Hick has called "the fruits of the 
spirit" commensurate with their theoretical ideals. Since this is true, it is not easy to be convinced 
by the argument of John Milbank, that; "... a postmodern position that respects otherness and 
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locality, and yet at the same time still seeks the goals ofjustice, peace and reconciliation, can 
only, in fact, be a Christian [or possibly a Jewish] position. " 6. 
Milbank seems to believe that the post-Enlightenment liberal perspective is, in its origins, 
intrinsically associated with a Jewish/Christian inheritance, and therefore ought not to be 
"transplanted" to the context of Eastern religions; any attempt to do so is to reinforce the kind of 
imperialism and ethnocentricity so much deplored by pluralists. However, Milbank himself may 
be accused of ethnocentricity in his suggestion that concerns with justice, equality and freedom are 
"evidently Western" and in what seems to be his refusal to allow the religions to develop as they 
wish, in dialogue with modemity. 7. According to Milbank, traditions - and here I use the term 
with deliberation since he does not concede that there is any such genus as "religions" - are best 
understood by reading "dead texts pre-ddting Western intrusion and practices relatively 
uncontaminated by Western influence. " 8. This is because living representatives of traditions are, 
according to Milbank, inevitably influenced by the West to the extent that they cannot be said to 
be truly representative of their traditions at all, their very willingness to engage in dialogue with 
the West indicates alienation from their roots. 9. 
The implication of this is that Milbank, rather than the religious representatives themselves, would 
be the arbiter and decision maker in the matter of how far the religions may be allowed to develop 
as they wish in dialogue with modernity. In this way, Milbank himself may be accused of 
ethnocentricity, in displaying an attitude which consigns the religions to the status of historical 
phenomena, by denying their relevance to the modern context and their ability to develop within 
it. Milbank holds a sceptical view of the usefulness of inter-faith dialogue, based on his belief in 
the basic incommensurability of faith traditions. He believes that, 
"... it must be sheerly illusory to associate evidently Western 
concerns with socialjustice, social equality and thefteedom ofthe 
Other ... %ith a tradition-transcending pluralism ... this association 
implies that one canfoundjustice andfreedom in universal human 
reason. " 10. 
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According to Milbank, the 'now general realization of the literate" is that this is impossible. 11. 
It is precisely this issue that we need to examine more closely in the next section, for Milbank's 
assertion has far-reaching consequences. If he is right, and moral principles cannot be founded in 
human reason, it is very questionable whether they can be subjected to human reason as a means 
of scrutinizing them either. And if this is so, it must indeed be the case that inter-faith dialogue 
based on the search for common ethical criteria is a fruitless exercise, for only reason can show 
us that the conflict between persons who hold opposing moral views is in fact a relationship 
between one who is correct in his or her moral beliefs and one who is mistaken. The problem with 
Milbank's thesis is that, even if he is correct in his stance that moral principles such as justice are 
rooted in the Jewish/Christian tradition, and cannot be transplanted to other traditions, we can in 
fact have no way of judging whether this is so or otherwise, if we reject human reason as a means 
of scrutinizing this issue. The claim that any tradition [for example, Hinduism] is devoid of any 
moral principle founded on reason, [for example, justice] is dependent on some other argument 
based on human reason, which is capable of sustaining the claim. I shall argue, however, that 
Milbank is mistaken, and that it is by no means the case that "the literate" acknowledge the 
impossibility of founding justice in human reason. I shall not attempt the task of demonstrating that 
any specific moral ideal, such as justice, is equally and commensurably present in the religions, 
but rather, the alternative task of demonstrating that it would in fact be impossible for Milbank, 
or anyone else, to substantiate the assertion that justice or any other principle is not found in the 
traditions in their "authentic" and "uncontaminated" forms, without recourse to human reason in 
some form, to ground such an assertion. It is necessary to demonstrate that moral ideals can be 
founded in and scrutinized by human reason, in order that, in inter-faith dialogue, the religions 
may be able to thresh out precisely how far, in what ways, and with what degree of 
commensurability, these ideals do in fact appear in the faiths. 
it is worth noting that several other theologians hold what we may consider to be rather more 
optimistic views regarding both the present affirmation of the importance of human rights among 
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the religions, and the potential of this sphere as a future meeting point among them. It is the view 
of R. Traer that, 
". .. it is clear that among those who affirm human rights there is 
considerable agreement as to both thefiindamental importance of 
human rights in the modern world and the content of human 
rights ... faith in human rights is not merely international but 
interreligious. " 12. 
The Latin American theologian, Jon Sobrino is in agreement that we may discern a nucleus of 
liberating capacity in the sacred scriptures of all the major faiths, although he believes that this 
central issue must be given greater emphasis in the world we live in today. 
D- 
... By reason of their sacred writings and history, the Abrahmnic 
religions can claim an essential liberating capacity. 7his is 
certainly clear in Christianity and Judaism, at least in its Old 
Testament form, but also in Islam, as modern Muslim exegesis 
attests ... In India I heard an exegesis of certain sacred Scriptures 
of Asian religions in which social criticism and the ideal means 
for social transfonnation, that is, liberation, are central. Without 
wishing to overgeneralize, I believe that liberation is central to the 
sacred writings of the religions, although in differentforms and 
degrees, and is something that we must affirm and emphasize 
nowaddys. " 13. 
Sobrino, gives substance to the meaning of "human liberation" by his definition of the idea as, 
"... that which frees the poor from the proximity of death and 
encourages them to live ... from a religiousperspective ... liberation 
is more than freedom from socioeconomic oppression; but we 
cannot call a religion liberating, in today's world, unless, in some 
way, itfosters this kind of liberation. " 14. 
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William Burrows also views the concern for human rights as a futuristic possibility for a meeting 
point among the faiths, rather than a present reality. Burrows distances himself from the Christian 
orthodoxy / post-Enlightenment debate and the attendant issues related to orthodoxy and 
orthopraxy by adopting a different stance towards the derivation of such concerns. He suggests 
that the primacy and emphasis accorded to human rights by liberation theologians constitutes a 
fairly radical reappraisal within the religious traditions of their central preoccupations. 15. He 
states that, historically, the faiths have not demonstrated an overriding concern to redress the 
structural ills of society, which is in alignment with Hick's belief that it would be anachronistic 
to suppose that Christianity or any other tradition should have sought to overturn social orders 
that, in the historical situations in which they have developed, seemed to be fixed and immutable. 
For this reason, Burrows is probably right in stating that a preoccupation with human liberation, 
as a future goal of the religions, "says more about the openness of the great traditions to radical 
reinterpretation and reorientation than it does about liberation as a central motif in their classical 
constitution. " 16. This is not to say, however, that the notion of human liberation is 
incommensurable within the spectrum of religions, for, "the very fact that we are able to discuss 
the issue in some sort of logical fashion reveals a basis for comparison and, therefore, 
commensurability. 17 How far these theologians are justified in believing that it is possible to give 
greater definition to the ideas of liberation and human rights, and therefore to examine more 
explicitly their commensurability within the faiths, we will discuss in the next section. 
2. The level of generalfty expressed in the ideas of "Human Rights" and "'Universal Moral 
Principles". links between Religious and Secular Moral Philosoph . 
To recap, the suggestion has been that the level of generality expressed in the ideas of "human 
rights", and "universal moral principles" is so great that the ideas themselves are rendered morally 
vacuous. We should have no hesitation, I believe, in making some concessions to this point, but 
what is interesting is why this should be so. That there should be a high level of generality in far- 
reaching statements of human morality is a function of their absolute character and universal 
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application. Certainly, it must be conceded that it is when we move from the general to the 
particular that problems arise. To use a simple example from individual morality, it is easy to 
obtain a consensus about the sanctity of human life; the moral principle "thou shalt not kill" is 
accepted by the world faiths and by secular humanists alike and is usually enshrined in human law. 
It is true that theoretical and general moral principles of this kind often fail to arouse strong 
feelings of moral approbation or disapprobation, for they seem to be so obvious as to be morally 
vacuous. It is when we apply them to specific contemporary issues that they are found to be of 
little value; our supposed "universal agreement" rapidly disintegrates in the face of human 
dilemmas concerning abortion, voluntary euthanasia, killing in wartime and a host of issues 
centring on modern medical technology, with which we have only just begun to be confronted. 
Why should this be so? The answer must in part lie in the fact that the world faiths, growing up 
in particular historical and cultural conditions, are simply not able to provide us with easy and 
obvious solutions to the particular moral problems with which we are faced today. Where 
Unristianity is concerned, this problem is emphasized by Jesus' own eschatology, which strongly 
suggests that he, and the disciples who followed him, were in imminent expectation of the ending 
of the world order as it then existed. As Albert Schweitzer has written, in relation to Christian 
ethics; 
"... Me ideal would be that Jesus should have preached religious 
truth in a form independent with any connection with any 
particular period and such that it could be taken over simply and 
easily by each succeeding generation of men. 7hat, however, he 
did not do, and no doubt there is a reason for it. We have, 
therefore, to reconcile ourselves to the fact that his religion of 
love appeared as part of a world-view which expected a speedy 
end of the world. Cothed in the ideas in which he announced it, 
we cannot make it our own. " 18. 
Here, Schweitzer states very forcibly the problem associated with what appears to have been Jesus' 
eschatology. Paradoxically, however, this need not imply the redundancy of what Hick has called 
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the "Golden Rule" as a general principle, provided it is clearly understood as being only a starting 
point. Far from being vacuous or insignificant, Hick believes the general principle of goodwill, 
compassion and concern for others is morally unassailable and, if adhered to, would have 
overwhelmingly significant consequences. He writes of, 
"... the utterly basic principle that it is evil to cause suffering to 
others and good to benefit others and to alleviate or prevent their 
sufferings. Ihis is so fundamental and universally accepted a 
principle that it is seldomformulated. And yet if all hwnan beings 
lived in accordance with it, there would be no wars, no injustice, 
no crime, no needless suffering. " 19. 
There would be nothing insignificant or vacuous about the consequences of a universal 
commitment to moral principles. But what is clearly essential, given the reality of a lapse of almost 
two thousand years since the historical life of Jesus, and similar or greater time lapses since the 
foundation of other faiths, is an absolute moral obligation to use very human endeavour to apply 
basic principles to present day circumstances and present day moral issues, in the knowledge that 
fundamental principles are only a starting point, and that there is a clear need to redefine moral 
principles in the modern context. Hick also reminds us that, 
"... 7he love commandment of the Sermon on the Mount by itsetf, 
without the insistentprompting of hwnanist and rationalist voices, 
did not end slavery and has not ended exploitation. " 20. 
He reminds us that Christianity cannot be credited with the achievement of a general trend towards 
a more just and egalitarian world, outside the context of the wider human endeavour towards this, 
associated with the notion of "modem liberal ethics. " For this reason, it seems by no means 
inappropriate for the religions to draw upon the insights of modern moral philosophy in their quest 
to establish common ethical principles. In a religiously plural world, the increasing awareness of 
the traditions of each others' moral values has inevitably weakened the constraints of historical 
ignorance, nor, if the religions wish to claim relevance for their particular world-views, should 
they distance themselves from dialogue with modernity. The idea I wish to explore, in dialogue 
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with moral philosophy, is that it is by no means the case that it is impossible to found the ideals 
of freedom and justice in universal human reason, and that the insights of moral philosophy may 
be valuable in redefining and clarifying traditional religious perspectives. This will be done with 
reference to recent contributions to religious and moral philosophy, by Jeffrey Reiman and Gordon 
Kaufman. Equally, it will be necessary to examine the very influential views of those who refute 
the notion of grounding morality in human reason; here I will examine specifically the more recent 
work of Alasdair MacIntyre. If it is possible to establish a viable argument for the existence of 
a realist moral philosophy, this will provide a means of refuting Milbank's belief, as stated above, 
that it is impossible to ground morality in human reason and that inter-faith dialogue on such 
issues is a fruitless exercise. [It will not answer the question of how far moral ideals such as 
justice do in fact exist in the religions, or how far they are commensurable, but if successful, it 
will demonstrate the usefulness of continued inter-faith dialogue as regards these issues. ] 
In examining the work of both Reiman and Kaufman, one may discern a continuum of the 
monumental influence of Kantian ethics in illuminating the significance of persons as free moral 
agents. Kauftnan emphasises this point in his recent work, In Face of Mystery: A Constructiv 
TheoLoU in the context of the relationship between individual and collective ethics; 
a ... persons - asfree and responsible agents and thus 
in important 
respects seV-detemining and with projects of their own - should 
never be dealt with as mere "things", mere instruments for the 
purpose of others; they are always entitled to special respect. " 21. 
Further he writes, 
"... But we are trulyfree and responsible [that is, agents] only to 
the extent and in the respect that we legislate for ourselves truly 
universal laws, and act in accordance with those laws; that is only 
as we take responsibility for universal concerns, not merely our 
own interests or desires. " 22. 
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Kaufman places emphasis upon the concept of justice as a profoundly basic and absolute principle 
that functions within our linguistic structure as an "idealizing symbol. " The major task of his most 
recent theological enterprise '[which is, howeverp very much an extension and elaboration of his 
earlier thinking] is to attempt to give an historicist reconstruction to certain religious/linguistic 
symbols which, he believes, have become irrelevant and meaningless to persons as they find 
themselves in their present context. Within Kaufman's thinking, the symbols of Truth, Justice, 
Equality and Freedom are grouped together with the symbol of God, as those which, within our 
culture, have given value and meaning to our lives, despite our awareness of the limitation and 
inadequacy of the linguistic structure themselves to encapsulate the fullness of the underlying 
concepts. 23. However, Kaufman believes that is the modern era, many people have become 
alienated from the symbolic concept of God; he questions what the concept itself can mean to 
people, in the light of intense suffering, both human and ecological, for, with liberation 
theologians, he acknowledges that Christian and other religious communities have been responsible 
for much of this suffering. Human alienation from the concept of God is explicable, in the light 
of this suffering, therefore, a reconstruction of Christian concepts is a vital necessity, if they are 
to be retrieved from a pit of meaninglessness. His work is a construction of Christian theology as 
an imaLyinative construction, for he believes human creativity and imaginative thought processes 
play an integral part in the theological enterprise, because ultimately, the meaning of human life 
is beyond our comprehension and the focus of the study, God, is profound mystery. This approach 
to theology is in marked contrast with the conception of theology as the exposition of doctrine 
deriving from authoritative sources, and may certainly be considered an anthropological approach. 
In many respects, this most recent contribution to theological thinking in relation to ethical 
concepts such as that of justice is in alignment with Jeffrey Reiman's work on this issue, in Justice 
and Modern Moral Philosophy. Reiman holds a naturalistic world-view, but also emphasises the 
centrality of the concept of justice, rooted in the notion of the non-subjugation of persons and in 
alignment with Kant's view of the universality of the moral imperative. 24. Reiman outlines a 
theory which views the notion of justice as a fundamental moral principle underpinning a realist 
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conception of justice. This is commensurate with the social contract theory of justice in moral 
philosophy, which has developed from Hobbes and Locke, to Kant, Rawls and beyond. The social 
contract theory of justice, in its suggestion that there are moral demands arising from this 
hypothetical contract which are rationally binding on all, is capable, according to Reiman,, of 
overcoming the doubts of those who deny the possibility of establishing any moral principles as 
true and valid beyond reasonable doubt. 25. 
Reiman believes the crucial problem for moral philosophy is to distinguish between might and 
right; to demonstrate that certain moral judgements should override others, not simply because 
they are able to do so, through sheer force of numbers or strength of conviction, but because they 
are rooted in a basis of rationality which entails that they ought to do so. The principle of justice 
is viewed by Reiman as the fundamental moral principle by which we are able to identify and 
therefore eliminate the threat of subjugation of the individual. Subjugation is the term he uses of to 
characterize any case in which the judgement of one person prevails over the contrary judgement 
of another simply because it can and thus without adequate justification for believing that it 
should. " 26. Justice is singled out by Reiman as the fundamental moral principle, having primacy 
over all others, not because it is a "higher" moral ideal but because it functions to determine what 
is permissible or impermissible in relation to other moral beliefs; "its task is to determine the 
things that can be done in the name of other moral beliefs ... justice polices the border 
between 
might and right. " 2 7. 
If the principle of justice is attained by eliminating the conditions of subjugation, we must, 
according to Reiman, turn to reason as the only means available to us to refute the suspicion of 
subjugation, for reason is an absolute requirement for us to arrive at knowledge of the conditions 
of subjugation and thereby to eliminate them. Therefore, the fate of justice is dependent on the 
authority which derives from human reason. 28. Reiman is aware of the challenges made to this 
concept of reason in twentieth century philosophy, but responds that, if we reject reason as a 
Ineans, of distinguishing what we should believe from what we do believe, there is simply no other 
means available to us, and we are pushed into the unsatisfactory position of conceding that what 
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we do believe derives from faith or feeling, custom or convention, intuition or mere whim. 29. 
For many people, this is an intellectually unsatisfactory position; it requires that we should not 
easily dismiss the task of seeking to ground morality in reason. If we value the moral principle 
of justice as the antithesis of subjugation, we are obliged to concede that the fate of justice is 
dependent on the authority which only derives from reason. 
Only reason gives us the requirements of justice, not just formally but substantively. The formal 
requirement is rooted in the principle of universal izabil ity, that if I state that something is true and 
valid in one situation, I must, to avoid logical contradiction, affirm that it is true and valid in 
analogously similar situations. However, this is insufficient as a moral requirement; it is merely 
a logical requirement rooted in the principle of non-contradiction. A person who asserts that a 
bachelor is a married man violates the principle of non-contradiction, but we would not thereby 
call him or her an unjus person in any sense, and certainly not in the sense that we would call a 
murderer or a rapist an unjust person. Something more fundamental than a logical requirement is 
called for, to ground a moral requirement. The substantive approach must be grounded in an 
acceptance of some fact or facts whose very nature implies that justice is an absolute and universal 
requirement. Reiman singles out the facts of human subjectivity, the fact that human beings care 
about their lives and the conditions of them in an absolute and ultimate way [what Tillich would 
call "ultimate concern"] to ground the absolute requirement of justice. He affirms the absolute 
status of human subjectivity; 
"... what it is like tb be a subject is to occupy, in the first person., 
a practical partisan attitude. A subject does not just have this 
attitude. Subjectivity is the inhabiting of that attitude. It occurs 
and can only be grasped in thefirstperson. Accordingly, to know 
subjectivities other than one's own, observation alone will not do. 
One must identify with them. " 30. 
To identify with human subjectivity requires more than empathy, it is an act of cognitive choice. 
The link between the act of cognitive choice and its grounding in reason is the notion of 
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ii- In maxU=ing coherence by rational thought, which Reiman attributes to Gilbert Harman. 31 
order to maximize the coherence of his or her beliefs about the world, the rational thinker 
recognizes that other human subjects have identical concerns about the conditions of their lives as 
he or she has, and this recognition can only be brought about by identifying with them. 32. In this 
way, 
ff reason is brought to see what I think is the simple truth of 
morality - namely, that the fact that human beings care about 
their mortal lives in the way that they do is reason enough to 
allow them, each and all, to make the best of them. Recognizing 
this truth is discovering that reason requires human beings to 
refrain ftom subjugating one another. " 33. 
The theses of Kauftnan and Reiman differ in that one derives from a "religious" and one from a 
"secular" world-view, however, they are in fundamental agreement in several respects. Firstly, 
they are rooted in a Kantian philosophical framework which underlines the universality of a 
principle such as justice and claims that it is grounded in human reason. Secondly, they view the 
concept of justice as an absolute moral principle which emphasises individualism rather than 
collectivism. However, implicit in this realist view of morality is a commitment to the belief that 
human beings are capable of transcending the limitations of particularist societal allegiances; 
cognition and morality are in some sense autonomous and human beings are capable of formulating 
and abiding by principles that have universal application beyond what is specific to particular 
traditions. Hence, a wedge is driven between the apparently opposing theses of individualism and 
collectivism. 
In these respect they provide an alternative to the views of those who in recent times have argued 
that morality itself is "tradition specific" and that the present state of moral disorder is attributable 
to the modern emphasis upon individual rather than collective rights, when, in reality no such 
rights can be discerned with recourse to universal human reason. A formidable proponent of this 
view is Alasdair Maclntyre, in After Virtue. A Study in Moral Thtary, and in his more recent 
work, Whose Justice? Which Rationalily?, It is MacIntyre's contention that it is erroneous to view 
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the self as a free-floating agent, outside specific social contexts, and that the modem view of "self" 
is peculiarly the product of a process of historical and cultural transformation, that can be traced 
back to the failure of the Enlightenment project to justify morality in human reason. It is his belief 
that the central characteristics of modem society are individualism and collectivism: these 
characteristics are, superficially, in tension with one another, but, ultimately and paradoxically, 
are also mutually sustaining, for the so-called "freedom" of individual behaviour is enmeshed in 
a web of bureaucratic controls. Ultimately, according to MacIntyre, a view of morality which 
purports to be rooted in human autonomy and human individualism is as tradition-specific as any 
other. 
According to MacIntyre's thesis in After Virtue, key episodes in the social history of Europe, 
specifically, the Enlightenment, have contributed to a process of historical transformation which 
has culminated in the present situation in which "emotivism" has emerged as the dominant moral 
norm. He claims that emotivism asserts that, "... there are and can be no valid rational 
justification for any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist and hence that 
there are no such standards. " 34. The Enlightenment project of justifying morality in human 
rationality, which MacIntyre associates with Kiergaard, Kant, Diderot and Hume, was, he claims, 
as tradition specific as any other. Despite its rejection of Christian theology, it was rooted in a 
teleological framework in which God, freedom and happiness as the culmination of virtue was, 
pervasively, the norm of the moral environment. Given that this was a particul moral 
environment, as historically and culturally specific as any other, the Enlightenment project must 
inevitably fail, for there are no "timeless truths of reason. " 
By contrast, Kaufman, for whom the acknowledgement of historical and contextual significance 
in all philosophical thinking is axiomatic, nevertheless sees far greater potential in Kantian ethics 
for transcending contextual constraints. He believes Kant himself was acutely aware of the 
historical process in which religious and societal institutions are created, but believed his own time 
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was a critical period, a "coming of age" in terms of human self-awareness of the nature and 
Potential of individual freedom and responsibility. It is Kaufman's belief that, 
N it is possible, thus, to connect his [Kant's] views directly with 
a historicistic understanding of moral responsibility and 
fteedom... an understanding in which the essential priority of 
history and society over the individual is recognized, but in which 
it is also recognized that the flowering of human history is to be 
seen in the emergence offree and responsible women and men in 
well-ordered communities ofpeace and justice. " 35. 
MacIntyre, however, rejects the central thrust of Kant's thinking, which is to view morality as 
grounded in human reason, autonomous, and the basis for the postulation of God's existence. For 
MacIntyre, misguided notions of human freedom are characteristic of the moral climate of modem 
society, in which the moral agent sees himself or herself as freed from the constraints of realising 
his or her "telos" within a hierarchical structure. Hence the emergence of the individual who 
believes himself or herself to be autonomous in moral authority, the "emotivist" self. The deep 
disorder of the language and practice of morality is, he believes, attributable to the modem 
individualistic view of self; moral utterances and moral practices are rootless in modem society. 
36. 
In After Virtue his claim is that the unity of selthood is best understood within the concept of a 
personal narrative, embedded within the context of defined social roles which give moral 
particularity to the individual quest for the good life. 
we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a 
particular social identity. I am someone's son or daughter, 
someone else's cousin or uncle; I am citizen of this or that city, 
a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan., 
that tribe, this nation.. . these constitute the given of my life, my 
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moral starting point. this is in part what gives my life its own 
moral particularity. "37 
His claim is that, 11 ... this thought is likely to appear alien and even surprisingfrom the standpoint 
Of modern individualism. From the standpoint of modern individualism I am what I myself choose 
to be. " 38. 
MacIntyre's suggestion seems to be that the notion of moral autonomy within a social structure 
which emphasises the priority of the individual presupposes acceptance of the view that there are, 
and can be, no objective moral standards. This is not necessarily so. In creating a sharp 
dichotomy between the "emotivist self' and the "narrative self' he oversimplifies what may 
actually occur when persons make moral judgements. Persons who see themselves as free moral 
agents do not necessarily see themselves as thereby detached from the social roles and character 
traits that are embedded in the concept of a "narrative self', indeed, they may acknowledge that 
personhood and identity are intrinsically bound up with such matters. In modem society the 
individual, while seeing himself or herself as able to exercise choice in moral judgements, may 
attempt to choose on the basis that morality must be rational, impartial, and must conform to the 
principle of non-subjugation of persons, so that a fair and consistent social order of morality could, 
at least in theory, eventually emerge. It is MacIntyre's view that "the form of moral utterance 
provides a mask for almost any face. " 39. This verges on a parody of what issues are involved 
in making moral choices. He gives examples of contemporary moral disagreements, such as that 
which exists between the committed pacifist and his or her moral opponent, who would argue that 
in order to avoid war it is essential to deter aggressors with the threat of violent action, and, if 
necessary, be prepared to wage war on a scale which can have no predetermined limits. 40. 
Despite their opposing views it may be very far from true to say that the pacifist and the non- 
pacifist are involved in making moral choices on the basis of emotivism, as defined by him. 
Neither would it be true to say claim that any specific religious tradition provides such overriding 
guidelines on this issue, as to command a moral consensus. But what MacIntyre seems to 
overlook, in citing this and other examples of moral disagreement, is that these need not be issues 
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of exclusive disjunction. If persons did not attempt to subjugate one another, the problem of war 
simply would not arise. 
As Hick has written of the principle that it is evil to cause harm to others and good to benefit 
them; "... this is so fundamental and universally accepted a principle that it is seldom formulated. 
And yet if all human beings lived in accordance with it there would be no wars, no injustice, no 
crime, no needless suffering. " 41. 
Simple and idealistic as is this notion of Hick's. it is appropriate that it should be so if the issue 
in question is one of moral realism and the possibility, or otherwise, of the existence of moral 
nl%s Ab olutes within a Kantian philosophical framework. I would contend that the principle of non- 
subjugation of persons is capable, at least in theory, of transcending what MacIntyre believes to 
be the historical and cultural specificity of moral norms, and providing a useful basis for enquiry 
in moral debate. In citing examples of moral disagreement MacIntyre certainly draws our attention 
to the fact that there is no universally acceptable platform from which such disagreements can 
easily be solved. However, this is logically different from saying they are therefore impossible to 
solve. 
MacIntyre's thinking, in After Virtue and in Whose Justice? Which Rationalijy? is rooted in the 
notion of tradition as the sustainer of good practice; within this, the Aristotelian account of justice 
is included within the framework of "morality of the virtues". Maclntyre writes as if traditions of 
rationality exist as discrete entities, providing us with exclusive world-views. The notion of 
traditions of enquiry, where the demarcation lines between one tradition and another are sharply 
drawn, is, however, insufficiently nuanced, as pointed out by Byrne; 
"... the reality is surely that there are intellectual traditions but 
they are loose fwnilies. Individual thinkers differ in background 
beliefs, and traditions have loose, fluid boundaries, so that the 
background beliefs of those "Inside " and those "outside" these 
groupings merge at the edges - with the result that intellectual 
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exchange and the development of new ideas that resuItfrom such 
nterging is easily conceivable. " 42. 
A similar point has been made by Wokler, both in relation to Maclntyre's views about the 
Enlightenment, upon which, as stated above, much of his criticisms hinge, and in relation to the 
alleged moral deterioration of modem society. Wokler questions the existence of the Enlightenment 
as a discrete entity; according to him, the diversity of thought discernible between the mid 
Seventeenth and mid Nineteenth centuries was so great, and the tension between the thinkers so 
profound, that there can be no justification for asserting that a generic identity or common 
purpose, such as the notion of an "Enlightenment project" implies, actually existed. 43. MacIntyre, 
he believes, conceives the Enlightenment as a homogenous whole; this view fails to do justice to 
the variety and diversity of thought during a particular yet very protracted historical period, as 
Wokler suggests. It could further be argued that MacIntyre provides an over-simplistic view, 
failing to acknowledge the complexity of the process of historical change and the dynamics of 
historical development. MacIntyre seems to suggest there was a uniformity of thought regarding 
the characteristics of human nature and the moral laws which governed it, but as Wokler points 
out, philosophers other than Kant, including Hume, Turgot and Rousseau, subscribed to rather 
different views, which emphasised a developmental and evolutionary process in human history, 
with potential for good and evil. This is a point I shall return to. 
Clearly, as pointed out by Wokler, MacIntyre has been highly selective in those thinkers he 
chooses to incorporate within his notion of an Enlightenment project. The omission of Eighteenth 
century French thinkers from the "stage" of an Enlightenment project" which, according to 
MacIntyre himself, was characterized by a rejection of traditional protestant and Catholic theology, 
is a serious omission. Voltaire [in Wokler's view the "Godfather" of the Enlightenment] certainly 
springs to mind as one who exercised considerable influence over the political life of his time; his 
writings on what he saw as the moral callousness and perversion of Christian belief prevalent at 
the time, and his concern in addressing issues which were specific to the rejection of traditional 
theology, surely entitle him to be incorporated within MacIntyre's notion of the Enlightenment. 
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44. Such serious omissions undermine the credibility of the notion itself, as conceived by 
Maclntyre. 
Further, MacIntyre's notion of clearly defined traditions of enquiry is problematic, where issues 
of human moral judgement are concerned. In After Virtue he concedes that, 
"... the fact that the setf has to find its moral identity in and 
through its membershiP of communities such as those of the 
fwnily, the neighbourhood, the city and the tribe does not entail 
that the setf has to accept the moral limitation of the particularity 
of those forms of community. " 45. 
This concession that the moral starting point does not constitute an ideal moral order presupposes 
that such an order may, at least in theory, exist beyond the moral starting point. If this were not 
so, the concept of "the good" would be static and changeless, which is denied by the axioms of 
MacIntyre's thesis. Yet within his notion of clearly defined traditions of enquiry he seems to imply 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the individual's moral judgement and the theoretical 
basis of that judgement. In reality, something more complex, more nuanced and more intuitive 
may take place when human beings make moral judgements. Byrne makes this point: 
ff we know that the racial theories of Nazism are wrong by the 
violence they do to any discussible ideas ofjustified homicide. We 
judge by reference to moral realities which are to some extent 
independent of theorising. " 46. 
The implication here, is one of the existence of a core morality which transcends tradition specific 
and theoretic sources. Others interested in the same sphere of moral philosophy share this view 
of the transcendence of what may be called "intuitive moral knowledge" over moral theory. 
Adams, in Religious Ethics in a Pluralistic Socigy shares the view that the requirements of a 
common morality are not the same as the requirements of a shared ethical theory. 47. In the same 
recent publication, Stout cites the same example as Byrne, that of Nazi genocide, to illustrate the 
point that some moral truths - albeit, perhaps few - command universal acceptance without 
Page 297 
recourse to a shared ethical theory. 48. The existence of any such truths, however, implies the 
existence of a morality that transcends history, culture and tradition. 
Ultimately, the notion of sharply demarcated "traditions of enquiry" creates a strait-jacket which 
has far-reaching consequences for MacIntyre's theory of justice. His account of justice is 
entrenched within the notion of tradition as the sustainer of "good practice. " As we have seen, he 
concedes that no particular starting point, an Aristotelian one or any other, necessarily constitutes 
an ideal moral order. Therefore, presumably, practices may be the subject of critical scrutiny. But 
MacIntyre does not make this clear; he writes as if the exercise of virtue is inherently rooted in 
the worth of practices. According to him, practice is, 
.... any coherent and complex form of socially established co- 
operative human activity through which goods internal to that 
form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, thatform of activity, with the result that 
human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of 
the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. " 49. 
There is nothing here, which defines what is just, and therefore virtuous, independently of practice 
itself, therefore this analysis as it stands, seems to presuppose the intrinsic goodness of practice. 
In failing to sever the concept of justice from the performance of practice, MacIntyre pays too 
little regard to the possibility of potential evil in what, superficially, appears to be good practice. 
As pointed out by Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, "Maclntyre, Feminism and the Concept of 
Practice", heterosexuality is generally considered to be the norm, "good practice" in society, yet 
this practice contains within itself considerable potential for the subjugation of women. 50. 
MacIntyre gives insufficient attention to the roles of the participants in practice, and to subtle 
social and political aspects of supposed good practice, which might cause us to be more cautious 
in our unequivocal approbation of them. 51. The problem is inherent in MacIntyre's thesis in 
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After Virtu 
,I would suggest, because of 
his own "moral starting point"; a concept of justice 
which is rooted in and defted by, a rigid collectivism. 
However, in his more recent work, Whose Justice? Which Rationalijy? MacIntyre does concede 
that within some societies, such as that of the post-Homeric Greeks, justice may be linked to 
individualism. Justice may be 
ma disposition to give to each person, including onesetf, what 
that person deserves and to treat no one in a way incompatible 
with their deserts. " 52. 
This definition of justice entails the notion of personal desert. It is arguable, however, that in order 
to make any kind of judgement concerning desert, which MacIntyre now defines as a personal 
issue, it is first necessary to subject the supposed goodness of human practices to critical scrutiny. 
It is further arguable that, in present day society, the notion of giving to each person according 
to personal merit, is a notion which receives more widespread approbation and consensus of 
approval than has been the case historically. But if this is so, it can only have occurred because 
of changes in traditional practices [such as access to education and political life] which, in the past, 
have excluded whole sections of society. The exclusion of groups of persons from certain 
practices, on the grounds of social class, race or gender, has been the antithesis of any notion of 
individual desert. It is only because of critical appraisal of practices themselves, and consequent 
revision of what in reality is bad practice according to present human judgement, that the notion 
of personal desert makes any sense, and can flourish. "Good practice" in society, must be 
sub*ted. to human judgement in this way, if the notion of desert is to be meaningful, and this 
must entail appraisal of "what is good" within practice. 
MacIntyre makes some acknowledgement of this, in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? It remains 
his belief that each discrete tradition of enquiry has its own mode of rational justification, and that 
modern liberalism is just such another tradition of enquiry, which is unable to provide neutral 
ground from which rival traditions can be judged. There must be debate regarding problems of 
justice and practical rationality, but it is only from the perspective of his or her own tradition that 
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the individual can engage in debate both within it, and with rival and conflicting traditions. How, 
then, is the individual to proceed in this debate? According to MacIntyre, such engagement 
requires the acquisition of what he has called a "second first language", which, 
"... in turn requires a work of imagination whereby the individual 
is able to place him or herself imaginatively within the scheme of 
belief by those whose allegiance is to the rival tradition, so as to 
perceive and conceive the natural and social worlds as they 
perceive and conceive them. " 53. 
Ultimately, it appears, the individual whose perspective derives from the tradition of modem 
liberalism employs precisely the same means of judgement in relation to issues of morality and 
conceptions of justice as those outlined by Reiman. The requirements of justice are grounded in 
human reason, and reason requires that one should extrapolate beyond one's own subjectivity, and, 
recognising the identical and equal subjectivities of others, attempt to identify with them. 
As Wokler has pointed out in relation to what he believes was the wide-ranging thinking in what 
has been too sharply defined as "the Enlightemment", if any one principle characterized this period 
of intellectual development, it was the principle of toleration. For moral philosophy in the 
Eighteenth century, it did not follow that members of disparate traditions were unable to grasp the 
values of others, nor that perceived differences constituted insurmountable obstacles in debate. 
"... A cosmopolitan spirit of tolerance and goodwill would be a 
welcome antidote to the fractious fundamentalism of many 
contemporary religious movements and the all-too-persistent 
ravages of ethnic and civil wars. Yhe moral chaos of the modern 
world stems notfi-om thefailure of the Enlightenmentproject, but 
from its neglect and abandonment. " 54. 
In sympathy with this view, and extrapolating from Wokler's observation that certain 
Enlightenment thinkers adopted an evolutionary view of human development, emphasising the 
malleability of human nature and its potential for good and evil within a providential framework, 
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I believe it is possible to discern a continuum, indeed a revival of this kind of thinking, within 
both religious and "secular" spheres. Reiman's thesis is not a specifically "religious" one; he holds 
a naturalistic world-view. It is his contention, however, that what is essential to religion is the 
belief that there is something worthy of reverence, the human subject is the object of reverence 
and this is "the sacred. " 55. Similarly Kaufman writes of a "serendipitous creativity, " a creative 
cosmic force, acting as an evolutionary/historical trajectory, that has brought humanity into being 
and sustains it in being. 56. We are, he believes, biohistorical creatures; through our historical 
creativity we are far more than it is strictly necessary for us to be in strictly biological terms. He 
cites the examples of certain human acts and achievements, such as the invention of moveable type 
and the splitting of the atom, which have had far-reaching consequences for good and evil, 
consequences that were unintended in their historical time and could not have been humanly 
predicted. 57. In this way, the creative forces of history, and humans acting within history, seem 
to have a volition, a spiritual essence and dynamism intrinsic to themselves. It is within this 
conception that Kaufman wishes to locate and reconstruct the symbol ic/l inguistic concept of 
"God", in such a way that he believes will be more meaningful and relevant to humans as they 
find themselves in their present experience. 
How far this is acceptable to Christianity, is not an issue I will be able to explore here. What I 
would suggest, however, is that this kind of theological thinking contains within itself the potential 
to move us beyond what MacIntyre believes to be our present state of moral disorder. Through 
a detailed examination of the dynamics of the historical process, we are able to perceive ourselves 
as part of a cosmic framework within which, as free and responsible human agents, we have some 
control over our destiny. We are framed by the historical past, but we also have the potential, at 
least to some extent, to frame our future destiny. Kaufinan's theological reconstruction cannot lead 
us to absolute moral certainty; within this framework God is not only "serendipitous creativity" 
but "absolute mystery" and between these two concepts is the locus of faith. What is important, 
as Kauftnan points out, is the possibility of discerning in the writing of many thinkers, both 
religious and secular, 
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w.... profound moral concerns about the web of life on planet 
Earth, as well as deeply religious attitudes of awe and respectfor, 
and even love of, the magnificent cosmic order of which we are 
a part; and their open ex ression of these things encourages p 
similar attitudes in their readers. " 58. 
What we see in the work of Kaufman and Reiman, I would suggest, is a welcome revitaiization 
of Enlightenment thinking, which allows us to proceed into the future with more optimism than 
MacIntyre provides. Whether such optimism is justified is a debatable issue, and one for which 
only the future can provide answers; what is clear is that there is sufficient thinking in the sphere 
of moral philosophy to refute Milbank's contention that there is any kind of consensus to support 
the view justice cannot be founded in human reason. And if it is possible to ground the notions 
of freedom and justice in universal human reason, we can have no reason to dismiss the notion 
of enquiry into shared ethical norms among the faiths as a useful basis for inter-faith dialogue. 
It is vital that we should continue to discuss ethical concerns in inter-faith dialogue, for Milbank's 
thesis has far reaching consequences, not only in terms of the relationship between human reason 
and the apprehension of the moral virtues of justice and freedom, but in terms of what Ian 
Markham has discerned as the implications of Milbank's thinking towards increased intolerance 
and antagonism between faiths. Markham cites Milbank's essay in Christian Unigueness 
Reconsidered, in which he states that, 
regards the general furtherance of the critical 
understanding of discourses (the minimum that religions can truly 
share in common) it will be better to replace "dialogue" with 
mutual suspicion .... In the course of such a conversation, we 
should indeed expect to constantly receive Christ again, from the 
unique spiritual response of other cultures. But I do not pretend 
that this proposal means anything other than continuing the work 
of conversion" 59. 
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I would contend that it is not easy to see how Milbank's notion of a "conversation" differs from 
that of a "dialogue", but with Markham, would suggest that if it is one of mutual suspicion it can 
be of little avail in furthering tolerance and understanding of the religious and cultural diversity 
that is clearly an essential aspect of God's creation. Markham is surely correct in his judgement 
that,, "... the Milbank outlookfeeds the tribal instinct to which largeparts of the Christian narrative 
are so strongly opposed. " 60. 
Markham's own thesis in Plurality and Christian Ethics is that the best defence for tolerance in 
a pluralist society is the frmnework of a theistic, specifically Christian metaphysic, rather than the 
framework of secular anti-realism. His claim is that, 
religion is a life-transforming world perspective which affects 
every aspect of life ... at the heart of the universe is goodness and 
love enabling all to be. Ais is what we mean by God. 7heistsfind 
themselves in awe and reverence placing ultimate value on being 
at the heart of the Universe. " 61. 
In this respect, Markham's views would be in alignment with those of Kauftnan, outlined 
previously. Markham contends that a theistic world perspective, rooted in a rationality provided 
by God, who has created an intelligible universe, provides the best possibly antidote to the nihilism 
inherent in secular reason. 62. What would be interesting would be to see how he would reply to 
naturalists such as Reiman, whose secularist stance incorporates the notion of the self as "the 
sacred". 63. Within a synthesis of secular/religious ethics, Christianity would be able to contribute 
to the public debate on issues of global concern without compromising its unique world-view, and 
in the confidence to look upon plurality as a manifestation of the beauty and diversity of God's 
creation, rather than a threat from which it must defend itself. 
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3.1he Influence of Post-Enligghtemment Liberal Ethics upon the Religions: the argument against 
grounding religious theoly in a spurious Commonality of practice 
The final criticism of the soteriocentric approach to the theology of religions centres on the view 
that the notion of "soteria" must be grounded, in Christianity, in the theoretical basis of the faith, 
and cannot be severed from it. Here, the specific objection is directed towards what is conceived 
as the blurring of particular religious truth claims, by the influence of Post-Enlightenment liberal 
ethics. [As suggested by Wokler, theologians and philosophers are inclined to use the term "the 
Enlightenment" far too vaguely and broadly. For the purpose of this section I shall retain this 
terminology, since it is so widely used, although we should bear in mind that the notion of "an 
Enlightenment project" does tend to suggest a homogenous entity, which fails to do justice to the 
variety and diversity of thinking over a long period of historical change. ] 
D'Costa has argued that a "kingdom-centred" or "real ity-centred " hermeneutic must derive from 
the theoretical norms of Christianity, to avoid the objection that they are otherwise merely 
grounded in modern liberal ethics, and seriously disregard the truth content of faiths' doctrinal 
systems. 64. Here, D'Costa seems to suggest that it is both possible and necessary to make a clear 
distinction between an ethic that is grounded in a religious tradition, and one that derives from a 
secular humanist context. However, as I suggested above, no such clear distinction can be made, 
or ought to be made. The alternative suggestion, which I wish to explore, is that the close 
reciprocal relationship which exists between the ethical norms of a living faith, and the social 
reality in which it finds itself at a given time in human history, makes it both impossible and 
undesirable that we should attempt to make such a clear cut distinction. Praxis is grounded not 
only in religious theory, but is complexly enmeshed with cultural and historical moral norms. An 
anthropological approach to theological thinking in fact presupposes that, in late Twentieth Century 
Western and predominantly secular society, the norms and values held by the religious believer 
will inevitably be a complex admixture of the "purely religious" and "secular" influences of that 
society. If society influences religious thinking, and religion influences society, it may be 
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impossible to say how much statements of modem ethics derive from post-Enlightenment thinking 
and how much from the teachings and traditions of influential world faiths. But why need this 
concern us, provided that the moral and ethical norms which condition the thinker/believer are 
complementary and mutually sustaining, rather than contradictory and mutually opposed? 
The fact of social and historical conditioning of theological thinking, and an implicit acceptance 
of this, can be discerned in the work of many theologians who nevertheless hold opposing views 
in relation to the theology of religions, [and who may accept in varying degrees the fact of this 
conditioning. ] As a "representative inclusivist", D'Costa, in Christian apologetics, draws our 
attention to what he believes is Hick's misunderstanding or ignorance of the historical conditions 
which led to the formulation of the Catholic Church's "extra ecclesiam" doctrine in the Third 
Century A. D. and its retention through the Middle Ages. He writes of the historical situation of 
the Early Church, which was beset by problems of persecution and schism, and the ignorance of 
the Medieval Church which believed the known world to be " Gospel -saturated" and believed Islam 
to be a Jewish/Christian heresy, rather than an emerging world faith. 65. Implicitly, therefore, an 
understanding of the doctrine [and a defence of it] is only made possible by an understanding of 
the historical conditions which affected the Church's development and survival. What would be 
morally suspect, [if not indefensible] in today's world becomes morally explicable in its historical 
context. 
We saw in Chapter 2, that our "representative exclusivist", Lesslie Newbigin, affirms that "truth" 
and "reason" are embodied in specific historical/cultural contexts which constitute the "plausibility 
structure" of a given society. 66. [Although as I have argued, his thesis is very one-sided, for he 
fails to concede the existence of this kind of conditioning upon the Biblical witnesses, and its 
possible influence in the formulation of a supernaturalist, incarnational. interpretation of the 
historical events which are the content of Christian revelation. ] Newbigin is another theologian 
who would assert the precedence of orthodoxy over orthopraxis in relation to the theology of 
religions, however. 
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"... When we absolutize words like justice and liberation we 
remain locked in our own definition of what these words mean. 
There is nothing to stand in the way of our imperial claims. Men 
we place at the centre the one who is Lord and Judge, then we 
are on the way to the realization of a justice and freedom which 
are truly God's gifts, and a deliverance from our own imperial 
pretensions. " 6Z 
Here, by a curious sleight of hand, Newbigin attempts to root the imperialist tendencies with 
which Christianity has been accused in the radically contemporary liberative "motifs" of 
orthopraxis. It is not easy to be convinced by this argument, however, since the weight of opinion 
seems to suggest that the reverse is true. It is Knitter's belief, [with reference to the "extra 
ecelesiam" doctrine] that, "certainly it cannot be denied that in the past such doctrines and such 
christology have been used to justify the subordination and exploitation of other cultures and 
religions. " 68. Michael von Bruck holds that, 
"... 7he Roman Catholic mission since the Axteenth century and 
Protestant missions since the eighteenth have been closely bound 
up with European colonial history. 7he converts often bowed to 
the political and economic pressures of the conquerors. " 69. 
This is endorsed by Leroy Rouner, who believes that Christianity is presented with a moral and 
historical challenge in confrontation with other traditions, because; 
"... Christians have been responsible for colonising and even 
subjugating people of the 7hird World. For most Protestant 
theology of religions political and economic repentance for the 
sins of Western colonialism now also includes theological 
repentance for the sins of Western Christianity in denigrating the 
religions of the Aird World. " 70. 
None of these theologians equate missionary activity with liberative tendencies, rather the reverse 
is the case; they suggest that the motivating forces behind the missions of history were 
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predominantly orthodox, theoretical, and rooted in an exclusivist Christianity. It is important to 
note that these theologians are not necessarily suggesting that the missionaries themselves had 
anything but the best intentions and the most sincere convictions that, by engaging in missionary 
activity, they were acting in accordance with the will of God. Nevertheless, if missionary activity 
was inextricably linked with Western imperial tendencies - and the weight of opinion strongly 
suggests it was - it is not easy to be convinced by Newbigin's assertion that, "the revelation of the 
truth is a contradiction of all imperialisms. " 71. Christian mission to "reveal the truth" would 
seem both to derive from and to result in an increase of imperialist tendencies. Even more 
implausible is what seems to be the attempt on Newbigin's part to link contemporary liberative 
ideas with the motives of imperialism, as an alternative to the link which has been clearly 
discerned by several theologians between imperialism and the orthodoxy of historical Christianity. 
From a historical perspective, the juxtaposition of the notions of "liberation" and "imperialism" 
seems to be falsely conceived and contradictory. 
In support of the thesis that, in the modern world, we are beginning to see a closer reciprocal 
relationship between religious beliefs and practice and the beliefs and practice of secular society, 
Hick himself has drawn our attention to the Early Christian Church's acceptance and support for 
slavery, and the necessity for modern humanist ethics to exert an influence upon the Christian 
commandment "to love thy neighbour as thyself', [Matthew 22,39. ] before slavery was brought 
to an end. 72. The conditioning of religious thinking by external historical and sociological forces 
may be discerned, whether we are talking about the religions themselves, or examining the 
thinking of particular theologians. As D. A. Pailin has written of Barth, and others before him, 
"... What Ellis, Mansel and Barth found as the revealed "word " 
seems to readers at later times to have been noticeably influenced 
by their times. Whether or not it should be held that God reveals 
the divine nature and will in culturally relative ways so that the 
divine 'word" is relevant to the contemporary situation, it seems 
clear that even those who assert the revealed origin of all 
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authentic theology show by what they produce that other factors 
contribute to it. " 73. 
A similar point is made by Gordon Kauftnan, whose emphasis on modern historical awareness in 
relation to the theology of religions has led him to the conclusion that; 
every theological position has always been taken, and every 
claim has been made, by some particular, limited, finite, human 
being, whether named Paul of Tarsus or Yhomas Aquinas or John 
Calvin or Karl Barth. " 74. 
The examples I have cited of the conditioning of the religions and of religious thinkers by external 
factors, [and many more could be accumulated] serve to illustrate the fact that religions and 
thinkers cannot be assessed outside their historical and cultural spheres, as Hick himself concluded 
in relation to the ethical "track records" of religions, in his exercise, "On Grading Religions. " 75. 
They also indicate that in the present day, as in history, it is likely that the religions both 
influence, and are influenced by, the external sociological and cultural climate, and it is probably 
impossible to discern the dominant direction of influence. But, I reiterate, why should it be a cause 
for dismay if the central concerns of the religions are influenced by post-Enlightenment liberal 
ethics, and are perceived in the present era as being in increasingly close alignment? Should it not, 
rather, be a cause for considerable optimism? 
The Relationship between Hick's Philosophy and Theology of Religious Pluralism and 
Enlightenment Ethics: an over-view of his theological developmen 
We saw above that it is possible to discern a considerable ambivalence in the attitudes of some 
theologians towards "the Enlightenment, " in terms of its roots and its effects. I have also suggested 
that it may be necessary, according to Wokler's criticism of MacIntyre, to define what we mean 
by "an Enlightenment" rather more precisely; the term tends to be used broadly, and vaguely, by 
a varietY of thinkers who deplore its perceived influence towards secularism and indifferentism 
as undermining the distinctively religious basis of society, with insufficient regard for the variety 
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and diversity of thinking associated with a long historical period of change. Newbigin, for 
example, sees Enlightenment thinking as rooted in the Christian tradition. 
"... 7his newfaith had indeed Christian roots. It had been brought 
forth out of a Christian culture, a culture pervaded by the idea 
that every human being is of supreme dignity as made in the 
image of God ... But the new faith of the Enlightenment saw 
Christianity as merely one of the surviving traditions of which it 
had no firther need. " 76. 
D'Costa believes that; 
". -- Philosophically, such an emphasis on morality as the 
uncontroversial bridge to avoid the impasse [in judging religious 
traditions other than one's ownj... stems from an impoverished 
form ofEnlightenment natural ethics which assumes incontestable 
universal moral norms that would be adhered to by all sensible 
persons. It should also be said that such a pragmatic approach is 
sometimes suggested by those who are frankly indifferent to 
religions and essentially wish to impose a humanistic agenda 
homogeneously upon all religions. " 77. 
The problem here is that it is quite possible for the individual to affirm moral realism, [and be 
very far from indifferent to religions] while nevertheless believing that the questions posed by this 
period of historical development refuse to go away. Fundamentally, the "post-Enlightenment 
question" asks, whether a rational person is justified in affirming religious belief, without seeking 
some kind of external criteria of verification which would move the affirmation from one of belief 
to one of ascertained knowledge. Hence, the distinction between faith and knowledge, which we 
examined in detail in Chapter I in relation to Hick's philosophical theology of religious belief, is 
central to the post-Enlightenment debate. And the question of rational justification of religious 
belief is not answered, but merely moved one stage further away, in the modem era, by appealing 
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to the authority of the church, or to scriptural testimony, or to the apostolic tradition. [Newbigin-I 
Whether we like it or not, the questions posed by the Enlightenment are likely to remain with us. 
It has however been recognized that the distinction drawn in the "ages of reason" between matters 
of fact, which are capable of being verified, and matters of belief, which are not, is too sharply 
drawn. Newbigin is right to draw our attention to this, and to note that the physical sciences, 
among other fields of "objective knowledge", increasingly acknowledge the role of conjecture and 
the "leap of the imagination" which is a necessary prerequisite for the formation of scientific 
hypotheses in the first place. 78. But it was in response to the questions raised by "Enlightenment 
thinking", and in acknowledgement of the central importance of these, that Hick, in the earlier part 
of his career, devoted himself to the exploration of the rationality and intelligibility of religious 
belief, as we also saw at the beginning of this thesis. The philosophical approach he adopted was 
to focus upon the intelligibility and rationality of religious belief rather than upon proof for the 
existence of God " ipso facto. " 
"... Me question is not whether it is possible to prove, starting 
ftom zero, that God exists; the question is whether the religious 
man, given the distinctively religious form of human existence in 
which he participates, is properly entitled as a rational person to 
believe what he does believe? " 79. 
Hick, as we have seen, argued that the rational person is so entitled. 
"... It therefore seems prima facie, that the religious man is 
entitled to trust his religious experience and to proceed to conduct 
his life in terms of it. " 80. 
He has sought to defend a fact-asserting, experientially grounded account of religious belief, which 
is ultimately verifiable eschatologically. 81. But - and this is of crucial importance - he does not 
accept the validity of arguing from other peoples' experience. If the Christian believer is entitled 
to assert the veridical character of his or her religious experience, other believers from other faiths 
are equally entitled to do so. Hence the pluralist option; 
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"In establishing the rationality of the Judaic- Christian theist's 
belief in the reality of God, must it not also and equally establish 
the rationality of the Buddhist's belief, arising out of his own 
coercive religious experience, and likewise of Hindu belief and of 
Islwnic belief and so on? We need, I think, have no hesitation in 
accepting this implication. " 82. 
Hick's account of rational religious belief, as I also outlined in Chapter 1, draws not only upon 
an argument from religious experience but upon an argument for innate human knowledge of that 
which is morally good. What we seem to see in Hick's work is the priority of the idea of an 
innate human ethic. Kant, whose work has been very influential upon Hick, gave precedence to 
the idea of a "categorical ought": the traditional order is reversed and the ethic itself is the 
categorical ought. The individual moral agent is so sure of the moral position that God's existence 
is argued for as a presupposition of morality itself. Moreover, the ethical ought is capable of 
surviving the decline of the religious metaphysic which may have provided the original matrix for 
the development of the ethical conception. 
"... Ais wonderful religion with its great simplicity of statement 
has enrichedphilosophy withfar more definite and purer concepts 
than it had been able to furnish before; but which once they are 
there, are fteely assented to by Reason and are assumed as 
concepts to which it could well have come of itself and which it 
could and should have introduced. " 83. 
Here, Kant suggests that religion provides a matrix within which ethical conceptions develop 
within specific cultural and historical conditions, but that they are logically independent of the 
matrix and are capable of surviving the decline of the religious metaphysic. 
In the work of Hick, I believe, we can discern the precedence of the moral imperative, in Kantian 
terms, which has been used as the means of evaluation of particular Christian doctrines. The 
morally relevant circumstances of our far greater knowledge and awareness of other world faiths 
imposes upon us the need to reinterpret the doctrine of the Incarnation and to bring about a shift, 
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within Christianity, towards soteriocentrism or what I have called anthropocentrism. 71iis is not 
necessarily to suggest that the religious metaphysic is redundant; Mitchell is right to remind us that 
Kant's dictum developed against the background of a religious philosophical substructure. 84. 
However, with MacIntyre, and unlike Kaufman, he does not seem to envisage the possibility of 
the transcendence of Kantian ethics from their historical roots, within a framework of moral 
realism in which there is co-operation between religious and secular thinkers concerning issues of 
universal concern. What religious pluralism suggests is that this is a possibility, and that the 
environment within which this development may take place need not necessarily be exclusively 
Christian, and must have relevance to the modem context. 
Hick wrote of the Real, in An Int=retation of Religio ; 
n ethically its central theme should be the lovelcompassion to 
which all the great traditions call us; and in our sociologically 
conscious age this is likely to be increasingly a politically 
conscious and active agape / karuna which seeks to change the 
structures of society so as to promote rather than hinder the 
transformation of all human life. " 85. 
Here, he anticipates the trend of development of the pluralist theology of religions based on shared 
ethical criteria, although as we have seen in Chapter 6, other theologians, notably Paul Knitter and 
the Latin American liberation theologians Jon Sobrino and Juan Luis Segundo have gone further 
than Hick, to date, in formulating a precise agenda of common ethical concerns. Nevertheless, 
their ideas presuppose, and are implicitly dependent upon, the revision of traditional christology 
pioneered by Hick in God and the Universe of Faiths two decades ago, and they propose a 
soteriocentric centre for Christianity, in alignment with Hick's thinking in Problems of Religious 
Pluralism and in An Int=retation of Religio . 86. 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I examined in detail Hick's reasons for rejecting traditional christology, 
and proposing in its place a mythological interpretation of the doctrine of the Incarnation. While 
he raised formidable philosophical and historical objections to the doctrine as traditionally 
formulated, it is likely that his strongest reasons for rejecting it in his "Copernican days" centred 
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upon the theological issues involved, ie. the implications of the doctrine, as he saw them, for the 
salvation of non-Christians. Hick's primary objections may therefore be viewed ultimately as moral 
objections rooted in disapprobation of the Christian failure to take seriously the religious 
, W, Ljv "Perience Of Others. This is in alignment with his underlying philosophy of religious belief based 
on moral knowledge and religious experience, as outlined in Chapter 1. The subsequent 
developments in his theology of religious pluralism have reinforced the internal coherence of his 
theology as a whole; moral objections outlined in the 1970's have been further emphasised in his 
later publications. 
The Future for a Global Theology of Religions based on shared Ethical Criteria 
What is vital is that the religions, rather than debating the origins of liberal ethics, move to the 
forefront of the human endeavour to promote human rights and to combat injustice, oppression 
and conflict based on differences of race and belief - and should be seen to be doing so. 
Braybrooke notes, in his introduction in Stoping Stones to a Global Ethic that, "Manypeople are 
disillusioned with religions and are not willing to base their behaviour on the teaching of a 
particular religious tradition. " 87 It is the claim of the religions that the goals of peace, justice 
and human rights derive from their teaching, although I have argued that today these ideals are 
complexly enmeshed with modem liberal ethics, and cannot be ascribed to the religions alone. But 
it is possible that, to the ordinary person, the religions of the world are held at least partially 
accountable for the failure to promote peace and to combat injustice, and this may be one of the 
root causes of the disaffection Braybrooke suggests. Extracts from the World Conferences on 
Religion and Peace, cited by Braybrooke, indicate that the religions themselves have begun to be 
aware of this and to be increasingly self-critical in these respects. 
".... We believe that the political, economic, social and even 
religious institutions created by man are... in need of 
transformation ... What is imperative, therefore, is not the total 
rejection of traditional values but an honest and critical 
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examination of them to separate the essentialfrom the accretions 
of time. " 88. 
At the same World Conference on Religion and Peace, held at Kyoto, Japan in 1970, it was 
declared; 
". - -In order to restore credence in the moral and ethical authority 
of religion, the religious leaders of the world will have to take 
much more active and positive leadership in a continuous effort 
for creating effective awareness of hwnan rights and their 
promotion at all levels. " 89. 
Four years later, at Louvain, Belgium, it was conceded by the World Conference that, 
". - -Often religious groups and institutions have been sidetracked 
ftom their real aim to become ideological instrumentsperpetuating 
unjust structures. Religion will be credible in the modern world to 
the extent that it risks its own security in promoting integral 
human development. " 90. 
Further, at the fourth Assembly of the World Conference at Nairobi, Kenya, in 1984, [and almost 
in Hickian terminologyj 
"... We have become aware of much that binds us together. 
Ultimate reality is infinite, while our ways of describing and 
understanding it are necessarilyfinite, so we have learned that we 
must listen with respect and humility while others worship or 
describe their spiritual experience ... We cannot wait until all 
outstanding differences are settled before turning to such questions 
as war, poverty, racism, injustice and oppression. " 91. 
These statements of self-criticism from the World Conferences on Peace and Religion, as much 
as the areas of consensus which seem to be emerging, may be seen as signs of hope that the 
religions have the potential to move to the forefront in issues of global concern, alongside 
humanists and rationalists, without jealously claiming the right, to which they are not entitled, to 
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have a monopoly of interest in these matters. It is vital for the distinctively religious world view, 
and for the survival of the faiths themselves, that they should succeed in doing so. As Thomas 
Hardy wrote in 1878, 
"... Hwnan beings, in their generous endeavour to construct a 
hypothesis that shall not degrade a first cause, have always 
hesitated to conceive a dominant power of lower moral quality 
than their own; and, even while they sit down and weep by the 
waters of Babylon, invent excuses for the oppression which 
prompts their tears. " 92. 
This thesis is an attempt, not to invent excuses for the "first cause", but to affirm that our 
anthropological orientation towards the religious reality of this moral authority obliges us, before 
all else, to "seek first the Kingdom. " In doing so, it may be both necessary and appropriate, in 
the present era, to seek for greater links between secular and religious world views, as far as 
ethical issues are concerned. With Hick, however, one may still differentiate between the two 
categories in affirming the validity of religious experience, and awareness of a transcendental 
"Other", beyond the limitations of this present existence. 
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